After eight months of obstructionism from the Labour Friends of Israel government of the UK, tomorrow is the day on which the Scottish Court of Session will finally decide whether to go ahead with the judicial review it granted in January, or kowtow to Downing St.<\/p>\n
I publish below two of the three main papers we have submitted for the hearing. The UK government has submitted nothing in advance, obviously confident it has it stitched up. The third main paper, the amended petition, I don\u2019t have in clean form at the moment but will upload later.<\/p>\n
It is unlikely anyone reading this in the next 11 hours of night time in Scotland will be able to get to Court Number 1 of the Court of Session in Parliament Square by 8.30am tomorrow, but if you can I should be most grateful for the moral support.<\/p>\n
I am stating in my affidavit baldly a direct challenge to the government\u2019s honesty. Whether this is a sensible legal strategy I do not know, but it has the virtue of being the truth. <\/p>\n
The \u201cpaper apart\u201d giving the argument for this hearing from the legal team makes the point very clearly that in acceding to the UK government\u2019s continued sidelining the Scottish case the court is behaving in an unprecedented way and breaking its own rules. I have removed at least as much footnote from the Paper Apart as text remains, for the sake of readability. If anyone wants a full copy let me know.<\/p>\n
Wish me luck. I am sleepy.<\/p>\n
IN THE COURT OF SESSION<\/strong> COMPEARED CRAIG MURRAY, 1. I was a member of the Diplomatic service from 1984 to 2005 including six years as a 2. One of the positions I held in my career was Head of the FCO section of the Embargo 3. To the best of my knowledge and belief, as a result of my work on Iraq, I held the highest 4. Although at the time of the publication of the government dossier on Iraqi weapons of 5. When the government dossier on Iraqi WMD was published, to my certain knowledge at 6. I therefore know for certain that many of the individuals involved were well aware that 7. The hard truth is that officials will produce the narrative which ministers want, in order 8. The policy that ministers wish to follow is gleaned by civil servants from official minutes, 9. The Chilcott report stated that: 10. I can testify that challenging the government\u2019s desired version of the truth on that 11. We know from Iraq that the UK government sometimes promotes a narrative which is 12. That is the case in the prescription of Palestine Action, with a narrative of an escalating 13. In matters of intelligence and national security the government can in particular not be 14. I have given, from personal knowledge, the example of Iraqi weapons of mass 15. I gave evidence on complicity in torture and extraordinary rendition, appearing in person 16. I am a whistleblower and I do not believe there is any longer any serious denial of my 17. My purpose in this affidavit however relates to one key aspect of the governmental 18. I refer to the report of the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee on The footnotes are essential as they detail evidence including documentary evidence, not \u201c229. Craig Murray was the British Ambassador to Uzbekistan from August 2002 to July<\/em> 19. The Government response to the committee made no challenge to this account.<\/p>\n 20. So the government machinery, especially in matters concerned with intelligence and 21. I can testify to the truth of both these assertions from direct personal experience. They 22. We have a blatant example of deliberate concealment before us. As a result of the closed 23. None of these phrases was redacted because its revelation would impact UK national 24. This is one small example of the much bigger picture.<\/p>\n 25. In an earlier hearing, the Advocate General stated that the reason the Scottish Counter 26. In fact, to my experienced eye the much more probable explanation is that CONTEST 27. The government\u2019s narrative of an escalating pattern of violence is simply untrue as a 28. The government\u2019s claims of the escalating pattern of violence were heavily based on two 29. In the Thales case, in Scotland, there were no convictions for violence. In parliament 30. I view it as relevant that the Sheriff Appeal Court in Scotland recently overturned a 31. In the Filton case, I attended in person two days of the trial of six activists, plus the 32. In an effort to substantiate its claims of violence against Palestine Action, the State 33. I believe these are the main \u201cserious charges\u201d to which the Advocate General referred in 34. All six charges of aggravated burglary failed before a jury, returning not guilty. So did the 35. So there is simply zero factual basis for the narrative of an escalating pattern of violence. 36. The extent to which the state \u2018s case for proscription rested on this false narrative of \u201cThe criminal offences of Aggravated Burglary (s.10 Theft Act 1968) and Violent Disorder (s.2 Public<\/em> 37. I understand from contact with defendants across a number of cases that the state has 38. The state has now brought charges of violent disorder against 14 individuals and 39. This is a narrative which proved entirely false.<\/p>\n 40. I find it a reflection on the honesty of the government and of its legal representatives 41. They may of course be relying on concocted evidence from the security services in closed 42. Similar caution needs to be exercised in relation to the claims of the extent of property 43. It is my understanding from trial reports that concealing what was damaged from the 44. Only after the verdicts in the second trial was an alleged account of the damage from 45. Similarly the extent of property damage at Thales has not been subject to scrutiny. The 46. It is unique to designate an organisation involved in damage to property only as a 47. There is no serious effort by government to itemise property damage by Palestine Action 48. The JTAC documents reveal no effort to quantify property damage or to make the 49. That property damage alone, which does not endanger life, is capable of being classified 50. Some actions of other direct action groups in, for example, closing down railways and 51. As there is no escalating campaign of violence, and the property damage is not life 52. I have met personally with scores of people over the age of 70 years old who have been 53. Across the UK I understand over 3,500 are charged. Recently 1,855 were listed in a single 54. Being charged with a terrorism offence is life changing. Not only do they face possible jail 55. None of those that I have met charged with speech offences including placards was 56. That all of this is proportionate is an absurd contention and the heartlessness of the 57. I am a resident of Scotland. I believe the direct action campaign of Palestine Action was 58. Where there is obviously a major and widespread effect on human rights of ordinary 59. I have a perspective that gives weight to that fact from relevant personal experience. I This: NINETEENTH day of AUGUST 2026 PAPER APART FOR THE PETITIONER<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. THE PETITIONER\u2019S