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Shubhamanyu Lahiri<\/strong><\/p>\n On 22nd<\/sup> October 2025, the ICJ delivered its Advisory Opinion<\/a> on Israel\u2019s Obligations in Relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nationsto other International Organisations and Third States in and in Relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory<\/em>. In doing so, the primary jurisdictional constraint the Court faced was the question posed by the General Assembly resolution.<\/a> When requesting this Opinion, it only asked to reiterate Israel\u2019s obligations to the UN and other actors providing aid and humanitarian assistance in the Occupied Palestinian Territories under Article 96 of the UN Charter and Article 107 of the Rules of the Court, which allows the Court to respond to a legal question put before it via advisory proceedings (operative clause 10). This article contends that the Court managed to establish that Israel violated its obligations under international law without explicitly addressing the questions of legal consequences.<\/p>\n Such a constraint meant that even if the Court were to reiterate Israel\u2019s obligations, it would not be able to determine whether Israel violated them (para 77). Although a challenging affair, this is not the first time the Court has faced such a challenge. In its 1988 Advisory Opinion<\/a> on Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947<\/em>, the ICJ reiterated that based on the question provided for by the General Assembly, its jurisdiction is limited to identifying the United States\u2019 obligations under the Headquarters Agreement, and not to decide whether it violated the agreement (para 33).<\/p>\n Despite the strict jurisdictional constraints, by considering the judgment as a whole, it can be concluded that the Court indicated that Israel violated its obligations. When examining Israel\u2019s responsibilities in the Gaza Strip in particular, the Court referenced actions taken by Israel concerning the blocking of aid or restricting UN agencies such as UN Relief and Works Agency in Palestine (UNRWA) (paras 110-124) and reminding Israel of its obligations as an occupying power under articles 56 and 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949<\/a> (paras 93-109 and 128-133).<\/p>\n These two read together, especially para 109, which expressly mentions that the population in Gaza has been supplied inadequately, lay bare that Israel has violated its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Advisory Opinion followed the same approach when reiterating Israel\u2019s human rights obligations and its obligations as a member of the United Nations.<\/p>\n This argument is based on the issue-rule-analysis-conclusion approach, where the Court stops at analysis. The \u2018issue\u2019 is Israel\u2019s acts, which are contrary to the \u2018rules\u2019 under international law, the Court\u2019s \u2018analysis\u2019 being that Israel had an obligation to uphold international law and its duties under the Geneva Conventions and the UN Charter. The conclusion, which the Court excluded, would inevitably be that Israel violated its obligations under international law.<\/p>\n Thus, while on paper, the Court cannot make any assessment on possible violations of these obligations by Israel, the Advisory Opinion alone would stand sufficient on a de facto<\/em> basis to prove such a violation.<\/p>\n The ICJ has faced legal questions not amounting to consequences before, some of which also include obligations, wherein the General Assembly has asked questions relating to the obligations of states, without a follow-up on the legal consequences.<\/p>\n \u00a0For instance, the question of obligations without consequences could also be said to be brought up in the Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West Africa<\/em><\/a>, but the obligations were based on the status of the Mandate conferred to the Union of South Africa under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations<\/a> and possible change of the mandate status instead of possible violations.<\/p>\n In the Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25th<\/sup> March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt<\/em><\/a>, one of the questions posed to the ICJ was regarding the obligations of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Republic of Egypt under the agreement, which the Court answered by simply reiterating that both parties have an obligation to act in good faith and negotiate and for the WHO to provide for a reasonable period of time.<\/p>\n The ICJ also had such jurisdictional restrictions in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion<\/a>. There, it determined that the question posed by the General Assembly<\/a> limited it to determine whether Kosovo\u2019s independence declaration violated international law, but no other factors, such as any legal consequences arising out of it (para 51)<\/p>\n All of these cases, in some form or other, deal with obligations of states under agreements or international law in general, without delving into legal consequences \u2013 except the Kosovo opinion. In that case, the court considered the legal validity of the Declaration of Independence, but expressly restricted itself from addressing questions of consequences.