\n<\/p>\n
The publication complained of<\/strong><\/p>\n On 11 January 2023, Andrew Bridgen, who was then a Conservative MP, tweeted a link to an article suggesting a connection between COVID vaccination and serious adverse health conditions, commenting: \u2018As one consultant cardiologist said to me this is the biggest crime against humanity since the Holocaust<\/em>\u2019.<\/p>\n At Prime Minister\u2019s Questions later that day, Matt Hancock, who was then also a Conservative MP and had famously served as health minister during the COVID-19 crisis, asked then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak whether he agreed that \u2018disgusting, antisemitic, anti-vax conspiracy theories<\/em>\u2019 had no place in the House of Commons or wider society.\u00a0 Sunak did agree.<\/p>\n Immediately afterwards, Hancock tweeted a video clip of the exchange in the House of Commons, together with the words: \u2018The disgusting and dangerous anti-semitic, anti-vax, anti-scientific conspiracy theories spouted by a sitting MP this morning are unacceptable and have absolutely no place in our society<\/em><\/strong>\u2019.<\/p>\n Procedural history<\/strong><\/p>\n Issue, and attempted strike out on reference<\/u><\/p>\n In May 2023, Bridgen issued a claim for libel against Hancock, complaining of the allegation of antisemitism.\u00a0 He served proceedings that September.\u00a0 In December 2023, Hancock applied to strike out the claim, contending that the issue of reference<\/em> was deficiently pleaded.\u00a0 To succeed in a libel claim, a claimant must prove that the words would be understood to refer to them by the reasonable reader.\u00a0 Normally that is straightforward, because the claimant is named in the publication.\u00a0 Where, as in this case, they are not, a claimant may seek to persuade the Court that people acquainted with him would nevertheless understand the publication to refer to him (\u2018ordinary reference\u2019), or that readers with knowledge of particular facts, would do so (\u2018innuendo reference\u2019).\u00a0 In its original formulation, Bridgen\u2019s claim relied on ordinary reference.\u00a0 Although there was mention of innuendo, the particular facts relied upon to support a reference innuendo case were not pleaded.\u00a0 Hancock contended that Bridgen\u2019s claim did not sufficiently articulate his case on reference and should be struck out accordingly.\u00a0 That application was heard by Steyn J on 1 March 2024, with judgment<\/a> handed down on 20 March 2024 (Bridgen v Hancock <\/a><\/em>[<\/a>2024] EWHC 623 (KB)<\/a>)\u00a0 Steyn J rejected Bridgen\u2019s case on ordinary reference, finding that the reference to \u2018a sitting MP\u2019 could not possibly identify Bridgen to those acquainted with him, and that Bridgen\u2019s case was inevitably dependent on readers of the tweet having knowledge of other events that had occurred, in particular, in the hours before the tweet.\u00a0 She agreed that, as it was then formulated, Bridgen\u2019s pleading on reference was defective, but considered that this defect was not only capable of being cured, but that Bridgen would have \u2018little difficulty\u2019 in establishing reference innuendo.\u00a0 On that basis, she gave Bridgen an opportunity to amend his claim.<\/p>\n Determination of meaning<\/u><\/p>\n Bridgen subsequently filed Amended Particulars of Claim on 1 May 2024.\u00a0 The case then proceeded to a preliminary issues hearing, to determine the meaning of Hancock\u2019s tweet, and whether it constituted a statement of fact or opinion.\u00a0 That was heard before Collins-Rice J on 12 June 2024, with judgment<\/a> in Bridgen v Hancock <\/a><\/em>[2024] EWHC 1603 (KB)<\/a> handed down on 24 June 2024.<\/p>\n Bridgen contended that the tweet would have been understood to mean that he was an antisemite, and that this was a statement of fact.\u00a0 Hancock contended that the tweet would have been understood to mean that Bridgen had disseminated views which, in Hancock\u2019s opinion, were antisemitic in nature.\u00a0 These contentions were both advanced without prejudice to any remaining dispute on the issue of reference, which will be determined at trial.<\/p>\n Whilst Mr Bridgen complains only of the allegation of antisemitism, the Court must take the whole of a publication into account when assessing meaning.\u00a0 Collins-Rice J also took account of the context that the tweet was an example of \u2018political speech\u2019, observing that the hypothetical reasonable reader of such a tweet would have a general awareness of public debate or controversy around (a) vaccination in general, covid vaccination in particular, and Mr Hancock’s record of responsibility for and public comment on the latter and (b) allegations of antisemitism in UK politics and public life.<\/p>\n Although the clip from Prime Minister\u2019s Questions formed a part of the tweet, the parties agreed that Parliamentary Privilege meant that they could not pray it in aid, and Collins-Rice J considered the meaning of the tweet without reference to the content of the video, beyond the fact that Hancock was repeating what he had previously said in Parliament.<\/p>\n Collins-Rice J found that the reference to \u2018this morning\u2019 would clearly anchor the tweet, in the minds of the reasonable readers, to a recent event, and that they would understand that Hancock was using the fact of that event to distance himself from the sort of views he was condemning. The tweet was more about Hancock\u2019s views, than Bridgen\u2019s.