\n<\/p>\n
\n\u201c<\/i><\/span>We agree with the High Court that in \nThe Bench also cited Fatten Lall v. Guju Lall<\/i> to support its \n“Though \n“Whether
\nthe absence of any evidence to show as to who propounded this pedigree which
\nthe Subordinate Judge acted upon, it is not possible to say that it was an
\nadmission by Kishore Das through whom Ishar Das lays his claim and consequently
\nthe pedigree would not be an admission relevant under\u00a0<\/span><\/i>section
\n21\u00a0of the Indian Evidence Act. But the
\njudgment itself, we think, can be received in evidence under\u00a0<\/u><\/span>section
\n13\u00a0of the Evidence Act as a transaction<\/b> in which Kishore Das, from whom Ishar Das purports to
\nderive his title, asserted his right as a spiritual collateral of Mangal Das
\nand on that footing got a decree. The decree also recognised the right of
\nKishore Das to institute the suit as such collateral. We think therefore that
\nthe judgment could be received in evidence and although it is not by any means
\nconclusive and has got to be weighed and appraised for what it is worth, it can
\nbe used in support of the oral evidence adduced in the case. <\/span><\/u>It is to be noted that this part of the plaintiff’s story
\nwas not challenged by the defendants in their evidence at all. In our opinion
\ntherefore on the evidence on the record it is fully established that Sital Das
\nwas a spiritual collateral of Kishore Das.\u201d
\nadmissible in evidence under the provisions of\u00a0<\/span><\/i>sections 40<\/span><\/i><\/a>,\u00a0<\/span><\/i>41<\/span><\/i><\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0<\/span><\/i>42<\/span><\/i><\/a>\u00a0of the Evidence Act.\u00a0<\/span><\/i>Section 43<\/span><\/i><\/a>\u00a0which is extracted below,
\nclearly provides that those judgments which do not fall within the\u00a0four corners
\nof\u00a0<\/span><\/i>sections 40<\/span><\/i><\/a>\u00a0to\u00a0<\/span><\/i>42<\/span><\/i><\/a>\u00a0are inadmissible unless the
\nexistence of such judgment, order or decree is itself a fact in issue or a relevant
\nfact under some other provisions of the\u00a0<\/span><\/i>Evidence Act<\/span><\/i><\/a>:-
\nJudgments, etc., other than those mentioned in\u00a0<\/span><\/i>sections 40<\/span><\/i><\/a>
\nto\u00a0<\/span><\/i>42<\/span><\/i><\/a>, when relevant- Judgments,
\norders or decrees, other than those mentioned in\u00a0<\/span><\/i>sections
\n40<\/span><\/i><\/a>,\u00a0<\/span><\/i>41<\/span><\/i><\/a> and\u00a0<\/span><\/i>42<\/span><\/i><\/a>,
\nare irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment? order or decree is a
\nfact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of this Act.”
\njudgment as coming under the provisions of<\/span><\/i>\u00a0s. 43<\/span><\/i><\/a>, referred to above. We are, however,
\nof the opinion that where there is a specific provision covering the
\nadmissibility of a document, it is not open to the court to call into aid other
\ngeneral provisions in order to make a particular document admissible. In order
\nwords, if a judgment is not admissible as not falling within the ambit of\u00a0<\/span><\/i>sections 40<\/span><\/i><\/a>\u00a0to\u00a0<\/span><\/i>42<\/span><\/i><\/a>, it must fulfil the conditions of<\/span><\/i>\u00a0s. 43<\/span><\/i><\/a> otherwise it cannot be relevant
\nunder<\/span><\/i>\u00a0s. 13<\/span><\/i><\/a>\u00a0of the Evidence Act. The words
\n“other provisions of this Act” cannot cover s. 13 because this
\nsection does not deal with judgments at all It is also well settled that a
\njudgment in rem like judgments passed in probate, insolvency, matrimonial or
\nguardianship or other similar proceedings, is admissible in all cases whether
\nsuch judgments are inter parties or not. In
\nthe instant case, however, all the documents consisting of judgments filed are
\nnot judgments in rem and therefore, the question of their admissibility on that
\nbasis does not arise, As mentioned earlier, the judgments filed as Exhibits in
\nthe instant case, are judgments in personam and therefore, they do not fulfil
\nthe conditions mentioned in<\/b><\/span><\/i>\u00a0s. 41<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/b>\u00a0of the Evidence Act.\u201d
\nposition and then quoted a Calcutta High Court judgement and another Privy
\nCouncil judgement to hold as follows:<\/span>
\nthe recitals and findings in a judgment not inter parties are not admissible in
\nevidence, such a judgment and decree are, in our opinion, admissible to prove
\nthe fact that a decree was made in a suit between certain parties and for
\nfinding out for what lands the suit had been decreed.”
\nbased upon sound general principle or merely supported by reasons of
\nconvenience, the rule that so far as regards the truth of the matter decided a
\njudgment is not admissible evidence against one who is a stranger to the suit
\nhas long been accepted as a general rule in English law.”