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Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n More than 75 years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights<\/a> (UDHR) in 1948, Asia still lacks a binding regional human rights (hereinafter, \u201cHR\u201d) framework. This is not surprising, given that Asia is home to more than half of the world\u2019s population, and has also witnessed some of the most persistent and visible HR challenges of the contemporary era, including the Rohingya crisis<\/a> in Myanmar and serious concerns regarding the treatment of<\/a> Uyghurs<\/a> and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.<\/p>\n While Europe, America and Africa have institutionalised regional systems for HR protection, Asia\u2019s silence raises a serious question: Why has the region consistently resisted institutionalising a shared HR framework? Understanding this silence requires looking beyond the formal commitments that have shaped Asia\u2019s approach to dealing with HR protection. The answer lies not only in the region\u2019s size or diversity, but also in the political choices, specifically the strong attachment to sovereignty and non- interference.\u00a0<\/p>\n Existing Regional Models<\/strong><\/p>\n Regional HR systems are designed to strengthen and protect HR. The European Convention on Human Rights<\/a>, for instance, created a supranational court whose decisions are legally binding on member states in Europe. Similarly, the Inter-American system<\/a> operates through the dual structure of a Commission and a Court, thereby functioning as both an adjudicating and a monitoring body. Additionally, the African Charter<\/a> takes a unique approach by extending HR protection beyond individual rights and explicitly recognising collective and peoples\u2019 rights, which also reflects the continent\u2019s social realities and historical experience. The emphasis on collective rights is similar to Karel Vasek\u2019s idea of third generation or solidarity rights<\/a>, which recognises that some rights, such as development and self-determination, belong to communities and peoples rather than only to individuals.<\/p>\n Africa\u2019s experience holds utmost relevance to Asia because African states were similarly protective of their newly acquired sovereignty and non-interference. Yet, unlike Asia, Africa already developed a continent-wide political institution in the name of Organisation of African Unity<\/a> (OAU). By the late 1970s, this provided a platform through which human rights protection could be framed as part of the broader African project rather than merely as external influence. Therefore, Africa remained concerned about sovereignty, but its shared political experience and the presence of the OAU made cooperation on human rights easier to accept.<\/p>\n These regions have managed to reach a consensus on HR protection despite deep political differences and historical problems. On the other hand, Asia\u2019s failure to develop a similar framework is not solely due to structural impossibility, but rather due to reluctance stemming from political choices and strict views on sovereignty. Therefore, this issue warrants further examination.<\/p>\n The Asian Exception<\/strong><\/p>\n The most common reason<\/a> for Asia\u2019s resistance to a regional HR framework is the insistence of states on treating HR violations as an internal matter, hence excluding any external oversight. This external scrutiny of domestic governance is viewed as an intrusion into internal affairs. It is also associated with Asia\u2019s history of colonial rule and Cold War intervention. Conflicts such as the Korean War and the Vietnam War involved major foreign powers and strengthened the fear of outside interference in domestic affairs. This view of Asian states is also reflected in regional arrangements, such as ASEAN, within which non-interference is the foundational principle<\/a>. However, concerns about sovereignty alone are insufficient to explain Asia\u2019s position. Similar issues were present in Africa<\/a>; yet, African states ultimately accepted a regional charter and adjudicatory authority that reflects local realities.<\/p>\n Another recurring justification is the idea of \u2018Asian Values\u2019<\/a>, defended by writers such as Kishore Mahbubani<\/a> and Bilhari Kausikan<\/a>, who have argued that HR should be understood in light of Asia\u2019s social and cultural priorities rather than solely through the lens of Western individualism. Critics such as Yash Ghai<\/a> and Amartya Sen<\/a>, however, question whether such cultural differences can justify limiting universal HR. While cultural diversity is undeniable, the Asian values argument raises difficult questions about how far cultural context can justify limiting HR<\/a>. Therefore, reaching regional consensus becomes extremely difficult because Asian states differ widely in their political systems, institutions and approaches to individual rights.\u00a0 It involves different types of governments, from liberal democracies to military dictatorships, and many more. Yet, this\u00a0 comparison should not be overstated.\u00a0 Europe was also deeply divided after the Second World War, especially during the Cold War, but it still developed regional cooperation on the issue of HR. Asia never experienced a similar level of collective commitment.<\/p>\n The issue of geopolitical rivalries involving major powers has further reduced the likelihood of consensus. Therefore, a binding HR arrangement would require states to accept external review, something that many Asian governments are unwilling to do.<\/p>\n Do We Even Need an Asian Human Rights Convention?