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By: Lavya Bhasin<\/strong><\/p>\n (iii) Set III: Inherent Powers Viewed To Supersede Compounding Powers Due To Not Being Bound By Statutory Limitations <\/strong><\/p>\n To build on judgments from Set II, another set of judgments must be analysed, which not only say that the powers of quashing are different, but also that inherent powers, whether of the Supreme Court (hereinafter \u201cSC\u201d) or High Courts (hereinafter \u201cHCs\u201d); as a result of which proceedings are quashed are not bound by statutory limitations.<\/p>\n For example, in the cases of Kailash Chand v State of Rajasthan<\/a><\/em>, and Ramgopal v State of Madhya Pradesh<\/em><\/a>, <\/em>\u00a0the SC held that as opposed to section 320 CrPC<\/a> where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences \u201ccompoundable\u201d within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a HC under Section 482 CrPC<\/a> or vested in this court under Article 142<\/a> of the Constitution (power to do complete justice), can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of section 320 CrPC. However, this is against the proposition laid down in Supreme Court Bar Assn v Union of India<\/em><\/a> wherein the SC held that in exercise of its plenary\/inherent powers, the SC\/HC cannot ignore any substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject. It is a residuary power, supplementary and complementary to the powers specifically conferred on the SC\/ HC by statutes. Thus, the conundrum pointed out above as to the muddled scope of any kind of inherent power still exists.<\/p>\n Another form of supersession is also seen in the case of Unnikrishnan v State of Kerala<\/em><\/a>, <\/em>where by use of inherent powers, the court reduced the sentence imposed while maintaining the conviction in a non-compoundable offence, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties. This was also seen in the case of which has relied on Ishwar Singh v State of MP<\/em><\/a> in holding that compromise entered into by parties for a non-compoundable offence is indeed a relevant circumstance for considering the quantum of sentence. Not only is this unimagined by the legislature, but is also another shade of compounding a non-compoundable offence, the rationale for which goes unexplained. The court has offered no reasoning except for saying that the court has in earlier precedents (Bharat Singh v. State of M.P<\/em>., Ram Lal v. State of J&K<\/em>, etc) allowed to \u2018compound\u2019 the offence even though the offence is non-compoundable, and what emerges from the same is that even if the offence is not compoundable within the scope of section 320, the court may, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, reduce the sentence imposed while maintaining the conviction. What is troubling is that the SC has not explained how the latter flows from the former power.<\/p>\n Moreover, the court here does use the language, \u201ccompound a non-compoundable offence\u201d, which is a subtle swing from the viewpoint that the court cannot compound, but only quash proceedings of a non-compoundable offence, as the two powers are \u2018different\u2019 from one another.<\/p>\n CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD <\/strong><\/p>\n So far, we have seen many contrasting precedents in the use of inherent powers of the HC in quashing proceedings of a non-compoundable offence. On the one hand, there are decisions such as Manoj Sharma, <\/em>which say that if Section 359(9)<\/a> of the BNSS has already barred compounding of a non-compoundable offence, then the HC should not exercise its inherent powers under Section 528<\/a> to do something indirectly, which has been prohibited directly. On the other hand, we have decisions such as CBI v A Ravi Shanker Prasad<\/em><\/a> which say that the object of incorporating inherent powers was to prevent abuse of process of the court and to secure ends of justice, thus, these powers cannot be bound by statutory limitations.<\/p>\n Nonetheless, what is still not starkly clear is whether quashing a non-compoundable offence is a use of inherent <\/em>powers or indirect <\/em>powers, in the view of the SC. The abovementioned judgements clearly depict that the SC has vastly differing views on the scope<\/em> of inherent powers themselves, in this context.<\/p>\n Some courts view such quashment not as (indirect) exceptions to section 359(9), but rather as powers that inhere (directly) in the HC. Nonetheless, the effect is that over the years, judicially designed guidelines have come into existence, which exceptionally<\/em> allow Section 359(9) to be permeated. For example, in the case of State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal<\/em><\/a>, <\/em>the court even unpredictably read in the doctrine of \u2018rarest of the rare cases\u2019 to use inherent powers to quash proceedings of a non-compoundable offence. This glaring inconsistency, and oscillating stances between judicial restraint and judicial activis,m must be given some much-needed clarity.<\/p>\n One way to do the same would be to advocate not only for judicial, but also statutory clarity on this matter, and to establish a clear correlation between Sections 359 and 528 of the BNSS in the statute itself, along with principles on which exceptions to Section 359(9) may be granted.<\/p>\n I believe that over the years, some of these exceptions have been carved by the judiciary itself, but the trend can only be crystallised by statutory interventions. In order to let Sections 359(9) and 528 operate harmoniously, such that both provisions can be given effect to, I propose that a Proviso can be added to section 528 of the BNSS, which as of now stands to be a non-obstante clause.<\/p>\n It says that \u201cNothing in this Sanhita shall affect inherent powers of the High Court\u2026\u201d To this, a Proviso can be added, that says that in the case of Section 359(9), the High Court shall make an order of quashment only if certain conditions are met, which justify quashing proceedings of a non-compoundable offence. These conditions (or rather exceptions, as discussed above) can be (a) where the nature and gravity of the offence is predominantly private or civil, not heinous; (b) where public interest is not undermined; and (c) where the timing of compromise justifies judicial intervention (such that trial should not have progressed substantially, and consent should not have been subsequently vitiated).<\/p>\n Such statutory safeguards are advantageous because they clear the fog around the misleading conception that quashment and compounding can be interchangeable words. Further, they are helpful because approaching the HC for quashment of a non-compoundable offence is quite expensive, as it not only entails a fresh round of litigation, but also takes time due to the HC engaging with its own procedural formalities. Further, the collective effect of statutory and judicial ambiguity has led to a misuse of section 528, as accused individuals file petitions with the primary intention of delaying ongoing investigation or prosecution against them, and also seek quashing of an FIR or charge sheet without first availing other statutory remedies such as applying for anticipatory bail or regular bail.<\/p>\n In sum, a carefully drafted proviso to Section 528, with principled exceptions carved out, would harmonise its scope with Section 359(9), ensuring that neither provision eclipses the other. By doing so, ad-hoc judicial improvisation will be replaced with a clear statutory framework, making law, policy and practice speak the same language.<\/p>\n (Lavya Bhasin is a law undergraduate at the National Law Institute University, Bhopal. The author may be contacted via mail at lavyabhasin.bscllb@nliu.ac.in<\/a>)<\/em><\/p>\n
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