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<\/figure>\nI was invited on several occasions to sign the\u00a0Montreal Declaration on Animal Exploitation<\/em><\/a>. I appreciate that the drafters asked me to sign but, for the following reasons, I am unable to do so.<\/p>\n First, the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0Does Not Reject All Animal Use<\/strong><\/p>\n What is the end \u2014 the ultimate goal \u2014 envisaged by the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>?<\/p>\n The\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0purports to seek \u201cthe end of animal exploitation.\u201d But what does that mean?<\/p>\n Just about\u00a0every<\/em>\u00a0animal charity condemns \u201canimal exploitation.\u201d But just about\u00a0all<\/em>\u00a0of these charities also promote various types of supposedly higher-welfare animal use. They may characterize factory farming practices as \u201cexploitation\u201d but promote supposedly more \u201chumane\u201d farming. They reject \u201cexploitation\u201d but give awards or praise to companies that produce or use these supposedly \u201chappy\u201d animal products. Some groups even have their own higher-welfare labels. The same is true of the signers of the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>. They oppose \u201cexploitation\u201d but many still promote various types of animal use.<\/p>\n To say that one opposes \u201canimal exploitation,\u201d without saying more, is meaningless and may \u2014 and almost always does \u2014 mean nothing more than that one is opposed to some practice that one finds immoral or unjust.<\/p>\n For precisely this reason, it has been and remains my view that we must be unequivocally clear that we seek the end of animal\u00a0use<\/em>.\u00a0We must be clear that\u00a0<\/em>all<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0use is exploitation.<\/em><\/p>\n The\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0does not do that \u2014 and could not do that \u2014 because many of the signers have in various ways explicitly\u00a0rejected<\/em>\u00a0the idea that all animal use is exploitation. Therefore, I cannot sign the\u00a0Declaration.<\/em><\/p>\n Second, the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0Does Not Promote Veganism as a Moral Imperative<\/strong><\/p>\n A central point in my\u00a0work<\/a>\u00a0since the 1990s has been that the animal rights movement has failed because it decoupled the means from the ends, and proposes means that are not suited to achieve the end of abolishing animal use. I have argued that means such as welfare reforms or single-issue campaigns are not only not conducive to the end of abolishing animal use but are actually counterproductive because they make people feel more comfortable about continuing to participate in animal use and thereby perpetuate it. It has been and remains my view that\u00a0veganism<\/em><\/a>\u00a0\u2014 not using animals for food, clothing, personal care products, research and medicine, entertainment, etc. to the extent practicable \u2014 is a necessary and non-negotiable means to the end of abolishing animal use.<\/p>\n As we saw above, the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0does not seek the end of all animal use. So it should not come as any surprise that it does not promote veganism as a means to end animal use. The\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0does not propose that we adopt veganism\u00a0now<\/em>\u00a0as a moral imperative as a means to that end. Indeed, the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0says\u00a0nothing<\/em>\u00a0specific about individual obligations.<\/p>\n I suspect that the problem here is that many of the signers are\u00a0not<\/em>\u00a0vegans. Moreover, some actively promote nonvegan strategies such as reducetarianism, or supposedly higher-welfare animal products; some have been very critical of consistent veganism. The\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0really could not have proposed veganism as a moral imperative without putting many of the signers in a most uncomfortable spot.<\/p>\n What does the\u00a0Declaration<\/em> propose as to what we should do? What is its normative message?<\/p>\n The\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0claims that we need to develop \u201cplant-based food systems.\u201d But what does that mean? Putting aside that eating animals is only one of the ways in which we exploit them, the food system\u00a0cannot<\/em>\u00a0change unless individuals demand that change and those who continue to eat, use, or otherwise participate in animal use are not likely to demand the change that they themselves refuse to adopt. The\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0proposes that we advocate for the closure of slaughterhouses. But that demand is absurd unless it is made in the context of the signers objecting to and refusing to participate in all animal use in the here and now. Slaughterhouses exist because the public demands animal products. The problem is not slaughterhouses; the problem is the demand for animal products. If ten slaughterhouses are closed today, but demand persists, ten more will be built or ten existing ones will expand production capacity.<\/p>\n So, in the end, what the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>, which explicitly states that change cannot happen \u201cin the short term,\u201d is doing is calling for incremental measures short of veganism now to get to some morally better position later.<\/p>\n Because the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0does not promote veganism as a moral imperative, I cannot sign it.<\/p>\n Third, the Declaration is Not Clear About \u201cNecessity\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n The Declaration states:<\/p>\n Insofar as it involves unnecessary violence and harm, we declare that animal exploitation is unjust and morally indefensible.\u201d<\/p>\n \u2026.<\/p>\n It is obviously possible to refrain from wearing leather, attending bullfights and rodeos, or showing children captive lions in zoos. Most of us can already do without animal foods and still be healthy, and the future development of a vegan economy will make things even easier.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n I have\u00a0argued<\/a>\u00a0now for several decades that even if we do not embrace an animal rights position, our conventional wisdom \u2014 that it is wrong to inflict \u201cunnecessary\u201d suffering on animals \u2014 means that we should at least reject imposing\u00a0any<\/em>\u00a0level of suffering, or death, on animals pursuant to\u00a0any<\/em>\u00a0use that does not involve a true\u00a0compulsion<\/em>\u00a0\u2014 where there is\u00a0no<\/em>\u00a0meaningful choice.