MOTIONS<\/strong> 2. RECALL OF THE SIST<\/strong> 2.2 On 30 July 2026 the UK Supreme Court granted its permission for the claimant in the 2.3 The question of onward appeal to the UK Supreme Court now being resolved, the sist falls 3. THE RESPONDENT\u2019S MOTION TO RENEW THE SIST<\/strong><\/p>\n 3.1 On 19 August 2026 the respondent advised the petitioner that the position of the UK 3.2 Neither the legal nor factual bases upon which the UK Government will argue that the 3.3 As is clear from the repeated applications made by the respondent to sist these proceedings 3.4 The Advocate General\u2019s motion for a new sist to be imposed in this case is of a piece with 3.5 In seeking a further sist of these post-permission judicial review proceedings the Advocate 3.6 That is because there is no such Rule of Court. The relevant Rules of Court applicable to 3.7 Whatever legal basis upon which the Advocate General now seek this court to renew and 3.8 When acceding to the Advocate General\u2019s motion to sist these on 28 May 2026 this court 3.9 A search for cases in which a sist has been pronounced in judicial review proceedings 3.10 In Greenpeace Ltd v Advocate General for Scotland [2025] CSOH 10, 2025 SLT 303, 3.11 So in both the cases in which a sist was pronounced the court was simply endorsing the 3.12 As we have noted judicial review proceedings \u2013 unlike ordinary litigation \u2013 are 3.14 The only express mention of the possibility of the court pronouncing a sist within the 3.15 Rule 58.12(2) again specifies that \u201cat the procedural hearing the Lord Ordinary may 3.16 Yet Rule of Court 58.11(2) does not list the sisting of the cause as being a possible option 3.17 In this, the judicial review rules are to be contrasted with various Rules of Court 3.18 Against the general principle of statutory construction that expressio unius est exclusio 3.19 In these circumstances the primary position of the petitioner is that this court should 4. PROCEDURE TO DATE<\/strong><\/p>\n 4.1 Permission was granted for this judicial review to proceed as long ago as 26 January 4.2 This original timetable appears to have slipped and was not adhered to.<\/p>\n 4.3 Instead by interlocutor of 26 March 2026 the court \u2013 after granting a declaration under 4.4 Again, this timetable was not adhered to.<\/p>\n 4.5 By interlocutor dated 28 May 2026 orders with the following effect, among others were 4.6 There has already been significant (and frankly unacceptable) delay in the progress of this 4.7 The delays in progressing this matter may largely be attributed to litigation tactics adopted 5. THE LITIGATION STRATEGY OF THE UK GOVERNMENT IN THE ENGLISH PROCEEDINGS<\/strong><\/p>\n 5.1 In the Ammori proceedings before the English courts the UK Government has appeared 5.2 Its overall aim in adopting such tactics appears to be to delay as much as possible any final 5.3 Thus: 6. THE SCOTTISH DIMENSION TO THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROSCRIPTION OF<\/strong> 6.1 The Advocate General appears to be proceeding on the basis or assumption that if the UK 6.2 And if the UK Supreme Court says that Palestine Action cannot properly be proscribed 6.3 But as we have seen from the UKSC decision in Jwanczuk that is to approach matters from 6.4 One of the central planks offered by the Home Secretary in justification of her decision to 6.5 But it is important to bear in mind that in the English proceedings no challenge is made to 6.6 Because the Claimant\u2019s application for permission for judicial review on this ground was 6.7 This is a matter which can however usefully and properly be examined in the present 6.8 Much was made by the Home Secretary and by the courts in England and Wales that the 6.9 But the reality is that fireworks are not firearms. The throwing of smoke bombs was 7. FURTHER PROCEDURE: REPORTING THE CAUSE TO THE INNER HOUSE<\/strong><\/p>\n 7.1 The only question which is therefore before this court is what procedural orders should 7.2 The reality of this situation is that the present challenge to the proscription in Scotland 7.3 Whatever decision may be taken by the Lord Ordinary \u2013 whether to uphold or refuse the 7.4 Neither will any decision by the UK Supreme Court on the Ammori appeal finally and 7.5 In these circumstances it is clear that the most expedient course for this court to take in 7.6 The Inner House will be properly placed to hear and determine \u2013 without the benefit of 7.7 The petitioner now invites the Lord Ordinary to report the whole cause to the Inner House 7.8 Rule of Court 34.3(2) provides that \u201cthe decision of the Inner House on a report to it 7.9 This means that any decision of the Inner House, on the court\u2019s Chapter 34 report to it, is 7.10 The petitioner submits that, instead of considering the petition and answers at a 7.11If this proposed course of action is followed then it will at least allow the possibility of: the 7.12 The UK Supreme Court indeed welcomes the opportunity of being able to hear at the 7.13 What hearing appeals from Scotland and from England together means is that the UK 7.14 This course of hearing Scottish and English appeal together ensures, too, that a final 7.15 Against that background it is clear that the proper course to be followed in this case is 7.16 Accordingly, once the sist has been lifted in accordance with the first part of this 7.17 Any suggested alternative course which may be anticipated from the Advocate General 7.18 In the whole circumstances the petitioner renews the second part of his motion and 8. CONCLUSION<\/strong><\/p>\n 8.1 The petitioner in the present proceedings accepts that that the UK Supreme Court should 8.2 This aim can only be achieved by the court following the course of action which the 8.3 The UK Government\u2019s position by contrast seems to be one of impeding or delaying the 8.4 In all these circumstances the petitioner renews his motion as enrolled and moves the I am afraid we do desperately need more funds to get through this. All the delay and procedural trickery set out above is designed to bleed us dry and, to be honest, it is working.<\/p>\n Please do not contribute if it causes you difficulty. If you know people who are able to afford to help and likely to be sympathetic, please do contact them and ask their assistance. We are trying to keep a lot of very good people out of prison.<\/p>\n You can donate through the link via Crowd Justice, which goes straight to the lawyers, or through this blog.<\/p>\n
SUPPLEMENTARY AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG MURRAY<\/strong>
IN THE<\/strong>
PETITION<\/strong>
of<\/strong>
CRAIG MURRAY, residing at Edinburgh, EHl0\u00a0<\/strong>
PETITIONER<\/strong>
For judicial review of the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order<\/strong>
2025<\/strong>
At EDINBURGH on the NINETEENTH day of AUGUST 2026, in the presence of DAVID
JAMES FINLAY HALLIDAY, solicitor and notary public, Halliday Campbell WS,
solicitors,<\/p>\n
residing at Edinburgh, EHl0 who being solemnly sworn hereby
DEPONES as follows:-<\/p>\n
member of the Senior Civil Service.<\/p>\n
Surveillance Centre, a cross Whitehall and armed forces body, whose objective was the