<\/strong><\/p>\n A question that often goes unaddressed in discussions on regional HR is whether Asia, in its present condition, actually requires a regional convention. A major concern<\/a> recognised by Asian countries is the lack of political will across the region to establish a system comparable to those in Europe. For many Asian governments, the immediate priority is not regional rights enforcement but resisting the tendency of developed states to link HR compliance with trade benefits or other economic conditionality. The EU\u2019s GSP+ scheme<\/a> is one example, as additional access to the EU market is linked to compliance with international human and labour rights conventions. An alternative for Asia could be to develop HR protections within its existing regional arrangements. For instance, ASEAN agreements dealing with the movement of workers could require basic protections such as equal treatment, safe working conditions and access to complaint mechanisms for workers moving between states. This would allow regional HR standards to grow through arrangements that Asian states already participate in, instead of appearing as external conditions attached by developed countries.<\/p>\n Moreover, the huge size and differences within the region, make it harder to keep to one unified regional HR system. This has led some scholars to suggest<\/a> that sub-regional or national initiatives offer a more practical starting point, which can eventually develop into broader regional cooperation.\u00a0 Another reason is the uneven engagement of Asian states with existing international HR instruments. In the case of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, for instance, ratification of the treaty has been widespread, but accession to the 1966 core Covenants has been inconsistent.<\/a> Even when there is a formal commitment, the implementation is often poor. Bangladesh, for example, despite being a party to the Convention<\/a> has continued to face concerns<\/a> over child marriage, including exceptions to the minimum marriage age, which have been criticised by the UN<\/a>.<\/p>\n These concerns are compounded by an ongoing ideological debate within the region. Some governments continue to portray the issue of civil and political rights as Western or Eurocentric constructs<\/a>, which are ill-suited to Asian societies. At the core of these objections is unease with external scrutiny and accountability, which regional HR mechanisms are seen to represent. Similarly, there is also concern that stronger states would dominate such a framework, leaving smaller countries with little to no influence.<\/p>\n Despite these issues, there are compelling reasons to argue that Asia would benefit from some regional HR system. One such advantage is proximity and cultural familiarity; additionally, the shared experience of colonialism enables Asian states to better understand the social realities of other countries, which can help increase engagement. A regional HR system would also reduce excessive reliance on distant and often slow international forums. Even a modest convention could significantly contribute by setting an initial baseline of rights and creating a feeling of expectation on the part of the countries involved in the process. Such expectations, even without strict enforcement, can encourage accountability over time. This approach was also seen in the UN-sponsored regional workshops held across Asia<\/a> during the 1990s, which were termed as \u201csymbolic,\u201d but these workshops helped in engaging in dialogue in the region. Similar developments within ASEAN show both the limitations and potential of regional engagement. The 1993 Bangkok Declaration<\/a> acknowledged the universality of HR but emphasised the vast regional and national differences. ASEAN later established the AICHR in 2009<\/a> and adopted ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012. Nevertheless, these institutions largely remain advisory in nature and lack strong enforcement powers<\/a>. As a result, sovereignty and non-interference prevail in the region. Although ASEAN has not yet established a legally binding HR mechanism, the growth of national institutions in the region shows a slow but steady acceptance of such values.<\/p>\n At the same time, these claims highlight an important issue: the mere signing of declarations or conventions is insufficient. When regional arrangements prioritise duties, stability, or local values over individual rights, they risk undermining existing HR standards. Any Asian convention would therefore matter only if it were backed by a genuine focus on protecting individuals.<\/p>\n The Way Forward: Incremental Regionalism<\/strong><\/p>\n Rather than attempting to replicate any other continent\u2019s model, Asia needs to move forward in a gradual and practical manner. The European system itself developed incrementally as the ECHR was adopted in 1950, while additional rights and stronger enforcement mechanisms were introduced later through successive protocols, like Protocol No. 11<\/a>, which led to the establishment of the Permanent Court in 1998. One possible starting point is to focus on basic HR protections, such as access to justice and a fair trial, rather than immediately debating a long list of rights. These principles are less politically sensitive and can offer real protection in everyday situations.<\/p>\n Another way forward is to link HR more closely with areas where regional cooperation already exists, such as labour markets, digital governance and development projects. Integrating HR into these arrangements can help make accountability part of normal governance. For example, ASEAN economic and labour agreements could include basic labour rights and compliance requirements, allowing a human rights system, though nascent, to develop through existing regional institutions rather than through a separate convention.<\/p>\n This progress may depend less on who drives the process and more on the order in which commitments are made. Beginning with limited, clearly defined obligations can allow trust to develop before attempting stronger forms of regional cooperation.<\/p>\n