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<\/a><\/p>\nThe Rise and Fall of Boeing, And the Way Back, reveals how Boeing fell from its engineering roots to flirt with bankruptcy and how it will recover.<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Dec. 1, 2025, (c) Leeham News<\/strong>: In October, Boeing announced another delay in certification of the 777X and a delay from 2026 to 2027 of entry-into-service of the -9 model. Tim Clark, the president of Emirates Airline, is vocal about his dismay over the continuing delays. Emirates has more 777Xs on order than any other customer. The first airplane was due in early 2020. Had it been on time, Clark says Emirates would have had 110 in service by now.<\/p>\n During the Dubai Air Show, he told the financial news network CNBC that he believes Boeing can restore its glory. He doesn\u2019t know or predict when. But legacy Boeing\u2019s last hurrah was the development of what is now called by some to be the \u201cClassic\u201d 777.<\/p>\n Scott Hamilton\u2019s new book,\u00a0The Rise and Fall of Boeing and The Way Back,<\/em> details not only how Boeing lost its glory and how it\u2019s recovering. It tells the story of legacy Boeing\u2019s last hurrah: development of the 777 Classic.<\/p>\n Here is an excerpt.<\/p>\n \u201cWorking Together.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n \u2014The 777 Family<\/p>\n In 1985, Airbus, Boeing, and McDonnell Douglas (MDC) were planning for the next round of twin-aisle jets. Boeing toyed with the idea of building a larger 767. One concept included a partial double deck, but it was a very odd design. Instead of a 747-like hump at the front of the airplane, the upper deck began at about the wing and went aft. MDC considered a stretch of its DC-10 with initial working titles of Super 50, Super 60, etc. Airbus, still in the development phase on the A320, was already planning twin-aisle, two- and four-engine aircraft under the code names TA-6 and TA-7. These would become the A330 and A340.<\/p>\n Boeing\u2019s humpback 767 design was short-lived. It soon gave way to a wider twin-aisle, larger-capacity airplane that eventually became known as the 777. United Airlines was one of the leading contributors to Boeing\u2019s customer input process. The initial design became known as the 777-200. There were a shorter-range \u201cA\u201d model and a long-range \u201cB\u201d model. Both seated about 301 passengers in a mixed-seating configuration. The A model\u2019s range was 5,240 nautical miles (nm); the B model, which later was named the ER (for Extended Range), had a range of 7,065 nm. The planes\u2019 dimensions were identical.<\/p>\n One proposed feature for the 777 was the inclusion of folding wing tips to allow the plane to use some of the ramp and gate space of smaller widebody aircraft. Boeing eventually dropped the idea for weight-related and other reasons. But the idea would resurface decades later and become a key component for the next-generation 777.<\/p>\n Today\u2019s notable feature of the Boeing 777-X is its folding wingtip, designed to allow the wider wingspan to fit into today\u2019s airport gates. The idea was first conceived for the 777 Classic in the 1990s but discarded then. Credit: Leeham News.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Boeing was going to be last on the market with the 777. The MDC MD-11 and Airbus\u2019s four-engine A340 would precede the 777. The three-engine MD-11 was essentially a stretched DC-10 with new engines, a glass cockpit, and split winglets. Even with such features, however, when the airplane went into service with American Airlines, it was a big disappointment. American ordered MD-11s and planned a major overseas expansion from its prime hub at Dallas\u2013Fort Worth Regional Airport (DFW). DFW, situated in north Texas in the southern-middle of the United States, presented range challenges for American\u2019s ambitions across the Pacific. When the airline received route authority from DFW to fly to Tokyo, for example, American\u2019s long-range DC-10-30s couldn\u2019t make the hop non-stop. The airline acquired two ex\u2013TWA 747SPs for the route. As a shrink, the plane wasn\u2019t as efficient as the standard 747, but it could make the 6,500-mile trip non-stop.