enforcement of sanctions on Iraqi weapons procurement.<\/p>\n
possible levels of security clearance within the UK government system, including some
which entailed a specific visit to Washington to obtain.<\/p>\n
mass destruction I no longer held this position, then being ambassador designate to
Uzbekistan, I knew a great deal of background and many of the individuals concerned
with Iraqi weapons monitoring across Whitehall.<\/p>\n
the time much of it was factually incorrect. I was on training within the FCO at the time
and spoke with several officials including some who had been directly involved in
production of the dossier.<\/p>\n
the dossier, which they were involved in producing or agreeing, was factually wrong. One
senior official directly concerned with the production cheerfully and cynically
acknowledged to me that it was \u201cbollocks\u201d. A member of FCO Research and Analysis
Department, a year after the publication, told me that people in that department had
been in tears at the pressure put on them to agree the dossier.<\/p>\n
to justify the policy which ministers wish to implement. Many civil servants take the view
that the ministers are elected democratically and make the policy, and it is the civil
servants\u2019 job to fix the facts around the policy.<\/p>\n
from ministerial pronouncements in public or in parliament, from conversations with the
Minister\u2019s private secretary, from the Permanent under Secretary, from remarks made by
the minister in public or private meetings with others, and a variety of different routes.<\/p>\n
The judgements about Iraq\u2019s capabilities in that statement, and in the dossier published the<\/em>
same day, were presented with a certainty that was not justified<\/em>
and
It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and<\/em>
assessments. They were not challenged, and they should have been.<\/em><\/p>\n
occasion was extremely difficult and civil servants felt intimidated from doing so. The
pressures were sharply illustrated by the death of Dr David Kelly, whom I knew slightly.<\/p>\n
factually false in order to justify its policy.<\/p>\n
pattern of violence, much relied upon by the Home Secretary. It was also relied upon by
the English Court of Appeal as a predictor of Palestine action\u2019s future behaviour. Yet it is
an entirely false narrative.<\/p>\n
relied upon to produce an honest narrative of the facts, and the civil service cannot be
relied upon to act with integrity in the service of government.<\/p>\n
destruction. Let me also give the example of torture and extraordinary rendition, also
from personal knowledge.<\/p>\n
for questioning before the Joint Human Rights Committee of the UK Parliament, the
Intelligence and Security Committee, and committees of the European Parliament and
the Council of Europe.<\/p>\n
testimony on torture and extraordinary rendition, which is widely cited and a key source
on the subject. But the government denied it at the time.<\/p>\n
behaviour on torture and extraordinary rendition. This illustrates the willingness of civil
servants to hide the evidence of what policies are being pursued and why, at the
instruction of or in pursuit of the perceived wishes of ministers.<\/p>\n
Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition 2001-2010 HC 1113, under the chairmanship of
the Rt Hon Dominic Grieve KC. Paragraphs 130 and 131 of this report are crucial to my
evidence.
\u201d 130. This was not unique to the Agencies. Their sponsoring Departments appear to have<\/em>
adopted the same approach. We heard evidence from a former FCO official, Craig Murray,<\/em>
who suggested that \u201cthere was a deliberate policy of not committing the discussion on<\/em>
receipt of intelligence through torture to paper in the Foreign Office\u201d. In July 2004, when<\/em>
he was Ambassador to Tashkent, he raised concerns about the use of Uzbek intelligence<\/em>
derived from torture in a formal exchange of telegrams with the FCO. Mr Murray drew our<\/em>
attention to FCO documents from the same time, which we have seen, one of which<\/em>
referred to \u201cmeetings to look at conditions of receipt of intelligence as a general issue\u201d. He<\/em>
told us that the meetings specifically discussed the receipt of intelligence under torture<\/em>
from Uzbekistan and were absolutely key to the formation of policy on extraordinary<\/em>
rendition and intelligence. Mr Murray told us that, when he had given evidence to the<\/em>
Foreign Affairs Select Committee about this, they sought the documents from the FCO<\/em>
which replied that the \u201cmeetings were informal meetings and were not minuted\u201d. He went<\/em>
on to say:<\/em>
the idea that you have regular meetings convened at director level, convened by the<\/strong><\/em>
Director of Security and Intelligence, where you are discussing the receipt of intelligence<\/strong><\/em>
from torture, and you do not minute those meetings is an impossibility, unless an actual<\/strong><\/em>
decision or instruction not to minute the meetings has been given . \u2026 Were it not for me<\/strong><\/em>
and my bloody-mindedness, \u2026 you would never know those meetings had happened.<\/strong><\/em>
Nobody would ever know those meetings had happened.<\/strong><\/em>
131. We note that we have not seen the minutes of these meetings either: this causes us<\/em>
great concern. Policy discussions on such an important issue should have been minuted.<\/em>
We support Mr Murray\u2019s own conclusion that were it not for his actions these matters may<\/em>
never have come to light.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n
available to the public, which supported my testimony.<\/p>\n
2004, during which time he raised concerns about the UK\u2019s use of intelligence derived from<\/em>
torture. He had been in contact with the Gibson Detainee Inquiry, with a view to appearing<\/em>
as a witness. He contacted the ISC in August 2014 for the same purpose and gave evidence<\/em>
to the Committee in 2016.<\/em>
230. Mr Murray gave the example of photos of a torture victim in Uzbekistan that he had<\/em>
sent to the FCO, which sent them to a Professor of Pathology at the University of Glasgow,<\/em>
who is said to have reported that the victim had been beaten about the face and neck, and<\/em>
eventually had died of immersion in boiling liquid.<\/em>
231. Oral evidence \u2013 the former FCO official, 20 October 2016; FCO telegram from the<\/em>
Director General, Defence and Intelligence, to the British Embassy in Tashkent, 22 July 2004<\/em>
(\u2018Receipt of intelligence obtained under torture\u2019).\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n
national security, demonstrably can produce a false narrative. The fact it comes from
government should not imbue their narrative with a false authority. Not only that, but
the written record from government can deliberately conceal inconvenient facts, policies
or other information.<\/p>\n
should be borne in mind when considering the government\u2019s assertions about Palestine
Action.<\/p>\n
session process in Scotland, a number of redacted phrases in a Proscription Advisory
Group document have been unredacted and introduced into the open sessions.
