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Typically, copyright lawyers around the nation look to the Second Circuit, presiding over New York City, and the Ninth Circuit, similarly moderating Los Angeles, for pivotal intellectual property legal decisions. On January 12, 2026, however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit released an opinion that has upended seemingly settled music publishing principles.[1]<\/a> Donald Passman\u2019s textbook \u201cAll You Need to Know About the Music Business\u201d, a source read by aspiring music industry professionals, describes termination rights as:<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n One of the best goodies that creators got in the 1976 Copyright Law is the right of termination. The termination provisions say that even if you make a bonehead deal, the copyright law will give you a second shot\u2014thirty-five years later. In other words, thirty-five years after a transfer, you can get your copyright back. By the way, this termination is only for the U.S. copyright. You\u2019re stuck with whatever deal you made for the rest of the world. As it happens, the United States is the only country where you get a do-over.[2]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Domestic-only reversion is a presumption that the music industry for decades has abided by per the Berne Convention, Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.<\/em>, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner Chappell Music, Inc.<\/em>, and Clancy v. Jack Ryan Enterprises, Ltd<\/em>.[3]<\/a> Given the general understanding and relevant case law, it was bewildering to see the Fifth Circuit come to the exact opposite conclusion.[4]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Case History<\/p>\n Vetter v. Resnik\u2019s<\/em> history begins with Cyril Vetter and Don Smith\u2019s creation of the song \u201cDouble Shot\u201d in 1962.[5]<\/a> The next year, they assigned 100% of the copyright interests to Windsong Music Publishers for $1.[6]<\/a> \u201cThe 1963 Assignment included \u2018a transfer of the exclusive rights to Double Shot throughout the world for the full term of copyright protection, including a contingent assignment of all renewal period rights under the [Copyright Act of 1909].\u2019\u201d[7]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n In 1972, Smith died before the renewal term began and his heirs were assigned the renewal rights, not Windsong.[8]<\/a> Vetter, on the other hand, was still alive at the renewal term, so Windsong received those renewal rights.[9]<\/a> In 1996, Vetter Communications Corporation purchased the 50% interest that had previously been owned by Smith\u2019s heirs.[10]<\/a> Meanwhile, with its remaining 50% interest, Windsong transferred half to Lyresong Music Inc., maintaining 25% for itself.[11]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 304(c), Vetter submitted a termination notice to Windsong and Lyresong in 2019 to recapture 100% of the song\u2019s rights.[12]<\/a> \u201cThe notice of termination informed Windsong and Lyresong that Vetter was terminating \u2018all authorship\/ownership rights originally granted and conveyed by [Vetter] to [Windsong]\u2019 under the 1963 Assignment as of May 3, 2022.\u201d[13]<\/a> However, by then, Windsong had transferred its remaining 25% of \u201cDouble Shot\u2019s\u201d assets to Robert Resnik.[14]<\/a> Upon the effective date of termination under the 2019 notice, Vetter assumed he owned 100% of the rights. Later that year, American Broadcasting Companies (\u201cABC\u201d) attempted to expand the song\u2019s license on a television show worldwide<\/em> under the assumption that Vetter was the \u201csole and exclusive owner\u201d.[15]<\/a> Then, ABC was notified that Resnik still claimed 25% interest in foreign territories and that Vetter\u2019s reclaimed interests were only valid in the United States.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Legal Issue<\/p>\n On September 27, 2023, Vetter filed a declaratory judgment action in Louisiana federal court to address whether he was the sole owner of the \u201cDouble Shot\u201d rights worldwide.[17]<\/a> After a motion for summary judgment in Vetter\u2019s favor, Resnik appealed to the Fifth Circuit.[18]<\/a> The court highlighted language in 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 304 (c)(6)(E): \u201cTermination of a grant under this subsection affects only those rights covered by the grant that arise under this title, and in no way affects rights arising under any other Federal, State, or foreign laws\u201d.[19]<\/a> The court determined that \u201carise under this title\u201d referred to the copyrights originating in U.S. law, regardless of where they were exploited.[20]<\/a> Vetter cited Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.<\/em> to argue \u201cthere is a presumption that \u2018under this title\u2019 lacks geographical significance when used in the Copyright Act.\u201d[21]<\/a> Additionally, Vetter pointed to legislative intent where House Report No. 94-1476 dictated that \u201c[u]nder the bill, termination means that ownership of the rights covered by the terminated grant reverts to everyone who owns termination interests on the date the notice of termination was served.