<\/p>\n Yet, there is quite a difference in these cases and the present Opinion on Israel\u2019s obligations. None of these cases went on to describe acts that could amount to non-compliance. Thus, without actions, no legal consequence would emerge, making such Opinions quite distinct from the one at hand.<\/p>\n Except for the ones cited above, Advisory Opinions limiting their questions to a re-iteration of states\u2019 obligations have little precedence in the ICJ. However, such Advisory Opinions are a common practice in human rights courts, such as the African Court of Human and Peoples\u2019 Rights<\/a>, having done so in its Advisory Opinion on Participation in Elections During COVID-19<\/a> or the Advisory Opinion on Vagrancy Laws<\/a>, among others. \u00a0Even in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights<\/a>\u2019 landmark Climate Change Advisory Opinion<\/a>, the questions posed to it by Chile and Colombia were limited to the scope of obligations of states with respect to different rules concerning climate change and environmental protection (paras 24-29). This is unlike the questions posed to the ICJ<\/a> by the General Assembly<\/a>, which did ask for legal consequences (para 1).<\/p>\n When providing the Opinion, these courts, similar to the present Opinion, mention the acts that could amount to non-compliance with the respective charters and human rights law in general, before dictating the obligations of states (for example, paras 123-124 and 168-169). Therefore, even if it was not explicitly asked for, one could infer whether the states were engaged in human rights violations.<\/a><\/p>\n Jean-Marc Thouvenin<\/a> explains how narrowly the Court interpreted the question in the Kosovo Opinion, choosing to ignore the \u201creal issue\u201d. Yet, the ICJ almost always strives to interpret the questions posed to it as narrowly as possible, not advising on a question not asked of it. It may expand the scope of international law while answering the questions posed by the General Assembly, or shift the focus of the question to address the \u201creal issue\u201d, but the ICJ would never deviate from the questions posed to it to expand its advisory jurisdiction (page 144).<\/p>\n The Advisory Opinion is certainly the first of its kind. The Court had to navigate through obligations in international humanitarian law and the principles of armed conflict, including the rights of people suffering under an occupation, without holding anyone in contempt. Yet, it managed to do so through implied messaging.<\/p>\n This sets a precedent confirming that even if the questions to the Court are built to limit its jurisdiction and eventual effect, the Court shall find a way to create liability if acts to the contrary are committed. The Advisory Opinion also cements the contention that no obligation can be enforced without a cause or argument of its possible violation. The reason such Opinions are sought is because there are lingering beliefs that a violation was committed, or if not, at the very least, the adherence to such obligations was shaky. In its Opinion, the Court did not create new obligations out of the blue, or even reinterpret any such obligations, so to speak, but reiterated existing obligations that it believed Israel needed reminding.<\/p>\n Such an approach might be criticised for going beyond the mandate of the legal question, which in the present case was an overview of obligations. However, the mandate of the Court and its answer to the legal question are the conclusions that the Court reaches. Israel\u2019s violations were stated as mere facts that were taken into consideration, and thus do not meet the required criteria of going \u2018beyond the mandate\u2019.<\/p>\n As the court reiterated in the Opinion, the factual information has been provided by the relevant parties, including the states and the international organisations, including information on the situation in Gaza till 7th<\/sup> May 2025 (para 36-37). Thus, the factual matrix used by the Court cannot be challenged.<\/p>\n While the Opinion\u2019s enforcement or adherence has a dim scope, it is certainly not impossible. Advisory Opinions in the past, such as the Namibia Advisory Opinion<\/a> on the territorial status of South-West Africa, where the Court held that South-West Africa<\/a> no longer needs to be mandated, and the Chagos Advisory Opinion<\/a> on the status of the Chagos Archipelago, which held that the British government must withdraw its administration<\/a> from Chagos, have led to states acting in furtherance of such opinions. One can only hope this Advisory Opinion receives the same treatment.<\/p>\nThe Implications of the Advisory Opinion<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Advisory Opinions in the ICJ of a Similar Nature<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Opinions on Obligations in Other Courts<\/strong><\/h3>\n
The Effect of The Opinion<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n