<\/p>\n The MD-11 was supposed to be able to make the trip from DFW to Hong Kong, but it burned more fuel than expected, and its actual range was less than its designed range. DFW\u2013Hong Kong was out, and the economics on other long-haul routes within its reduced range strained airlines\u2019 ability to make these runs profitably. MDC worked diligently to make up for the shortfalls but, in the end, engineers couldn\u2019t recover 100 percent of the deficiencies. With MDC already on the decline, the shortcomings of the MD-11 didn\u2019t help sales. Eventually, only 200 MD-11s were sold.<\/p>\n Over at Airbus, super-salesman John Leahy did everything he could to jump on the MD-11\u2019s shortcomings. The third engine sitting on top of the MD-11\u2019s fuselage at the base of the tail was, he sniffed, just a big aerodynamic drag. Leahy\u2019s rhetoric was seen for what it was. But his company\u2019s A340 had its own problems, which were not insignificant: the plane was designed around the SuperFan engine that Rolls-Royce (RR) and Pratt & Whitney (P&W) ultimately killed, destroying the planned economics of the aircraft. Airbus executives met with P&W executives and pressured them unsuccessfully to reverse the decision. So, Airbus\u2019s next stop was CFM International, the 50-50 joint venture between GE and what was then known as Snecma (now Safran Aircraft Engines), a French company. The CFM 56 powered the re-engined MDC DC-8 Super 60 series (rebranded the -70) and the Boeing 737-300\/-400\/-500, later called the 737 Classic. It had been a monumental mistake by P&W to cede the 737 market from the original 737-100\/200\/200A models to the re-engining of the -300\/-400\/-500 series models. The Classic series put CFM on the map. Like an amoeba, CFM\u2019s dominance in the small jetliner market spread across the world. Airbus initially chose the CFM 56 to power the A320. International Aero Engines (IAE) later joined this market with its V2500 engine, but CFM products ruled.<\/p>\n When Airbus went to CFM, hat in hand, to power the A340 Glider, CFM exacted its pound of flesh. Airbus had no choice but to take it. The result was an airplane that was overweight to the power provided and slow compared with other trans-ocean airliners. Leahy, well after he retired in 2018, put it in his typically direct way: The A340 was prone to bird strikes from the rear. With four engines, maintenance costs were naturally higher. Fuel economy wasn\u2019t as good as some of its competitors, either.<\/p>\n Airbus tried mightily to overcome the A340\u2019s operational and economic disadvantages. In those days, ETOP aircraft, and the Extended-Range Twin-Engine Operations Performance Standards (ETOPS) that applied to them, which were developed and implemented by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), were both still fairly new. Qualifying for ETOPS certification was complicated, and some of the less-sophisticated airlines found that doing so strained resources. A four-engine airplane didn\u2019t require the same level of training, support, and sophistication as other models did, so the A340 fit nicely into airlines\u2019 systems. The A340, being lighter than the 747 and with less restrictive engine-out performance than a twin-engine widebody airplane, also could serve challenging airports more easily. For example, South African Airways found the A340 a better fit for its hot environment than the early 777s. The A340 could operate out of the French\/Dutch island of St. Maartin in the Caribbean, with its short runway and mountains near one end of the runway, more easily than the 747.<\/p>\n Airbus produced the A340 in four versions\u2014the original -200, with its underpowered CFM engines; the -300, with an upgraded engine; the -500 ultra-long-haul model; and a stretched -600 version, the last two featuring RR engines. Nevertheless, Airbus sold only 377 A340 models, a poor showing but still better than the MD-11.<\/p>\n Boeing\u2019s 777, with its subsequent versions, proved an out-of-the-park winner. Only eighty-eight of the base model -200s were sold, with United Airlines being a principal customer. The longer-range -200ER saw 422 sales. The ultra-long-range -200LR, the same plane dimensionally as the -200 and the -200ER, added sixty-one sales. Boeing stretched the airplane into two versions of the -300: the base model and the extended-range -300ER. These typical models seated around 365 passengers in a mixed-class configuration. The base -300 traded a little range (about 100 nautical miles) for capacity. The -300ER recovered the original ranges and added about 300 nautical miles more. It proved the most popular model, with sales of 837 aircraft.