(Respondent\u2019s 6th inventory of productions, 7 \/103 to 7 \/106 of process)<\/p>\n
security. I state that as a former expert practitioner in the field. What is obvious on the
face of these redactions is that every single one of them tends to strengthen the case
against proscription. That is why they were redacted by civil servants anxious to conceal
truth in order to forward the agenda of government.<\/p>\n
Terrorism Strategy Board (CONTEST) found that Palestine Action was not close to
meeting the bar for proscription, is that CONTEST is a mere \u201clocal board\u201d without full
knowledge of the facts.<\/p>\n
Scotland is remote from the political desires of London ministers \u2013 in this case
particularly to please Israel \u2013 while JTAC and the Proscription Advisory Group operate
under their direct influence. The Scottish view is the less distorted view.<\/p>\n
matter of fact. I have been closely following all trials of Palestine Action activists and to
my knowledge there has been only one single conviction for violence against the person,
and even in that one instance the specific charge of intent was rejected by the jury.<\/p>\n
cases, usually called the Filton and Thales cases.<\/p>\n
introducing the proscription and in subsequent media statements, the Home Secretary
relied on rather florid sentencing remarks by a Scottish sheriff without mentioning that
key fact.<\/p>\n
decision of the same Sheriff McCormick in another case of a pro-Palestine activist; and
the court\u2019s remarks called into question the fairness of McCormick\u2019s proceedings.<\/p>\n
sentencing hearing. I carefully read detailed reports of the case every day, both trial and
retrial.<\/p>\n
brought six charges of aggravated burglary, and six charges of violent disorder. There was
also one charge of grievous bodily harm with intent.<\/p>\n
response to my petition.<\/p>\n
six charges of violent disorder, returning three not guilty and three no verdicts. These
charges were not attempted again by the prosecution at retrial. GBH with intent also
failed. GBH with no intent was found guilty.<\/p>\n
There is no charge of violence at Brize Norton.<\/p>\n
violence is vividly illustrated by the bloodcurdling list of charges in the third paragraph of
page 5 of the gisted report of the Proscription Review Group in the respondent\u2019s 6th
Inventory of Productions:<\/p>\n
Order Act 1986) have been applied to the majority of offenders identified as being directly involved in<\/em>
each of these incidents, while more specific criminal offences have been applied to individual subjects<\/em>
for: Administering a Noxious Substance (s.24 Offences against The Person Act 1861); Threats to Kill<\/em>
(s.16 Offences against The Person Act 1861); Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) (s.47 Offences against The<\/em>
Person Act 1861); Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) with intent (s.18 Offences against The Person Act<\/em>
1861); and Participating in Activities of an Organised CrimeGroup (s.45 Serious Crime Act 2015).\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n
failed to obtain a single conviction on any one of the specific charges identified in that
long list. Today 19 August the state has failed yet again, as the jury in the second batch of
eight defendants in the Filton trial did not convict on any of eight charges of violent
disorder.<\/p>\n
achieved zero convictions.<\/p>\n
that these jury verdicts, which are a matter of fact, and the collapse of this narrative has
not been admitted in these proceedings and the false narrative has not been withdrawn.<\/p>\n
proceedings, on which I am unfortunately unable to comment.<\/p>\n
damage. In the Filton trial, the damage was not evidenced. The jury was given an
inventory of the tools the defendants had taken to break or damage Israeli weapons, but
no account at all of what was actually damaged.<\/p>\n
jury was a ruling by the judge, in pursuit of his further ruling that the motives of the
defendants in acting to prevent genocide must not be put to the jury.<\/p>\n
Elbit Systems given to the court. The defence lawyers attempted to question this
account, but this was not permitted by the judge. He accepted a figure of \u00a31.1 million
from an insurance claim. As this was not open to interrogation I do not know if it
includes consequential loss.<\/p>\n
Sheriff also referenced \u00a31.1 million and it is not clear if this includes consequential loss.
The aircraft leased by the RAF under the Private Finance Initiative which were sprayed
with water based paint at Brize Norton were reported to have been back flying within
ten days. Whether they would otherwise have flown earlier I do not know.<\/p>\n
terrorist group. The least that might be expected is a serious explanation of the property
damage, which is subject to some ability to scrutinise.<\/p>\n
in a transparent way. Let alone to give comparison to property damage by similar direct
action groups like Just Stop Oil and Extinction Rebellion which have not been proscribed.<\/p>\n
relevant comparisons. Again, I question the fundamental evidence base of the
proscription.<\/p>\n
as terrorism is an unusual feature of UK legislation. As opposed, for example, to property
damage to an air traffic control facility which obviously might result in deaths.<\/p>\n
major motorways for substantial periods, have had far greater economic effect on the UK
than actions of Palestine Action. They have been dealt with by ordinary criminal law.<\/p>\n
endangering nor on a massive scale, that feeds directly into the question of whether
proscribing this kind of \u201cterrorism\u201d is having disproportionate effects in constraining
human rights.<\/p>\n
charged with terrorism offences for no more that speech and assembly. All of them are
entirely respectable members of society, often from distinguished professions. Many are
pacifists, and Quakers. We do not have a consolidated figure from the Crown Office for
how many face charges in Scotland.<\/p>\n
day at Westminster Magistrate\u2019s Court. While the simultaneous listing was explained as
an error, a further 152 were arrested, the vast majority for speech offences, outside the
courtroom.<\/p>\n
sentences, they face serious international travel restrictions. On 9 August 2026 in
Glasgow I met one who told me that, as a consequence of being charged with a terrorist
offence, his home and car insurance premiums had gone up by over \u00a3600 a year in total.
I had previous met a lady who suffered debanking.<\/p>\n
previously a member of Palestine Action or participant in their direct action. At the last
hearing it was claimed on behalf of the Advocate General that I effectively represent
Palestine Action in this case. In my own view I do not. I represent myself as a resident of
Scotland whose human rights are curtailed in Scotland, and insofar as I can be said to
represent a group, I would view that group as the ordinary citizens of Scotland whose
human rights are being curtailed by this proscription, who usually had no past
connection to Palestine Action.<\/p>\n
state apparatus and those who control it fill me with dread.<\/p>\n
necessary, proportionate and in general well conducted. I should like to be able to say so
here, in Edinburgh, where I live. I apply for protection of my human rights to the court of
my own jurisdiction.<\/p>\n
citizens, a \u201cmargin of appreciation\u201d that assumes the executive violating people\u2019s rights
to be undeniably beneficent, truthful and well-intentioned is not reflective of the real
world.<\/p>\n
am particularly keen to put this testimony before a judicial review in my own jurisdiction.
It is not a perspective available in the English case.
All of which is truth as the deponent shall answer to God.
