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On February 20, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant William Morris Endeavor Entertainment (WME) in a copyright infringement claim brought forth by Plaintiff StudioFest,[1]<\/a> a production company. It is alleged that WME\u2019s film Together<\/em> infringed on the screenplay of the movie Better Half,<\/em> whose copyright is owned by the Plaintiff.[2]<\/a> The Plaintiff only claimed a screenplay violation and alleged that in 2020, it sent the full script and synopsis to the agents of co-defendants Dave Franco and Alison Brie as part of an offer to have them star in the project. According to the complaint, Franco and Brie passed on the offer, but later produced and starred in Together<\/em>, a film which, StudioFest alleged, was developed only after the defendants had access to Better Half<\/em>.[3]<\/a> StudioFest claims this was not a coincidence or an independent creation, but rather an intentional scheme in which Franco and Brie rejected the project so they could make a similar film themselves with another WME client, co-defendant Michael Shanks.[4]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n The complaint states that Together<\/em> copied the protected expression of Better Half<\/em> across plot, themes, characters, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, and sequence of events.[5]<\/a> StudioFest points to many alleged similarities, including the premise of a couple \u201cphysically fused together as a metaphor for codependency,\u201d repeated references to Plato\u2019s Symposium<\/em>, similar character types and jobs, awkward proposal scenes, animals or drawings foreshadowing fusion, a bathroom concealment scene, failed efforts to separate including hospital and chainsaw discussions, and an ending involving the Spice Girls\u2019 album Spiceworld<\/em> and the song \u201c2 Become 1.\u201d[6]<\/a> Based on those alleged similarities, StudioFest claims defendants have committed copyright infringement. The production company seeks damages, disgorgement of profits, attorneys\u2019 fees, and injunctive relief.[7]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n While the defendants did not dispute access to the script of Better Half<\/em>, they claimed that the works are not substantially similar as a matter of law.[8]<\/a> They argued the shared premise is simply an unprotectable idea, that Symposium<\/em> itself is public-domain material and not protectable, that some similarities are just natural outgrowths of a \u201cconjoined lovers\u201d story, and that the Spice Girls references are used differently so nobody can \u201cmonopolize\u201d them.[9]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n The district court held that, although the general idea of \u201cconjoined lovers,\u201d Plato\u2019s Symposium<\/em> itself, and some individual scenes might be unprotectable, StudioFest had still plausibly alleged enough protectable similarities in plot, sequence of events, and theme between the two films to allow the copyright claim to proceed.[10]<\/a> The court pointed to the shared \u201cinversion\u201d of Plato\u2019s Symposium<\/em>, the codependency\/enmeshment theme, and overlapping details such as the bathroom scene, drawings foreshadowing fusion, awkward proposals, and the recurring Spice Girls\/vinyl motif as some of the similarities making it sufficient for the complaint to survive at the pleading stage.[11]<\/a> As of today, the case is still ongoing, and this blog will provide a brief analysis regarding what will matter the most going forward.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n To succeed on a copyright infringement claim, the plaintiff must show that it owns a valid copyright in the work and that the defendant copied protected elements of the plaintiff\u2019s work.[12]<\/a> Here, it is established that StudioFest owns a valid copyright in the screenplay of Better Half<\/em>.[13]<\/a> The question is whether StudioFest can establish copying, which requires both copying-in-fact and copying-in-law. Copying-in-fact may be established either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.[14]<\/a> Direct evidence would include, for example, an admission by the defendant that they copied the plaintiff\u2019s work. Where there is no direct evidence, copying-in-fact may be established by circumstantial evidence showing that the defendant had access to the plaintiff\u2019s work and that the two works are substantially similar to support an inference of copying.[15]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Copying-in-law, by contrast, asks whether the defendant copied protected expression rather than merely using unprotectable ideas.[16]<\/a> Copying-in-law requires the court to filter out the unprotected elements of a work, such as ideas, public-domain material, and scenes \u00e0 faire, and compare only the protected expression.