\u00a0 Its rhetorical nature would have been understood as amplifying his views, rather than signifying objective factuality.\u00a0 The language amounted to a sweeping dismissal of the claims referred to, and not to the specific beliefs of the unnamed MP.\u00a0 The reader would understand that Hancock was expressing his strong opinions of the character, or mode of expression, of what had been said.\u00a0 This was robust, opinionated, reactive political comment.\u00a0 With all this in mind, Collins-Rice held that the tweet meant that:<\/p>\n An unnamed MP had said something that morning related to vaccination [fact] which was baseless, unscientific, dangerous and offensive, including because its character was antisemitic [opinion]<\/p>\n The basis for the opinion element of the tweet was indicated (that which had been said \u2018by a sitting MP this morning<\/em>\u2019).<\/p>\n Further pleadings, and application for summary judgment<\/u><\/p>\n As is commonplace in defamation proceedings, Bridgen filed Re-Amended Particulars of Claim following the determination on meaning, on 15 July 2024.\u00a0 Hancock filed a Defence on 30 August 2024, disputing Bridgen\u2019s case on reference (in part) and serious harm to reputation, and pleading the defence of honest opinion, pursuant to section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013<\/a>.\u00a0 Bridgen filed a Reply on 14 October 2024, averring, amongst other things, that an honest person could not have held the opinion which Hancock had expressed; an honest person would understand that Bridgen had not been belittling the Holocaust but amplifying the seriousness of the vaccine concerns.\u00a0 Bridgen also contended that he would demonstrate at trial that Hancock did not, in any event, hold the opinion he had expressed (pursuant to section 3(5) of the Defamation Act 2013, a claimant can defeat the honest opinion defence if he can show that the particular defendant did not, in fact, hold the opinion).<\/p>\n On 28 October 2024, Hancock applied for summary judgment, contending that Bridgen has no real prosect of succeeding on the issue of serious harm to reputation, and\/or resisting the defence of honest opinion.\u00a0 Failing that, he sought the striking out of Bridgen\u2019s pleading pursuant to section 3(5).\u00a0 This came before Collins-Rice J on 12 March 2025, with judgment<\/a> handed down on 14 April 2025 (Bridgen v Hancock <\/a><\/em>[2025] EWHC 926 (KB)<\/a>).<\/p>\n Serious harm<\/u><\/p>\n A claimant in defamation is required to show that the statement complained of has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to their reputation.\u00a0 The harm arises in the minds of the publishees; it is not necessary for a claimant to prove any specific adverse consequence, although it may be powerful evidence.\u00a0 Bridgen\u2019s case on serious harm is a substantially inferential one; relying on the gravity of the libel and the extent of publication.\u00a0 For the purposes of the summary judgment application, Collins-Rice J simply had to do determine whether Bridgen\u2019s case on serious harm was \u2018fanciful\u2019 and suffering from \u2018an absence of reality\u2019.\u00a0 She determined that it was not.\u00a0 This was capable of being found to be a relatively grave libel, and a mass publication case, published by a person of considerable influence.\u00a0 Bridgen\u2019s case was adequately pleaded.\u00a0 It was not \u2018entirely without substance\u2019.<\/p>\n Hancock argued that this missed the point.\u00a0 There was a logical fault-line running through Bridgen\u2019s case.\u00a0 It was (now) an innuendo reference case, and Hancock asserts that the only readers capable of recognising Bridgen as the subject, would be those who were directly or indirectly aware of Bridgen\u2019s own tweet that morning.\u00a0 They would have made up their own minds about it, and if they thought worse of Bridgen it would be as a result of his own words, and not Hancock\u2019s.\u00a0 There was therefore no prospect of Bridgen proving that any harm was caused<\/em> by Hancock\u2019s tweet.<\/p>\n Collins-Rice J acknowledged that any libel claimant complaining of a \u2018calling out\u2019 libel \u2013 whereby the publisher is criticising the claimant\u2019s own words \u2013 faces the challenge of showing that any harm to reputation was caused by the calling out, and not that which was being called out.\u00a0 This was particularly so in an innuendo reference case where the claimant\u2019s own words were being relied upon to establish the cause of action.\u00a0 However, the Judge did not think that this challenge for Bridgen was so acute as to be unanswerable.\u00a0 It was still more than merely arguable that Hancock\u2019s intervention \u2013 when looking at the net effect \u2013 caused serious harm to Bridgen\u2019s reputation.\u00a0 This would have to be determined at trial.<\/p>\n Honest opinion<\/u><\/p>\n As above, Collins-Rice J had previously found that the defamatory element of the tweet was an expression of opinion.\u00a0 In his Defence, Hancock pleaded that this was an honestly held opinion, the factual basis for which was \u2018incontrovertible\u2019.\u00a0 In his application for summary judgment, he asked the Court to find that Bridgen had no real prospect of successful disputing that an honest person could hold the opinion on the factual basis pleaded, or that Hancock did, in fact, hold it.