\u201d[22]<\/a> Ultimately, the court suggested that all rights are governed by the U.S. Copyright Act and termination is a mere reallocation extending internationally.[23]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n However, many industry professionals do not share the viewpoint that international copyright interests arise under U.S. law.[24]<\/a> In Article 5 of the Berne Convention, the concept of national treatment maintains that:<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n (3) Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law. However, when the author is not a national of the country of origin of the work for which he is protected under this Convention, he shall enjoy in that country the same rights as national authors.[25]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Music publishers have understood this to create \u201cmultiple and separate interests\u201d that arise under each country\u2019s domestic law, and, therefore, the rights that arise under foreign law would not be included in a termination reversion.[26]<\/a> Even Donald Passman said, \u201cRemember, as we discussed previously, this termination only applies to U.S. rights. If you sold your copyright in foreign territories, Quel dommage.\u201d[27]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Conversely, the Fifth Circuit contends that prior authorities do not remain persuasive including Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.<\/em>, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner\/Chappell Music, Inc.<\/em>, and Clancy v. Jack Ryan Enterprises, Ltd<\/em>.[28]<\/a> All three out-of-circuit cases hold that \u201ctermination under section 304(c) only recaptures domestic rights in a work.\u201d[29]<\/a> Cited within these opinions are quotes from Professor David Nimmer\u2019s and Professor William Patry\u2019s treatises\u2014two highly regarded sources for copyright law intricacies\u2014which the Fifth Circuit also finds unpersuasive.[30]<\/a> Resnik argues that the Fifth Circuit would be violating territoriality principles under the Berne Convention and Universal Copyright Convention by recognizing rights as a single interest that each foreign country needs to honor.[31]<\/a> However, Vetter replied that the presumption against extraterritoriality is only an issue in copyright infringement rather than in recognition of copyright ownership.[32]<\/a> Here, instead of wrongfully imputing U.S. infringement laws on foreign countries, the court maintains that worldwide interest reclamation is solely a consequence of the U.S. termination right.[33]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Inconsistencies<\/p>\n Congressional intent does not seem to be as clear as the Fifth Circuit makes it out to be. Resnik quotes the Staff of House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Congress, Supplementary Report, explaining that the language \u201carising under . . . foreign laws\u201d was meant \u201cto ensure that \u2018termination affects only those rights arising under the U.S. copyright statute and has no effect, for example, on foreign rights that are covered by the same contract.’\u201d[34]<\/a> The court agrees with Vetter and dismisses Resnik\u2019s point, stating that the ambiguous phrase, \u201cunder this title\u201d needed to be determined through context.[35]<\/a> Vetter instead quotes Kirtsaeng<\/em> and a less concrete statement from House Report No. 94-1476 as rebuttal: \u201c[u]nder the bill, termination means that ownership of the rights covered by the terminated grant reverts to everyone who owns termination interests on the date the notice of termination was served.\u201d[36]<\/a> Nevertheless, the mention of foreign law in Section 304(c)(6)(E) leaves one to assume that the option for copyrights to arise under a foreign law does exist.[37]<\/a> Not to mention, Kirtsaeng<\/em> is about an affirmative defense to infringement, not ownership.[38]<\/a> Recall that this was Vetter\u2019s exact argument for dismissing the presumption of extraterritoriality.[39]<\/a> The court declined to acknowledge the relevance of the Supplementary Report without offering an explanation (even though congressional intent does give contextual evidence).[40]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Takeaways<\/p>\n Contrary to Siegel <\/em>and Patry<\/em> indicating that \u00a7304(c)(6)(E) is clearly written, there is no universal clarification under the Copyright Act.[41]<\/a> While either interpretation is permissible, what matters most is the persuasive legal basis for choosing that analysis. The Ninth and Second Circuits are spotlight copyright jurisdictions, so while refusing to follow Siegel<\/em> and Fred Ahlert<\/em> is permissible, the decision is questionable given both are established precedents. On the other hand, when considering congressional intent, it would be hard to imagine that the Senate did not intend for foreign rights to be included when allowing a \u201csecond chance at fair remuneration\u201d.[42]<\/a> Accordingly, foreign rights can comprise more than 70% of royalties depending on the artist.