<\/p>\n The problem is that without a\u00a0very<\/em>\u00a0clear and explicit compulsion component, a necessity requirement may be satisfied by mere inconvenience. For example, I would say that the only people for whom it is necessary to eat animal foods are those marooned and starving on the mythical desert island, adrift in the mythical lifeboat, or otherwise in a situation that could plausibly be described as involving compulsion. There are supporters of the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0who have sought to justify the consumption of animal products when traveling or dining out or when with non-vegan companions who might be put off by veganism.<\/p>\n The \u201cinconvenience\u201d approach to necessity is suggested by the claim that the \u201cfuture development of a vegan economy\u201d will make it easier to do without animal foods in the future. But it\u2019s perfectly easy for us to avoid animal foods\u00a0now<\/em>. Vegetables, fruits, beans, grains, seeds, etc. are available just about everywhere and are almost always cheaper than animal products. The \u201cfuture development of a vegan economy\u201d may mean that one may have more choices when stuck at an airport than between a piece of fruit or a bag of potato chips and a meat\/dairy\/egg selection, but I would never say that it is \u201cnecessary\u201d to choose animal foods in the airport. It\u2019s just a matter of the inconvenience (very minor in my view) of a limited choice.<\/p>\n Moreover, given that the signers condemn \u201cunnecessary harm and violence\u201d but not all signers are vegan, and very few promote veganism as a moral imperative, one is left to wonder about what is meant by \u201cunnecessary.\u201d<\/p>\n Because the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0is not clear as to what is meant by \u201cunnecessary,\u201d I cannot sign it.<\/p>\n Fourth, Necessity Cannot Tell the Whole Story in Any Event: The Problem of Animals as Property<\/strong><\/p>\n Although I have discussed the necessity component of our conventional thinking about animals in my work, I have made it clear that necessity \u2014\u00a0even if<\/em>\u00a0compulsion is part of the analysis \u2014\u00a0cannot<\/em>\u00a0provide the sole basis for ethical theory as it concerns animal use. The reason is that anything that is generally\/widely accepted as necessary falls outside a rule that is intended to target animal uses that are transparently frivolous. Indeed, many who reject transparently frivolous uses of animals \u2014 e.g., for food, clothing, or entertainment \u2014 hold that at least some animal use for scientific purposes is justified morally precisely because such use is \u201cnecessary\u201d to avoid a tremendous burden to humans.<\/p>\n There is language in the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0that possibly seems to address my concern. The\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0claims to \u201ccondemn the practices that involve treating animals as objects or commodities.\u201d Animals used to supply heart valves for humans, or for basic or applied research, or for other supposedly scientific purposes are all commodities or objects. The only reason why we can use them for these purposes is because they are commodities or objects.\u00a0They are property<\/em>.<\/p>\n Now, as someone who has\u00a0written<\/a>\u00a0extensively going back to the 1990s about how the property status of animals necessarily relegates animals to the status of being commodities or things despite our claiming to recognize that they have morally significant interests, I agree that, if we recognize that nonhuman animals have a morally significant interest in not being used as property, that addresses the problem of vivisection. We are not justified in using animals for vivisection\u00a0or for any institutionalized use<\/em>\u00a0because all institutionalized uses depend on animals being commodities.<\/p>\n But if the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0was intending to propose the abolition of the status of animals as property, and, in effect, to recognize that all sentient nonhumans have a moral right not to be used as property, then why didn\u2019t it just say that?<\/p>\n I suppose that the answer is that, as mentioned above, a number of the signers of the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0have explicitly\u00a0rejected<\/em>\u00a0the abolition of all institutionalized animal use that would be entailed by a rejection of the property status that makes that use possible in the first place.<\/p>\n As long as animals are property, it will not be possible to accord their interests equal consideration because their interests must<\/em> weigh less than the interests of property owners. That is what it is to have an institution of animal property.<\/p>\n Because the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0does not promote the abolition of the status of animals as property, I cannot sign it.<\/p>\n Fifth, the\u00a0Declaration\u00a0<\/em>Does Not Recognize Nonhuman Personhood<\/strong><\/p>\n The\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0recognizes that sentience is sufficient to have a morally significant interest in not suffering but does not recognize that sentience is sufficient to have a morally significant interest in continuing to live. That is, the\u00a0Declaration<\/em>\u00a0does not recognize that sentient nonhumans are\u00a0persons<\/em>. I suspect that the reason for this is that a number of the signers maintain explicitly that sentience is not sufficient for personhood and that painlessly killing a merely sentient animal does not harm that animal because the animal lives in an eternal present and is not connected to a future self.<\/p>\n I have rejected this position in my work (1<\/a>,2<\/a>) and maintain that sentience is sufficient for having a morally significant interest in continuing to live, and that deliberately killing a sentient animal, or participating in institutional uses of animals that result in their death, is morally wrong. Even if merely sentient nonhumans are stuck in an eternal present (and I doubt that most of the nonhumans we routinely use are), there is something it is to be them in each second of their consciousness and that necessarily includes awareness of what it is like to be them in each second.\u00a0Even if animals live in an eternal present, they are necessarily connected to the next second of their consciousness<\/em>. They are aware of themselves in every second. There is a \u201cme\u201d in every second. That is what it is to be subjectively aware. Sentience is a means to the end of continued existence; to say that a being who is sentient but does not have a humanlike mind has no interest in continued existence is like saying that humans who have eyes have no interest in continuing to see.<\/p>\n\n