Signed:<\/p>\n
At: EDINBURGH
before me DAVID JAMES FINLAY HALLIDAY, Solicitor and Notary Public<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.craigmurray.org.uk\/wp\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Screenshot-719.png\")
~<\/p>\n
1.1 The petitioner moves the court:
(1) to recall the sist granted on 28 May 2026
(2) to invite the Lord Ordinary to report the whole cause to the Inner House for a ruling
under and in terms of rule 34.1(1) of the Rules of the Court.<\/p>\n
2.1 On 28 May 2026 the court sisted this cause till such time as the Court of Appeal gave its
judgment in Ammori v SSHD (Appeal No. CA-2026-000583) \u201cand the question of onward
appeal to the UK Supreme Court being resolved\u201d.<\/p>\n
English proceedings to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and
Wales in her Judicial Review Ammori v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 721. The Supreme Court
has fixed a two day diet (4 and 5 November 2026) for the hearing of this appeal
https:\/\/supremecourt.uk\/cases\/uksc-2026-0099.<\/p>\n
to be recalled.<\/p>\n
Government is that it will be moving this court to \u201crenew the sist\u201d (sine die ?) and that the
UK Government will oppose the reporting of this cause to the Inner House.<\/p>\n
court should adopt these positions has not been vouchsafed to the petitioner.<\/p>\n
\u2013 as well as the respondent\u2019s previous reliance on (misplaced) claims concerning \u201cjudicial
comity\u201d and (it may be anticipated, given remarks by the respondent\u2019s counsel at an
earlier hearing) fanciful and wholly unfounded submissions concerning res judicata
\/issue estoppel \u2013 the UK Government\u2019s position in relation to these Scottish proceedings
is to seek to try and avoid (or at the very least delay) the UK Government having to defend
in open court its policy of the proscription of Palestine Action on two fronts in two separate
jurisdictions.<\/p>\n
that overall aim. It is not however open to this court to accede or facilitate any such aim
of the respondent further to delaying matters in the progress of this case, as we have noted
above. Instead, the only orders which this court may competently pronounce as regards
further procedure following the lifting of the 28 May 2026 sist are orders which ensure the
speedy determination of the petition\u201d.<\/p>\n
General has failed to identify or specify any specific Rule of Court on which she relies as
the source of the court having power to renew this sist.<\/p>\n
judicial review proceedings are set out in Chapter 58. This Chapter contains the principles
which are the court is obliged to apply within the context of procedural decision within
judicial review procedure, as a distinct form of recourse to the courts in public law matters.
These Chapter 58 rules make it clear that the principle of \u201cspeedy determination\u201d applies
to the procedure to be adopted in judicial review application, both before (per Rule of
Court 58.4(4)) and after permission has been granted (Rules of Court 58.11(2) and
58.12(2)).<\/p>\n
continue a sist in this case, it clear that ex facie an order for sist does not constitute \u201can
order for further procedure which is \u201cappropriate for the speedy determination of the
petition.\u201d The Advocate General has therefore to satisfy that the principle of speedy
determination of judicial review application should be disapplied in the circumstances of
this case. She has to date failed to specify any such ground.<\/p>\n
stated that \u201ca sist of proceedings, whether on an agreed or opposed basis, is a regular
feature of litigation\u201d in explanation\/justification for the sist. In so stating the court
misdirected itself, and acted per incuriam. This is because judicial review proceedings
are not \u201cregular litigation\u201d. And sists are not a regular feature within the context of judicial
review proceedings.<\/p>\n
(whether in the Outer or Inner House) reveals only two Outer House case, in both of which
a sist was pronounced in highly unusual circumstances. In Craig v. Parole Board [2013]
CSOH 110, 2013 SLT 953, because of a formal written undertaking given to the court on
behalf of the Scottish Parole Board, that if two conjoined pending NI and E&W UKSC
decisions found against the Parole Board on a Convention rights issue (re Article 5(4)
ECHR and the need for oral hearing in parole cases) the UKSC decision would be followed
by it in Scotland. This meant that the Lord Ordinary, Lord Pentland, did not have to deal
with this ground of challenge and so after dismissing the common law case simply agreed
to sist the remaining aspect of the JR challenge pending the UKSC decisions.<\/p>\n
three JRs had been raised in Scotland to beat the 3 month time bar and got first orders.
Before the case reached the permission stage, parties agreed to sist the JRs pending UKSC
decision. Again the sist was done by agreement In any event, given that permission had
not been considered or granted by the time the sist had been pronounced, so the provisions
of Rule of Court 58.11(2) on which we rely \u2013 and which provides that \u201c(2) When permission
is granted, the Lord Ordinary must make such orders for further procedure as are
appropriate for the speedy determination of the petition\u201d \u2013 did not come into play.<\/p>\n
prior agreement of the parties, and so no argument was put before the court as regards the
competency of such a course. And there are simply no cases (other than this court order
of 28 May 2026) in which a sist of judicial review proceedings was pronounced by the court
in the face of opposition by any of the parties.<\/p>\n
proceedings characterised by the principle of \u201cspeedy determination\u201d. This is the key
principle for judicial review procedure. The aim of judicial review procedure is
\u201cto focus the issues so that the court can reach a decision upon them, in the interests
of sound administration and in the public interest, as soon as possible\u201d
3.13 Rule of Court 58.11(2) specifies that
\u201cwhen permission is granted, the Lord Ordinary must make such orders for further
procedure as are appropriate for the speedy determination<\/strong> of the petition\u201d (emphasis
added).<\/p>\n
context of Chapter 58 judicial review procedure is within the context of the pre-permission
procedure for intimation, service and advertisement of the petition, the lodging of answers
and relevant documents, and notification of intention to contest. Rule 58.4(5)(h) allows
that the court might sist the cause for legal aid, but only, per Rule of Court 58.4(4), after
having \u201cregard to the need for the speedy determination of the petition\u201d (emphasis
added).<\/p>\n
make such order for further procedure as is appropriate for the speedy determination of
the petition and in particular may make any of the orders listed in rule 58.11(2)\u201d (emphasis
added).<\/p>\n
in terms of the court\u2019s procedure in judicial review application where permission has been
granted.<\/p>\n
applying to procedures other than judicial review, where express provision is made
regarding the possibility of the court pronouncing a sist.<\/p>\n
alterius, the legal basis upon which the Advocate General for Scotland purports now to
rely, as she would have it, to give this court the power to pronounce a further sist in these
post-permission judicial review proceedings, is unclear, given that the possibility of
pronouncing a sist is not listed among the particular orders which may be pronounced by
the court in relation to the speedy determination of a judicial review petition once
permission has been granted for it to proceed, and there is nothing in the Rules of Court
applicable to judicial review procedure which would allow for it.<\/p>\n
refuse on grounds of competency the respondent\u2019s motion for a new sist to be placed in
this case on the grounds that:
\u2013 to grant a sist at this stage of these proceedings would be incompatible with the
principle of speedy determination which applied to the present judicial review public
law proceedings; and
\u2013 there is no applicable Rule of Court (nor any inherent power compatible with the
principle of speedy determination) under reference to which a sist might properly be
pronounced.<\/p>\n
2026. By interlocutor pronounced on this date the following timetable and case
management orders were made:
\u2013 parties to adjust their pleadings until 9 February 2026 being two weeks prior to the
date of the procedural hearing fixed for 23 February 2026
\u2013 final versions of parties\u2019 pleadings to be lodged no later than 16 February 2026,
being one week prior to the procedural hearing fixed for 23 February 2026
\u2013 affidavits to be lodged in respect of those facts founded on by a party at the substantive
hearing no later than 16 February 2026, being one week prior to the procedural
hearing fixed for 23 February 2026
\u2013 statements of issues to be lodged no later than 16 February 2026, being one week
prior to the procedural hearing fixed for 23 February 2026
\u2013 notes of argument to be lodged no later than 16 February 2026, being one week
prior to the procedural hearing fixed for 23 February 2026
\u2013 parties to confirm whether they are ready to proceed to the substantive hearing no later
no later than 16 February 2026, being one week prior to the procedural hearing fixed
for 23 February 2026
\u2013 23 February 2026 at 10am being fixed as the date for the procedural hearing;
\u2013 parties to lodge a list and bundle of authorities, marked up to indicate the parts the
party intends to rely on no later than 7 March 2026, being 10 days prior to the
substantive hearing.