[43]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Conversely, just because ownership is not explicitly mentioned in extraterritoriality principles, does not mean it should not fall under similar rules as infringement.[44]<\/a> Foreign countries have been operating under the assumption that when a U.S. artist decides to expand their rights, those exploitations are officially forfeited. These jurisdictions may feel the U.S. is overstepping their boundaries by suddenly deciding to take back what they already signed over.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n While Vetter<\/em> may seem like a win for artists, there is no telling what the international implications may be. As the Berne Convention is a non-self-executing treaty, the United States is free to interpret the provisions as it sees fit.[45]<\/a> However, the Fifth Circuit has now created a circuit split and deviates from any other appeals court that has heard cases on the question of foreign versus domestic copyright termination rights.[46]<\/a> Other countries are under no obligation to take the Fifth Circuit\u2019s decision as binding authority. In fact, copyright lawyers around the world have already begun to question the Vetter v. Resnik<\/em> ruling, ultimately placing it on a back burner until an equivalent or higher authority suggests otherwise.[47]<\/a> It could be beneficial for the World Intellectual Property Organization to issue clarification on Article 5 of the Berne Convention, or similarly, the Supreme Court could make a final ruling on the issue. Will Donald Passman have to create a 12th<\/sup> edition of his music industry guidebook to edit his section on Rights of Termination? Not just yet, but he and the rest of the copyright law community await further counsel on bridging this gap of international understanding.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Catherine Stagliano is a Second Year Law Student at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law where she serves as a Staff Editor and incoming Online Editor for the Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal. She is passionate about advancing her career in the music industry, with a particular focus on copyright litigation.<\/p>\n ________________________________________________________________<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Vetter v. Resnik, 163 F.4th 951, 968 (5th Cir. 2026) The Fifth Circuit oversees Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Donald S. Passman, All You Need to Know About the Music Business<\/em> 323 (11th ed. 2023).<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, as last revised at Paris on 24 July 1971 and last amended 28 September 1979; Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner\/Chappell Music, Inc., 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998); Clancy v. Jack Ryan Enterprises, Ltd., No. 17-CV-3371, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26553 (D. Md. Feb. 10, 2021).<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 968.<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Id.<\/em> at 954.<\/p>\n [6]<\/a> Susan H. Abramovitch & Sarah Grech, Double Shot (Of Copyright Termination): The Vetter judgment and worldwide copyright terminations<\/em>, Gowling WLG (Feb. 5, 2026), https:\/\/gowlingwlg.com\/fr\/insights-resources\/articles\/2026\/vetter-judgment-and-worldwide-copyright-terminations [https:\/\/perma.cc\/9CQV-XH6Y].<\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 954.<\/p>\n [8]<\/a> Aaron Moss, Fifth Circuit Expands Copyright Termination Beyond U.S. Borders<\/em>, Copyright Lately (Jan 12, 2026), https:\/\/copyrightlately.com\/vetter-resnik-fifth-circuit-ruling\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/X3AR-8S2X]. This is a special Copyright Act of 1909 stipulation.<\/p>\n [9]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 954.<\/p>\n [10]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n [11]<\/a> Vetter v. Resnik, No. 23-1369-SDD-EWD, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122767 at *4 (M.D. La. July 12, 2024) (\u201cThus, as of 1996, interest in the Renewal Copyright was held by Vetter Communications (50%), Windsong (25%), and Lyresong (25%)\u201d).<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> Tal Dickstein & Alexander Loh, Vetter v. Resnik<\/em>, Loeb & Loeb LLP (Jan 12, 2026), https:\/\/www.loeb.com\/en\/insights\/publications\/2026\/01\/vetter-v-resnik [https:\/\/perma.cc\/RP6K-N6VM].<\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 955.<\/p>\n [14]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n [16]<\/a> Id.<\/em>; Dickstein & Loh, supra<\/em> note 12.<\/p>\n [17]<\/a> Vetter v. Resnik, No. 23-1369-SDD-EWD, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122767 at *5 (M.D. La. July 12, 2024).<\/p>\n [18]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 954.<\/p>\n [19]<\/a> 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 304 (c)(6)(E).