[17]<\/a> The Ninth Circuit uses a two-part test for substantial similarity: the extrinsic test and the intrinsic test. The extrinsic test is a matter of law and may be decided by the judge, often with an analytic dissection of the works\u2019 expressive elements. If the plaintiff satisfies that test, the case may proceed to the intrinsic test, where the jury considers whether the ordinary reasonable observer would regard the works as substantially similar in their protected expression.[18]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n The defendants here seem to dispute both copying-in-fact and copying-in-law. Because there is no direct evidence of copying, copying-in-fact would have to be established by circumstantial evidence. Although the defendants did not dispute having access to the plaintiff\u2019s work, that does not mean the issue of copying-in-fact has been resolved.[19]<\/a> At later stages of the case, the defendants will likely argue that Together<\/em> was independently created and that any similarities are better explained by coincidence, common source material, or the natural development of a story built around conjoined lovers.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n This is also where Michael Shanks\u2019s denial may become relevant, although not because the statement itself proves anything. Shanks has publicly disputed direct copying and stated that Together<\/em> is rooted in his own experience.[20]<\/a> That statement alone is not enough, but it points to independent creation as a potential defense that defendants will likely develop as the case proceeds. Whether that defense succeeds or not will likely depend not on public statements, but on other evidence such as screenplay drafts, development timelines, internal communications, and testimony showing when the key story elements were created. If the defendants can show that the relevant plot points, themes, and motifs were developed independently, their defense would be stronger. If, however, documents obtained during discovery suggest that those elements emerged only after the defendants gained access to Better Half<\/em>, StudioFest\u2019s argument on copying-in-fact becomes considerably stronger.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Regarding copying-in-law, the key issue at the extrinsic test stage will be whether the protected expressions of the shared idea are substantially similar after the unprotectable material is filtered out. StudioFest\u2019s strongest argument appears to be that the \u201ccore plot point\u201d of both works is not merely conjoined lovers, but a reversal of Plato\u2019s Symposium<\/em>: a forced physical merger between two human beings, with both works repeatedly returning to Symposium<\/em> in similar sequences of scenes. The defendants have argued that the mechanism of separation is different, but, as the court pointed out,[21]<\/a> simply identifying a difference in mechanism does not explain why the overall plot structure, thematic framing, and recurring motifs are materially similar.<\/p>\n Therefore, the outcome of the case will likely turn on two questions: whether WME can ultimately prove independent creation, and whether, after filtering out unprotectable elements, enough protected expression remains to support a finding of substantial similarity under copying-in-law.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Zeyu Liu is a Third Year Law Student at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and a Staff Editor at the Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal. Zeyu is interested in intellectual property law, antitrust law, and corporate law.<\/p>\n _________________________________________________________________<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Order Denying Defendants\u2019 Motion to Dismiss at 16, StudioFest LLC v. William Morris Endeavor Ent., LLC, No. 2:25-cv-04294-JLS-SK (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2026) [hereinafter Denial of Motion to Dismiss<\/em>].<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Id.<\/em> at 1.<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Id.<\/em> at 2.<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Complaint \u00b6 28, <\/em>StudioFest LLC v. William Morris Endeavor Ent., LLC, No. 2:25-cv-04294 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2025).<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Id.<\/em> \u00b6 5.<\/p>\n [6]<\/a> Id<\/em>. \u00b6\u00b6 39\u201345, 47, 50, 52\u201353, 61\u201362, 69, 74.<\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Id<\/em>. \u00b6\u00b6 81\u201388.<\/p>\n [8]<\/a> Denial of Motion to Dismiss, supra <\/em>note 1, at 7.<\/p>\n [9]<\/a> Id.<\/em> at 12.<\/p>\n [10]<\/a> Id.<\/em> at 8.<\/p>\n [11]<\/a> Id.<\/em> at 11\u201314.<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000).<\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Denial of Motion to Dismiss, supra<\/em> note 1, at 7.<\/p>\n [14]<\/a> Id. <\/em><\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n [16]<\/a> Jacobus Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117\u201319 (9th Cir. 2018).<\/p>\n [17]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 1118\u201320.<\/p>\n [18]<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/p>\n [19]<\/a> Denial of Motion to Dismiss, supra<\/em> note 1.<\/p>\n