\u2013 17 and 18 of March 2026 at 10am fixed as the dates for the substantive hearing;<\/p>\n
section 6 of the Justice and Security Act 2013 that these proceedings are proceedings in
which a closed material application may be made to the court and refusing in hoc statu the
respondent\u2019s motion for the proceedings to be sisted \u2013 set out the following timetable for
further procedure:
\u2013 by 4pm on 9 April 2026 for the respondent to lodge with the court and serve on the
Special Advocates, any application in terms of section 8 of the Justice and Security Act
2013, together with any material subject to any section 8 application;
\u2013 by 4pm on 15 April 2026 for the Special Advocates to advise the respondent
whether they object to any section 8 application, and intimate to the Respondent any
submissions in response to any section 8 application,
\u2013 by 4pm on 29 April 2026 for the respondent to intimate to the Special Advocates
any response to the Special Advocates\u2019 said submissions,
\u2013 by no later than 6 May 2026 for the Special Advocates and counsel for the
respondent to meet in order to narrow any outstanding section 8 issues;
\u2013 by 4pm on 13 May 2026 for the Special Advocates and Counsel for the respondent
to notify the court whether a hearing to consider the section 8 application is required,
\u2013 no later than 4pm on 15 May 2026, if a hearing is considered to be required,
appoints for the Special Advocates and Counsel for the respondent to lodge with the
court a Joint Minute in terms of RCS 104.9(5) identifying the issues which cannot be
agreed between them, together with any CLOSED Notes of Argument and\/or CLOSED
affidavits that they wish to rely upon,
\u2013 on Wednesday 27 May 2026 at 10am for a CLOSED court hearing to be held before
the Hon. Lord Young;
\u2013 within seven days of the hearing of 27 May 2026 for the respondent to provide,
if required, any further disclosure to the petitioner, to do so;
\u2013 for the Special Advocates and Counsel for the respondent to agree, if possible, a date
for a CLOSED substantive hearing together with a procedural timetable for the
respondent and Special Advocate to intimate to each other and to lodge with the court
any CLOSED Note of Arguments and any CLOSED affidavits that they wish to rely
upon at the CLOSED substantive hearing;
\u2013 no later than 10 days prior to the substantive hearing for parties to lodge a list
and bundle of authorities, which should be marked up to indicate the parts the party
intends to rely on
\u2013 by no later than 4pm on 2 June 2026 for parties to adjust their pleadings and to
lodge final versions
\u2013 appoints notes of argument, statements of issues, productions and affidavits to be
lodged no later than 4pm on 9 June 2026;
\u2013 assigns 10 June 2026 at 9.30am as the date for a further continued procedural
hearing in respect of open procedure at which the petitioner might participate<\/p>\n
pronounced by the court:
\u2013 permission granted to the respondent under sections 8 and 11(4) of the Justice and
Security Act 2013 for:
(i) the respondent to withhold sensitive material otherwise than to the Court and
the Special Advocate, for the purpose of the respondent\u2019s section 6 application;
(ii) the sensitive material lodged by the respondent in relation to the section 6
application to be kept separately from the process by the Deputy Principal
Clerk;
(iii) for the sensitive material lodged by the respondent in relation to the section 6
application not to be borrowed or inspected by any party other than by a legal
representative of the Secretary of State or by any Special Advocate; and
(iv) the requirements of RCS 4.5(1)(b), 4.6 and 4.11 to be disapplied in respect of
the sensitive material lodged by the Respondent in relation to the section 6
application
\u2013 sists the cause until 30 July 2026 (being the date when the question of onward appeal
to the UK Supreme Court from the decision 15 June 2026 of the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales in Ammori v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 721 had been resolved)
(which occurred on 30 July 2026).<\/p>\n
judicial review application since permission was granted on 26 January 2026 for the
matter to proceed to a substantive hearing and decision.<\/p>\n
by the respondent in this case, which run contrary to the requirements properly to be
expected of public authorities when faced with public law based challenges to the
lawfulness of their actions.<\/p>\n
to conduct their defence to these challenges as if a \u201cwar of attrition\u201d. In the English
proceedings the UK Government has taken (ultimately ill-founded) procedural points and
has pursued procedural appeal wherever possible.<\/p>\n
reckoning before and by the court as to the lawfulness of the policy to proscribe Palestine
Action in England and Wales and perhaps also seeking to deplete the financial resources
available to the claimant to fund the prosecution of this challenge.<\/p>\n
\u2013 the UK Government first of all opposed permission being granted to the applicant in
the English proceedings: R (Ammori) v. Home Department [2025] EWHC 2013
(Admin) (per Chamberlain J. judgment handed down on 30 July 2025).
\u2013 the UK Government then unsuccessfully appealed against the grant of permission to
take the judicial review: R (Ammori) v. Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1311
[2026] WLR 1000 (per Lady Carr CJ, Lewis LJ, and Edis LJ judgment handed down
on 17 October 2025).
\u2013 the UK Government lost in the substantive hearing of the judicial review application
before the Divisional Court: R (Ammori) v. Home Department [2026] EWHC 292
(Admin) [2026] HRLR 9 (per Dame Victoria Sharp President of the King\u2019s Bench
Division, Swift J and Steyn J handed down on 13 February 2026).
\u2013 the UK Government then sought and obtained an expedited hearing of its appeal to the
Court of Appeal with hearing dates between 28 to 30 April 2026.