<\/p>\n [20]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 951; Chad A. Rutkowski, Theresa M. Weisenberger & Amanda M. (Spo!) Spoto, Copyright Termination Without Borders: Worldwide Recapture Rights Affirmed in Vetter v. Resnik (5th Cir. 2026)<\/em>, BakerHostetler (Feb. 12, 2026), https:\/\/www.bakerlaw.com\/insights\/copyright-termination-without-borders-worldwide-recapture-rights-affirmed-in-vetter-v-resnik-5th-cir-2026\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/L2HZ-HND6]; See<\/em> Bassel v. Durand-Day (In re Durand-Day), 134 F.4th 846, 851 (5th Cir. 2025).<\/p>\n [21]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 956.<\/p>\n [22]<\/a> Id.<\/em> at 957.<\/p>\n [23]<\/a> Rutkowski, Weisenberger & Spoto, supra<\/em> note 20; Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 957.<\/p>\n [24]<\/a> Moss, supra <\/em>note 8.<\/p>\n [25]<\/a> Berne Convention, supra<\/em> note 3, art. 5.<\/p>\n [26]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 962 (\u201cResnik\u2019s arguments are premised on the following theory: \u2018[T]he U.S. Copyright Act, together with the implementing legislation of each other member country, creates multiple and separate copyright interests in each country, rather than a single overarching international master copyright that each country is required to honor.\u2019\u201d)<\/p>\n [27]<\/a> Passman, supra<\/em> note 2, at 348. Quel dommage translates to \u201cWhat a pity\u201d.<\/p>\n [28]<\/a> Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner\/Chappell Music, Inc., 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998); Clancy v. Jack Ryan Enterprises, Ltd., No. 17-CV-3371, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26553 (D. Md. Feb. 10, 2021).<\/p>\n [29]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 960.<\/p>\n [30]<\/a> Nimmer on Copyright<\/em>; Patry on Copyright<\/em>.<\/p>\n [31]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 962.<\/p>\n [32]<\/a> Id.<\/em>; See<\/em> Tire Eng\u2019g & Distribution, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (\u201cAs a general matter, the [Copyright] Act is considered to have no extraterritorial reach.\u201d); See<\/em> Subafilms, Ltd. v. Mgm-Pathe Communs. Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (\u201c[T]he copyright laws do not apply extraterritorially . . . .\u201d).<\/p>\n [33]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 951; Lisa Holubar, Rethinking Worldwide Copyright: Ownership and Termination After Vetter v. Resnik<\/em>, Miller Johnson Attorneys (Jan 20, 2026), https:\/\/millerjohnson.com\/rethinking-worldwide-copyright-ownership-and-termination-after-vetter-v-resnik\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/323X-Q4YE] (\u201cWorldwide ownership, the Court concluded, is therefore a consequence of termination\u2014not an impermissible extraterritorial application of U.S. law.\u201d).<\/p>\n [34]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 956.<\/p>\n [35]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n [36]<\/a> Id.<\/em> at 957.<\/p>\n [37]<\/a> Moss, supra<\/em> note 8 (\u201cSection 304(c)(6)(E) reflects that same reality. Congress didn\u2019t say termination affects all rights \u201cwherever exploited.\u201d It said termination affects rights arising under Title 17\u2014and doesn\u2019t affect rights arising under foreign law. That language makes sense only if foreign exploitation rights are understood as arising under foreign law in the first place.\u201d).<\/p>\n [38]<\/a> Vetter v. Resnik Rec. Doc. 28.<\/p>\n [39]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 962.<\/p>\n [40]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 956-57.<\/p>\n [41]<\/a> Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 961 (\u201cThe district court in Siegel also references Professor William Patry\u2019s treatise: One provision is quite clear, however: termination only affects U.S. rights.\u201d); Moss, supra<\/em> note 8 (\u201cAnd in\u00a0Siegel<\/em>, the court\u2019s analysis was hardly equivocal. As that court put it, \u2018the statutory text could not be any clearer on this subject.\u2019\u201d).<\/p>\n [42]<\/a> Vetter<\/em>, 163 F.4th at 958.<\/p>\n [43]<\/a> Scott Hervey & Matthew Sugarman, The Briefing: Vetter v. Resnik: When Copyright Termination Goes Global, JD Supra (Feb. 27, 2026), https:\/\/www.jdsupra.com\/legalnews\/the-briefing-vetter-v-resnik-when-cop-10817\/ [https:\/\/perma.cc\/9RTR-U4GP].<\/p>\n [44]<\/a> See<\/em> Tire Eng\u2019g & Distribution, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (\u201cAs a general matter, the [Copyright] Act is considered to have no extraterritorial reach.\u201d); See<\/em> Subafilms, Ltd. v. Mgm-Pathe Communs. Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (\u201c[T]he copyright laws do not apply extraterritorially . . . .\u201d).<\/p>\n [45]<\/a> Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 app\u2019x. II., Sept. 9, 1886, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3; Chapter XII \u2013 Is Berne a Self-Executing or an Executory Treaty<\/em>, 10 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 4, 597 (1985-1986) (\u201cIf ratified by the United States, the Berne Convention would not be a self-executing treaty in this country. The protection it stipulates for authors and their successors could only be enforced here to the extent provided by existing U.S. law or by further legislation Congress enacted to implement ratification of the Convention.\u201d).<\/p>\n