<\/p>\n Even then, Boeing wasn\u2019t through. It took the -200LR and made a freighter out of it. As of 2025, the freighter was still in production, with a total of 321 orders. The 777LRF is to remain in production until 2027, when new noise and emissions regulations will render the model obsolete. The 777 became one of Boeing\u2019s best-selling jetliners of all time. Production peaked at a rate of 8.6 a month, a record for a widebody airplane up until then. The 777 and 737 carried Boeing\u2019s Commercial Airplanes division (BCA) through future industrial snafus with the 787 and the delays of the poor-selling 747-8.<\/p>\n The program manager for the 777 was Phil Condit. A lifetime Boeing employee and an engineer, Condit and former Boeing CEO Alan Mulally are credited with ushering in a major transformation in the way Boeing designed airplanes. The 777 was Boeing\u2019s first computer-designed aircraft. Its entry into service (EIS) was in 1995. The 777\u2019s development budget of $6 billion ballooned to nearly $12 billion (about $25.95 billion in 2025 dollars). But the airplane\u2019s reliability and performance over the following decades was unmatched. So was its safety. The first 777 hull loss didn\u2019t happen until 2008, fourteen years after the plane\u2019s introduction, when a British Airways 777-200ER lost power in both engines on a short final approach to London\u2019s Heathrow Airport. Through marvelous piloting, the plane crash-landed short of the runway. There were no fatalities and only forty-seven injuries, most of them minor. The power failure was traced to a freak icing condition that blocked fuel to both of the plane\u2019s RR engines. The 777 itself came away with a rather enhanced reputation for its strength.<\/p>\n The second hull loss happened to a 777-200ER when a cockpit fire broke out while the plane was parked. There were no injuries, and the fire damage was such that the airplane was written off. A third hull loss occurred when an Asiana Airlines 777-300ER crashed on landing at the San Francisco airport. Pilot error was blamed. Although the plane split in two upon the crash landing and spun around before coming to rest, only three of the 310 people on board died. They were the first fatalities of a 777 accident.[1]<\/a><\/p>\n How did legacy Boeing succeed so spectacularly with the 777 Classic? The reason is ironic, considering the future criticism that would come Boeing\u2019s way on the very same topic: culture.<\/p>\n \u201cI believe that it was primarily the culture that we built essentially for the program,\u201d Condit recalled in 2023 in an interview for this book. \u201cI had an advantage. I was coming from being executive VP so I could pick my team for the Triple Seven. I had the experience with the 757 program. We learned a lot on the 757 program. For example, what I discovered on the 57 program was that while we had a really good core team when we started, the developmental team, when the program got authorized, engineers started coming on the program at 200 to 300 a week. The culture very quickly shifted to what I call a traditional culture, because the core team was the minority all of a sudden. Everybody, in my words, set up camp the way they had always set up camp.<\/p>\n \u201cOn the 777 reset, when people come on to the program, everybody goes through what we call boot camp. Everybody got introduced to the program and got introduced to the culture. We actually took the whole initial team offsite on a Saturday and spent a whole Saturday crafting an eleven-word mission statement for the program very, very carefully. Every word in that mission statement had a really important meaning.\u201d<\/p>\n This was in 1990. Condit remembered that the theme then was people working together to produce the preferred new airplane family. \u201cThe first word in there was \u2018people\u2019. The whole program had a very strong focus on people, how important they were in the program, how critical they were to the program. \u2018Working together\u2019 became the buzz phrase, if you will, for the program.\u201d Boeing had a tradition of putting a pilot\u2019s name under a plane\u2019s flight deck window on the left side, and a co-pilot\u2019s name on the right side of the airplane. At the time, \u201cWorking Together\u201d was printed under the left side of each cockpit window.<\/p>\n \u201cIt was people working together,\u201d Condit recalled. \u201cWorking together to produce. We had a great, long debate. Not surprisingly, the engineers said it ought to be \u2018design.