Timeliness of Appeal<\/strong><\/p>\nAs an initial matter, the 2nd District Court of Appeals noted that under Rule 8.104(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court, an appeal must be filed on or before: (1) 60 days after the clerk of the superior court serves a \u201cNotice of Entry\u201d of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment showing the date either was served; (2) 60 days after a party serves a \u201cNotice of Entry\u201d of judgment or a file-endorsed copy of the judgment accompanied by a proof of service; or (3) 180 days after entry of judgment.<\/p>\n
Here, following the hearing on WEO\u2019s motion for contribution, the clerk of the superior court mailed a copy of trial court\u2019s minute order to WEO directing WEO to give notice to all other parties on November 22, 2023. While the minute order was accompanied by a certificate of mailing showing the date the minute order was mailed, the minute order itself was not dated. On November 29, 2023, WEO served a \u201cNotice of Ruling on Motion\u201d \u2013 not a \u201cNotice of Entry\u201d of judgment \u2013 attaching the minute order and the clerk\u2019s certificate of mailing.<\/p>\n
None of these documents, explained the Court of Appeal, satisfied the requirements of Rule 8.104(a)(1). Therefore, the deadline for R&J to file its notice of appeal was 180 days after judgment, which R&J timely did.<\/p>\n
Appeal of Contribution Order<\/strong><\/p>\nIn its notice of appeal form, R&J incorrectly checked the box that was appealing pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(3)-(13)<\/strong><\/span> (which applies to appeals from orders other than judgments) rather than 904.1(a)(2)<\/strong><\/span> (which applies to appeals from judgments). <\/p>\nWEO argued that R&J\u2019s failure to cite an applicable basis for appeal in the notice of appeal required the dismissal of the appeal.<\/p>\n
The Court of Appeal disagreed noting that Rule 8.100(a)(2) of the California Rules of Court requires that notices of appeal \u201cmust be liberally construed.\u201d<\/p>\n
R&J in turn argued that the trial court should have ruled that WEO\u2019s motion for contribution was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the trial court lifted the stay. R&J further argued that the trial court could not rely on the date WEO\u2019s original motion was filed because R&J\u2019s then pending appeal stayed further legal action and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear let alone take the original motion off calendar. Finally, R&J argued that WEO\u2019s second motion for contribution, which was not identical to its original motion for contribution, was not simply a re-filing of its original motion for contribution.<\/p>\n
The Court of Appeal disagreed. With respect to R&J\u2019s argument that WEO\u2019s second motion for contribution had to be filed within 30 days of trial court\u2019s lifting of the stay, the Court of Appeal stated:<\/p>\n
\nAlthough not expressly stated, we presume R&J is arguing the second motion, assuming it could rely on the original for purposes of timeliness, nonetheless had to be brought within 30 days of the remittitur. R&J cites no authority for this proposition. The only timeliness requirement imposed by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 883 is that the contribution motion be filed within 30 days of full satisfaction of judgment. The WEO defendants met this requirement when they filed their original contribution motion. Section 883 imposes no additional deadlines for placing the motion on calendar, restoring the motion to calendar if it is taken off calendar, or updating the motion to include postjudgment interest. Because the WEO defendants met the applicable deadline, there was no need for any \u201ctolling\u201d based on the section 916 stay. Nor does section 883 require the WEO defendants to revive, refile, update, or otherwise invoke their request for contribution by any particular time after the remittitur issued.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
The Court of Appeal also disagreed with R&J\u2019s contention that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear, let alone, take WEO\u2019s original motion off calendar and, therefore, the trial could not find that WEO\u2019s second motion was timely by reference to the date when WEO\u2019s original motion was filed: <\/p>\n
\nIf the purpose of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 916 [stay of proceedings in the trial court following appeal] is to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of the appeal, the trial court did just that by declining to address the contribution motion until the appeal was resolved. Merely accepting the filing of the motion and taking it off calendar does not jeopardize the status quo or risk affecting the outcome of the appeal. R&J cites no authority holding otherwise.<\/p>\n
The trial court\u2019s approach also makes sense as a matter of judicial economy. A section 916 stay does not permanently deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, it simply suspends that jurisdiction while the appeal is ongoing. Given the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction would be restored upon completion of the appeal, it was sensible for the court to stay further proceedings on the contribution motion by taking it off calendar rather than dismiss it outright and require the movant to refile the motion.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
Finally, the Court of Appeal disagreed with R&J\u2019s assertion that WEO\u2019s second motion for contribution \u201cmust be determined on its own merits, ignoring the first motion\u201d because it was not identical to WEO\u2019s original motion:<\/p>\n
\nConceivably, a second contribution motion could so materially differ from an earlier motion that the second motion must be treated as an entirely separate motion that cannot rely on the timeliness of the first. Here, however, R&J simply notes the differences, with no discussion of the differences or explanation why they are material, apart from the addition of postjudgment interest. This is insufficient to establish the second motion is anything other than the original motion permissibly updated to include postjudgment interest.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
Finally, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court\u2019s fifty-fifty pro-rata allocation was proper for several reasons. First, explained the Court of Appeal, the trial court properly considered WEO\u2019s contribution motion because the joint and several judgment against WEO and R&J did not apportion liability and there was no contractual agreement between the parties as to how such liability would be apportioned. Second, R&J\u2019s claims against WEO and the City remained to be tried. Thus, \u201cneither the contribution order nor R&J\u2019s compliance with that order impedes the parties\u2019 ability to litigate those untried matters. Finally, held the Court of Appeal, contribution orders encourage that judgments be paid promptly:<\/p>\n
\nIt is desirable that judgments be paid promptly. The contribution statutes encourage this by ensuring a judgment debtor who promptly pays a judgment can also promptly obtain repayment from the other judgment debtors. If, as R&J asserts, the judgment debtor cannot obtain repayment without first adjudicating all unresolved related matters among the judgment debtors, that judgment debtor would be discouraged from paying the judgment and shouldering the full financial burden for however long it takes to resolve those matters. This means the judgment creditor, despite having prevailed in its own lawsuit, may not be made whole until the judgment debtors sort out their own disputes. Better that all judgment debtors pay a pro rata share up front (absent a judgment or underlying instrument providing otherwise), thus promptly making the judgment creditor whole. Then, the judgment debtors can resolve any remaining issues among themselves, which may result in a debtor recovering some or all of its pro rata payment from the other debtors, an \u201coffset\u201d in the language of\u00a0Security Pacific.<\/em>(Supra,<\/em>\u00a025 Cal.App.4th at p. 707<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\nConclusion<\/h3>\n
And that, folks, is how sausage is made. It ain\u2019t pretty and often relies less on recipes than general concepts of fairness depending on the ingredients being used. One of my former colleagues even has a meat grinder in his office for this very reason. <\/p>\n
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