\u00a0 He argued that it was, to a degree, self-evident that an honest person could think that to draw a comparison between the COVID vaccination programme and the Holocaust was to belittle the historic experience of the Jewish people, and that this was antisemitic in character.<\/p>\n Collins-Rice observed that demonstrating that an honest person could<\/em> consider Bridgen\u2019s tweet to be antisemitic in character was a relatively low bar given the extremely wide nature of the defence, but it was nevertheless a burden for him to discharge.\u00a0 Bridgen was seeking to argue that the allegation was so toxic, that even in the context of political speech, it would be found at trial to be insufficiently pertinent to what he had said: an honest person would recoginse that it crossed a line.\u00a0 Collins-Rice J thought that there were \u2018fine shades\u2019 of judgement engaged but was not ultimately persuaded to call Bridgen\u2019s prospects of success unreal.\u00a0 It was potentially significant that none of the other comments on Bridgent\u2019s tweet which had been brought to Collins-Rice J\u2019s attention had condemned Bridgen in precisely the same way that Hancock had.\u00a0 The issue was highly evaluative in character and was not a matter to be foreclosed on an interlocutory basis.<\/p>\n Section 3(5)<\/em><\/p>\n Bridgen\u2019s Reply addressed section 3(5) over 21 paragraphs, directed, in part to Hancock\u2019s failure to plead a truth defence, in part to what Bridgen claims is the \u2018objective unreasonableness\u2019 of the opinion, and in part to a so-called \u2018wider animus\u2019 against him by people seeking to silence his voice on the vaccination issues.\u00a0 Collins-Rice J thought that much relating to the failure to plead a truth defence and the \u2018wider animus\u2019 was inapt or irrelevant.\u00a0 A defendant is under no obligation to plead a truth defence, and the fact that he does not is irrelevant to consideration of the statutory honest opinion defence.\u00a0 Meanwhile, the \u2018wider animus\u2019 pleading articulated no connection between the alleged wider animus and the tweet which it was fair for Hancock to be expected to answer (and its consideration was likely to obstruct the efficient disposal of the proceedings).\u00a0 However, Collins-Rice J noted that it is possible to base a section 3(5) \u2018counter defence\u2019 on an evidential groundwork from which the Court may draw an inference that the defendant likely did not genuinely hold the opinion.\u00a0 Bridgen contends that the \u2018antisemitic in character\u2019 allegation was a gratuitous bid to silence and politically harm him; something that it suited Hancock to say, rather than something he actually thought.\u00a0 In that regard, Collins-Rice J held that Bridgen\u2019s inferential case was adequately set out in his pleading.\u00a0 It would not be incoherent <\/em>for the trial Judge to find that the honest opinion defence was made out on its merits, but that \u2018antisemitic in character\u2019 was an exercise in vituperative rhetoric, rather than genuine opinion.\u00a0 Whilst the unfairness or unreasonableness of an opinion, and any ill-will on the part of a defendant, will not necessarily mean that the opinion could not have been honestly held, it may be evidence that it was not, in fact, held.\u00a0 In the end, whether someone holds an opinion is a matter of fact, and what was certain was that not all the evidence which could assist to determine the question was available at that stage.\u00a0 The fact that the section 3(5) \u2018counter defence\u2019 was to go to trial was a further compelling reason for the section 3 defence itself to go to trial.\u00a0 It would be artificial and potentially unfair to both parties to predetermine and foreclose on the defence, when trial of the counter-defence is capable of giving a trial judge perspective on the defence itself which is not presently available.<\/p>\n Accordingly, Collins-Rice J declined to give summary judgment on section 1, section 3, or section 3(5), and gave Bridgen a limited opportunity to submit a revised pleading on section 3(5) which is more focused and consistent with her findings.<\/p>\n What happens next<\/strong><\/p>\n Although both his applications met with some success, Hancock has now failed in two attempts to entirely dispose of Bridgen\u2019s claim, and whilst Hancock must still feel relatively confident of succeeding at trial, Collins-Rice J\u2019s most recent judgment has articulated a way in which Bridgen could \u2013 in theory \u2013 succeed, despite the broad nature of the honest opinion defence.\u00a0 Both parties have probably found the early skirmishes somewhat bruising, and it now remains to be seen whether they both have the determination to go through a full trial.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The publication complained of On 11 January 2023, Andrew Bridgen, who was then a Conservative MP, tweeted a link to an article suggesting a connection between COVID vaccination and serious adverse health conditions, commenting: \u2018As one consultant cardiologist said to me this is the biggest crime against humanity since the Holocaust\u2019. At Prime Minister\u2019s Questions […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[97],"tags":[103510,415,18605,3972,103511],"dealstore":[],"offerexpiration":[],"class_list":["post-276031","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-legal","tag-bridgen","tag-case","tag-hancock","tag-story","tag-twibel"],"yoast_head":"\n