\u2013 as noted above some 6 week later, on 15 June 2026 a 5 judge Court of Appeal (Lady
Carr CJ, Sir Geoffrey Vos MR, Edis LJ Vice President of the Criminal Division of the
Court of Appeal, Lewis LJ and Whipple LJ) handed down its decision upholding the
UK Government appeal.
\u2013 once the EWCA judgment was handed down the UK Government then immediately
filed a motion with the Court of Appeal requiring that the applicant apply to that court
for permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court by 22 June 2026 (i.e. just seven
days of that court\u2019s substantive decision upholding the UK Government appeal).
\u2013 an application for permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court was duly put before
the Court of Appeal by the applicant on 22 June 2026. But the UK Government then
opposed the grant of permission, which was then refused by the Court of Appeal.
5.4 Had the concern of the UK Government truly been for there to be a final authoritative
decision applicable across the UK on the lawfulness of the proscription of Palestine Action
it would have supported the applicant\u2019s PTA application.
5.5 In any event, notwithstanding the UK Government opposing permission to appeal from
the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in its favour, the UK Supreme
Court granted the Ammori applicant such permission and the matter is now, as we have
noted above, going to a substantive hearing before the UKSC on 4 and 5 November 2026.<\/p>\n
PALESTINE ACTION<\/strong><\/p>\n
Supreme Court on an appeal from the Court of Appeal of England and Wales upholds the
lawfulness under English law of its proscription as a terrorist organisation in England and
Wales, this this ruling will apply equally to and for Scotland (and to and for Northern
Ireland).<\/p>\n
under English law then \u2013 on the Advocate General\u2019s analysis at least \u2013 it must follow it
cannot have been properly proscribed under Scots law or under Northern Irish law, again
on the assumption there are no principles specific to English law, Scots law or Northern
Irish law that might allow for a different approach on this issue to be taken across the
internal national jurisdictions of the UK.<\/p>\n
completely the wrong way round. What Jwanczuk tells is that the courts in each of the
jurisdictions of the UK have to reach their decision independently of how courts in other
UK jurisdictions have reached them.<\/p>\n
proscribe Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation was an incident in Scotland in June
2022. In her written statement to the House of Commons made on 23 June 2025 (over 3
years after the Glasgow incident) she said this of it:
\u201cDuring Palestine Action\u2019s attack against the Thales defence factory in Glasgow in
2022, the group caused over a million pounds worth of damage including to parts
essential to submarines.
The Sheriff, in passing custodial sentences for the attackers\u2019 violent crimes, spoke of
the panic among staff who feared for their safety as pyrotechnics and smoke bombs
were thrown in the area where they were evacuating.
He further recorded the extent of damage to legitimate business activities which
included \u2018matters of nationwide security\u2019 and disputed the groups\u2019 claims its actions
were non-violent.\u201d<\/p>\n
the Home Secretary\u2019s statement made in justification for the order at issue that what
occurred during a protest incident at Thales SA, in Glasgow on 1 June 2022 constituted
acts of terrorism on the basis that they involved the use or threat of action which was said
to \u201cserious damage\u201d to, and only to property and was \u201cdesigned to influence a government
to advance a political, religious or ideological cause\u201d such as to fall within the ambit of
section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000.<\/p>\n
refused in the Administrative Court below (see R (Ammori) v Home Secretary [2025]
EWHC 2013 (Admin) at [77]-[80]), the retrospective characterisation of what is said to
have happened in Glasgow on 1 June 2022 at Thales SA as \u201cterrorism\u201d is not a matter
which can be disputed in the English proceedings. Indeed the Court of Appeal (in its
judgment at para 150) relies heavily on what it understands from the sentencing sheriff\u2019s
reported remarks as happened in Glasgow on 1 June 2022 in support of its finding in
favour of the lawfulness of the Home Secretary proscription of Palestine Action as a
terrorist organisation.<\/p>\n
Scottish proceedings. So too is the issue of consultation with actors in Scotland. A court in
Scotland is in a far better position to understand and situate the relevant actors in the
Scottish context; and separately, the circumstances of the June 2022 protest action at
Thales SA in Glasgow in respect of which the five individuals charged all pled guilty to
charges of breach of the peace. Two of these five also pled guilty to \u201cdamaging property\u201d
in gluing their hands to the edge of the roof. And one of the five, in addition, pled guilty to
behaving in a threatening or abusive manner when police arrive to de-bond her hands from
the roof when she was obstructive and required to be restrained using leg restraints. The
first four accused were sentenced by the Sheriff to serve a total of 12 months incarceration
and the fifth who resisted arrest received a total sentence of 14 months imprisonment.<\/p>\n
sheriff mentioned in his remarks the setting off of \u201cpyrotechnics including smoke bombs\u201d
at the start of what turned out to be a day long occupation of the premises. The sheriff
noted in his sentencing that \u201cin one criminal justice social work report it is said that \u2018the
offence is non-violent in nature and was planned as well as intended to cause disruption\u2019\u201d.
He then comments in passing that \u201cthrowing pyrotechnics into areas where people are
being evacuated could hardly be described as non-violent\u201d.<\/p>\n
charged as and only as \u201cbreach of the peace\u201d. None of the individual was charged with any
form of terrorism offences. The justification for the Home Secretary to found on the
circumstances of this case as a primary basis for the proscription in Scotland, as well as
the rest of the UK, of Palestine Action can therefore usefully be considered and determined
by the courts in Scotland in the present proceedings. So too can the issue of consultation
with relevant Scottish actors, a matter not considered by the courts of England and Wales.<\/p>\n
now be pronounced in this case (given the history slipping timetables and frankly
unwarranted delays) which will best allow for the \u201cspeedy determination\u201d of the petition.<\/p>\n
will not be finally resolved by the decision of this court at first instance.<\/p>\n
challenge to the proscription in Scotland of Palestine Action \u2013 will be reclaimed against to
the Inner House.<\/p>\n
authoritatively determine the question of the lawfulness of the proscription in Scotland of
Palestine Action, because the UK Supreme Court will be exercising its jurisdiction as a
court of England and Wales rather than as a Scottish court and its decision on this matter
will bind neither this court nor the Inner House. 9 Section 41 of the Constitutional Reform
Act 2005, so far as relevant, as follows:
\u201c41. Relation to other courts etc
(1) Nothing in this Part [3 concerning the UK Supreme Court] is to affect the
distinctions between the separate legal systems of the parts of the United Kingdom.
