Europe enters a more contested decade than any since the end of the Cold War. Yet the frontline shaping its security is no longer limited to land, sea, air or even space.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
It runs directly through the digital backbone that powers modern life: the networks, data\u00a0infrastructures\u00a0and connectivity systems on which governments, economies and armed forces depend.\u00a0<\/p>\n
But\u00a0Europe will not be secure until it takes this digital backbone\u2019s security seriously, and governs its openness through risk-based, verifiable sovereignty\u00a0rather than isolationism or complacency.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0Europe will not be secure until it takes this digital backbone\u2019s security seriously, and governs its openness through risk-based, verifiable sovereignty<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/figure>\n A digital frontline that\u00a0remains\u00a0dangerously exposed<\/strong>\u00a0<\/p>\n Hybrid threats no longer sit at the margins of European security.\u00a0In reality, they\u00a0cut straight through its core systems. Hospitals, energy grids, transport networks, financial\u00a0markets\u00a0and military command-and-control all rely on constant, resilient connectivity.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n And when those systems falter, nations falter. Recent blackouts in Portugal and Spain revealed what this means in practice.\u00a0A \u2018digital failure\u2019 is not an IT incident. It is a national security event.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Adversaries have already drawn the lesson. Subsea cables carrying 95 percent of the world\u2019s internet traffic face mounting sabotage risks. Satellites have become open theatres of geopolitical competition. And cyberattacks now routinely target both critical national infrastructure and the commercial networks that underpin\u00a0defense\u00a0readiness.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Despite this, much of Europe\u2019s digital backbone is still approached as a utility, not a strategic asset. Market forces, on their own, cannot deliver the resilience,\u00a0redundancy\u00a0and diversity that modern deterrence requires. Piecemeal upgrades and fragmented responsibilities across civil,\u00a0military\u00a0and regulatory silos leave avoidable gaps that adversaries will inevitably exploit.\u00a0<\/p>\n A \u2018digital failure\u2019 is not an IT incident. It is a national security event.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/figure>\n Europe must therefore elevate secure connectivity to the level of\u00a0defense\u00a0preparedness \u2014 politically,\u00a0financially\u00a0and operationally. It requires moving beyond incrementalism to a coordinated framework that fosters and defends critical digital infrastructure \u2014 one that enables governments and operators to plan, train and respond together before, not during, the next crisis.\u00a0<\/p>\n Sovereignty is about control, not isolation<\/strong>\u00a0<\/p>\n Connectivity alone is not the issue. Europe\u2019s strategic vulnerability also stems from how it governs the technologies on which its digital backbone depends.\u00a0<\/p>\n And while digital sovereignty is one pillar of Europe\u2019s wider resilience agenda \u2014 spanning critical value chains such as\u00a0defense, automotive, chemicals and energy \u2014 it is the pillar without which none of the others can function.\u00a0<\/p>\n Europe cannot\u00a0attain\u00a0digital sovereignty by continuing excessive dependence on a small number of non-European providers. But it also cannot achieve it by walling itself off from global innovation. Both extremes weaken resilience.\u00a0<\/p>\n That\u2019s\u00a0why sovereignty done right means governing openness on Europe\u2019s terms. Europe must keep critical operations in trusted European hands while\u00a0maintaining\u00a0access to the scale,\u00a0performance\u00a0and innovation that global platforms can provide.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n This approach starts with understanding sovereignty across three dimensions:\u00a0<\/p>\n \u2014\u00a0Data sovereignty<\/strong>:\u00a0who has lawful access to information.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u2014\u00a0Operational sovereignty<\/strong>:\u00a0who runs and can intervene in critical systems.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u2014\u00a0Technological sovereignty<\/strong>:\u00a0which capabilities Europe must own or control.\u00a0<\/p>\n The false choice between \u2018ban foreign tech\u2019 and \u2018do nothing\u2019 is a trap. The real path forward is risk-based, proportionate and verifiable. We must define what truly requires European control and work with like-minded international partners to build a trusted technology ecosystem. Sovereignty needs to be\u00a0demonstrated\u00a0in practice, not merely asserted in policy.\u00a0<\/p>\n This approach would also enable Europe to pool industrial capacity with trusted partners such as Japan, Canada, Australia, the United\u00a0Kingdom\u00a0and South Korea. This is cooperation that strengthens Europe rather than diluting control.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n From principles to verifiable control<\/strong>\u00a0<\/p>\n Europe should reject blanket bans based on EU borders that raise costs, slow next-generation deployment and\u00a0fail to\u00a0deliver true control. Instead, sovereignty must be translated into concrete, auditable mechanisms that strengthen resilience.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n To deliver it, Europe should follow four core principles:\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n In parallel, Europe should adopt a single EU framework defining practical levels across the data, operational and technological dimensions. This would give CIOs, regulators and public bodies clarity and consistency.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n From doctrine to delivery<\/strong>\u00a0<\/p>\n As the dust settles on the annual Munich Security Conference, Europe faces a defining choice. It can carry on treating its digital backbone as regulatory plumbing and watch vulnerabilities compound. Or it can recognise this backbone for what it is \u2014 a core line of defence.\u00a0<\/p>\n The real test of seriousness is whether governments and operators can plan together, train together and respond together when systems are stressed.\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/figure>\n The real test of seriousness is whether governments and operators can plan together, train together and respond together when systems are stressed.\u00a0And this depends on whether investment, procurement and certification systems finally move at the speed security demands.\u00a0<\/p>\n The way forward lies neither in dependence nor in fantasies of self-sufficiency. It must be grounded in risk-based sovereignty, delivered through verifiable control, modernized\u00a0infrastructure\u00a0and deeper public\u2013private cooperation, aligned with trustworthy allies.\u00a0<\/p>\n Ultimately, Europe\u00a0cannot defend what it cannot connect, and it cannot compete if it closes itself off. Europe will fail this critical strategic test if the regulatory agenda for connectivity \u2014 the Digital Networks Act, Cybersecurity\u00a0Act\u00a0and merger guidelines revisions \u2014 does little to strengthen the very networks its security depends on.\u00a0<\/p>\n If Europe gets this right, it can build a digital backbone capable of deterring adversaries, supporting allies, protecting citizens and powering innovation for decades to come.\u00a0<\/p>\n Disclaimer<\/em><\/p>\n POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n More information here<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n\n
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