\u2019 The factory guys said it ought to be \u2018built.\u2019 The support people said, \u2018Well, how do we get it there?\u2019 The word[s] we settled on w[ere] \u2018to produce.\u2019 It included design, build, all of the pieces together.\u00a0 Next, \u2018the preferred.\u2019 We had another debate. We were looking at one, at the word[s] \u2018quality,\u2019 \u2018performance,\u2019 \u2018customer satisfaction.\u2019 \u201d[2]<\/a><\/p>\n As with other Boeing 7-Series airplanes, with the exception of the 757, the 777 was going to be a new airplane family. \u201cThat was very intentional,\u201d Condit said. \u201cWe looked at a lot of derivatives that had potential for that program. [The 777] really changed the world. The whole program was designed with the intent that there would be a family of airplanes. We talked about that mission statement with everybody who came on the program, what it meant, why were we doing it. We said, for example, that \u2018working together\u2019 wasn\u2019t just internal, it was external. It meant that working together, we would work together with suppliers. We were going to work together with airlines. We actually had airlines on the team.\u201d<\/p>\n Condit\u2019s description of \u201cworking together\u201d at all levels, internally and externally, is a marked contrast to how things evolved at Boeing over the next thirty-plus years, when confrontations with labor, suppliers, and even customers became the rule rather than the exception.<\/p>\n The 777 program was launched in October 1990. The original 777 entered service in June 1995. The highly successful 777-300ER, in 2004. The 777 \u201cClassic\u201d was the last airplane designed and developed by Boeing before its 1997 merger with MDC. In many respects, the 777-300ER was probably the best airplane Boeing ever designed. Through 2024, more than 1,700 of all sub-types had been delivered. As a widebody airplane, the 777-300ER paled in comparison to the 737. The company\u2019s 787 model had higher gross sales. But unlike the troubled 737 and 787 programs, the 777 Classic proved to be a superb program.<\/p>\n It was legacy Boeing\u2019s last hurrah.<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Two more 777 hull losses occurred, resulting in fatalities to all on board the planes: Malaysian Airlines flight 370, which mysteriously disappeared in the ocean near Australia on a flight from Indonesia to China, and another Malaysian 777, which was shot down in a mistaken combat action by Russia during fighting in Ukraine. There have been a couple more hull losses, but no passengers died in these other accidents.<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> In 2024, when Kelly Ortberg was named by Boeing\u2019s board of directors to succeed departing CEO David Calhoun, Ortberg began using the phrase \u201cworking together\u201d when meeting with employees.<\/p>\n ********************<\/p>\n \n<\/div>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The Rise and Fall of Boeing, And the Way Back, reveals how Boeing fell from its engineering roots to flirt with bankruptcy and how it will recover. Dec. 1, 2025, (c) Leeham News: In October, Boeing announced another delay in certification of the 777X and a delay from 2026 to 2027 of entry-into-service of the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":326601,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[12027],"tags":[13389,2268,17240,153209,1351],"dealstore":[],"offerexpiration":[],"class_list":["post-326600","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-airbus","tag-boeings","tag-book","tag-excerpt","tag-hurrah","tag-legacy"],"yoast_head":"\nLegacy Boeing\u2019s Last Hurrah<\/strong><\/h5>\n
The Classic\u2019s folding wingtips<\/strong><\/h5>\n
<\/a><\/p>\nAirbus\u2019s engineless A340<\/strong><\/h5>\n
Out-of-the-park winner<\/strong><\/h5>\n
Unmatched safety<\/strong><\/h5>\n
777 success due to culture<\/strong><\/h5>\n
Working together<\/strong><\/h5>\n
Footnotes<\/strong><\/h5>\n
<\/a>The Rise and Fall of Boeing and the Way Back<\/em> is available here<\/a>.\u00a0Rise and Fall<\/em> continues the story told in\u00a0Air Wars, The Global Combat Between Airbus and Boeing<\/em>, published in 2021, also by Scott Hamilton. This tells the story of 35 years of competition between Airbus and Boeing, and the role played by super -salesman John Leahy of Airbus.\u00a0Air Wars<\/em> is available here<\/a>.<\/p>\nRelated<\/em><\/h3>\n<\/p>\n