(2) A decision of the [UK] Supreme Court on appeal from a court of any part of the
United Kingdom, other than a decision on a devolution matter, is to be regarded as the
decision of a court of that part of the United Kingdom.\u201d<\/p>\n
order to ensure the speedy final and authoritative determination of the present challenge
is for this court to report the whole cause to the Inner House, without the matter going to
a substantive hearing and determination by the court.<\/p>\n
the view of the Lord Ordinary \u2013 the substantive challenge to the proscription in Scotland
of Palestine Action because it will have the advantage of knowledge of two reasoned
decision from the English courts \u2013 on the equivalent proscription in England and Wales \u2013
at this stage of proceedings.<\/p>\n
for a ruling under and in terms of rule 34.1(1) of the Rules of the Court.<\/p>\n
under rule 34.1(1) shall be final\u201d: qv Davidson v. Scottish Ministers (No 3): incidental
application re Leave to appeal to House of Lords, 2005 1 SC (HL) 1 at \u00a713.<\/p>\n
habile to be appealed to the UK Supreme Court (see subsection 40(2)(a) of the Court of
Session Act 1988), provided that the necessary permission to appeal has been granted by
the appropriate court (subsections 40(1) and\/or 40(3) of the Court of Session Act 1988).<\/p>\n
substantive hearing and reaching his own determination on it, the option of reporting the
case to the Inner House is the most appropriate procedure to be adopted by the court in
all the circumstances of this case.<\/p>\n
Inner House making a decision on the Scottish challenge; and then for the UK Supreme
Court to have the benefit of the decision of two appellate courts, respectively determining
at the same time under Scots law and separately under English law, the lawfulness of the
proscription of Palestine Action. The UK Supreme Court will then be able to determine
this matter finally and most importantly authoritatively both in and for Scotland, and in
and for England and Wales.<\/p>\n
same time appeals from the decisions of the (intermediate) appellate courts in relation to
legislation which applies across the United Kingdom. The resolution of any differences in
approach as between the Scottish and English intermediate appellate court is indeed said
in Jwanczuk to be one of the justifications for the UK Supreme Court\u2019s existence.<\/p>\n
Supreme Court to get the benefit of the views of experienced appellate judges from both
sides of the border: see for example: R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28\/Eba v.
Advocate General for Scotland [2011] UKSC 29; and Cherry v. Advocate General for
Scotland\/Miller v. Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41. Indeed, standing that a powerfully
constituted bench of three in the Divisional Court (including the President of the King\u2019s
Bench Division) reached one conclusion on the lawfulness of proscription; and a (very
unusual) bench of five in the Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion, the Supreme
Court would perhaps be assisted to an even greater extent than normal by also having the
reasoned determination of the Inner House available to it.<\/p>\n
authoritative ruling can be handed down by the UK Supreme Court which unequivocally
applies to both sides of the border and thereby enhances and achieves the legal certainty
required to ensure compatibility with and respect for the Convention rights of all those
many individuals, north and south of the border, affected (including in relation to its
chilling effect) by the decision of the Home Secretary to list Palestine Action as a proscribed
terrorist organisation. Such an authoritative determination affording legal certainty is
needed in the present context, given that individuals in Scotland have been arrested and
prosecuted, and continue to face the risk of arrest and prosecution, for offences grounded
in the proscription of Palestine Action.<\/p>\n
for the Lord Ordinary to report this case to the Inner House.<\/p>\n
motion, the petitioner moves that the court \u2013 acting under and in terms of Rule of Court
34.1(1) \u2013 report the cause as a whole to the Inner House for its ruling on the substance of
this judicial review challenge.<\/p>\n
on behalf of the UK Government \u2013 for example that the present proceedings remain sisted
pending the determination by the UK Supreme Court of any appeal against the decision of
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, leaving the petitioner with the possibility simply
of applying to intervene in any English appeal in the UK Supreme Court \u2013 would be wholly
inappropriate, for at least the following reasons, among others:
(1) Any resulting decision of the UK Supreme Court in a solely English appeal would not
be binding as a matter of precedent in and for Scotland.
(2) The UK Supreme Court might choose to deny outright any application for the
petitioner to intervene.
(3) Even if the UK Supreme Court allowed the possibility for an intervention by the
petitioner, that court might determine that it will allow limited intervention only on
particular aspects or arguments, rather than the full range of the argument which the
petitioner might wish to present.
(4) Any arguments which the UK Supreme Court might allow to be heard from the
petitioner would be considered and determined against a background of there being
no independent Scottish court consideration of these arguments.
(5) It is particularly important for the UK Supreme Court to hear the views of the Scottish
courts because one of the main justifications on which the Court of Appeal of England
and Wales relied upon in deciding that Palestine Action was engaging in and
advocating for terrorism is a decision and sentencing remarks of a sheriff in a
criminal case at Glasgow Sheriff Court and how the Scottish authorities (the police,
the Crown and the sheriff) dealt with it (Ammori, [2026] EWCA Civ 721 paras 53,
150). Therefore, it is crucial that there is a complete and full understanding of the full
details and circumstances of that decision (and all other Scotland related decisions),
which only the Inner House can bring.
(6) In any event, there is no identity of parties (or arguably interests) between the
English and Scottish proceedings. Ms Ammori, the applicant in the English
proceedings, is a co-founder of Palestine Action and may be said to be a
representative of that organisation. But membership of an association is not to be
conflated with a desire to express support for the organisation and its action and
aims. The petitioner in the present Scottish proceedings is in no sense a
representative of the proscribed association. He is not its agent, or alter ego, nor
can he bind it in any way, nor does he in any sense act for it. He seeks to review the
proscription order because he is not, in Scotland, \u2018able to freely express his political
support for the organisation\u2019. It is on that basis that he has standing to pursue the
present challenge as a concerned and politically involved citizen and Scot.<\/p>\n
once more invites the Lord Ordinary to report the whole cause to the Inner House for a
ruling under and in terms of rule 34.1(1) of the Rules of the Court.<\/p>\n
be afforded the last and authoritative word on the lawfulness under Scots law of Palestine
Action in Scotland. That is a separate question in law from the issue of the lawfulness
under English law of the proscription of Palestine Action in England and Wales. There are
undoubtedly some common background factual and legal issues as between the two
challenges. It is accordingly expedient that the two appeals be heard and determined at
the same time before the same bench of the UK Supreme Court.<\/p>\n
petitioner urges on the court.<\/p>\n
final authoritative resolution of these matters in Scotland. That course should not be
permitted it by this court.<\/p>\n
court to grant both parts of that motion.
AIDAN O\u2019NEILL KC
MARK BONI, ADVOCATE
TONY CONVERY, ADVOCATE<\/p>\n