Burkina Faso, under President Ibrahim Traor\u00e9, has become a focal point for anti-imperialist sentiment and political renewal in Africa. Traor\u00e9\u2019s government has taken bold steps to assert national sovereignty, including the expulsion of French military forces, the denunciation of Western interference and the forging of new regional alliances with Russia and Sahelian neighbours.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These actions have resonated across the continent, reigniting hopes for a new era of African dignity and self-determination in the postcolonial age. Traor\u00e9\u2019s vision draws inspiration from the revolutionary legacy of Thomas Sankara, whose leadership in the 1980s prioritised food sovereignty, agroecology and the empowerment of rural communities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The roots of Burkina Faso\u2019s food system stretch back centuries, to societies that developed adaptive, resilient agricultural systems rooted in local knowledge, communal land management and crop diversity. Millet, sorghum and other indigenous staples formed the backbone of both food security and cultural identity. These systems were not only productive but also sustainable, built on the principles of reciprocity, ecological balance and community stewardship.<\/p>
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<\/a><\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\nFrench colonial rule, however, upended these systems. Colonial administrators and missionaries imposed new crops and farming methods, often prioritising exports and the needs of colonial urban centres over local food needs. The introduction of market gardening, irrigation schemes and export-oriented production disrupted traditional practices and began a long process of dependency on external inputs and distant markets. The colonial legacy was not simply one of resource extraction but of profound social and ecological transformation \u2014 a legacy that continues to shape Burkina Faso\u2019s food system today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
After independence in 1960, Burkina Faso\u2019s food system remained vulnerable. The country experienced cycles of drought, cereal deficits and reliance on food imports and international aid. Governments experimented with various strategies, but negative cereal balances and regional disparities in food access persisted. It was during the revolutionary period of the 1980s, under Thomas Sankara, that Burkina Faso articulated one of Africa\u2019s clearest visions of food sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Sankara\u2019s government rejected food aid, promoted agroecology and sought to empower rural communities through mass mobilisation and local production. Sankara famously declared \u201cHe who feeds you controls you\u201d, encapsulating the deep link between food and national sovereignty. However, his assassination in 1987 cut short these reforms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Today, President Traor\u00e9 invokes Sankara\u2019s legacy with ambitious initiatives like the 2023-2025 Fishing and Agropastoral Offensive, a $981 million plan to boost production of rice, maize, potatoes, wheat, fish, meat, poultry and mango. The initiative aims to create at least 100,000 jobs for youth, women and internally displaced people and to achieve food self-sufficiency by reducing reliance on imports. Mechanisation, the distribution of tractors and motor pumps and the mobilisation of thousands of young people into farming are central features. The government has also established a food sovereignty fund to support agropastoral actors and encourage local initiatives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Gates Foundation and AGRA<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
On the surface, these efforts appear to align with the anti-imperialist vision of national self-reliance. However, a closer look reveals that the underlying strategy is somewhat influenced by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and the Gates Foundation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
AGRA, which has operated in Burkina Faso for more than 15 years, promotes a model centred on commercial seeds, synthetic fertilisers and integration into global value chains. The Gates Foundation, AGRA\u2019s principal funder, argues that this is the fastest path to increased yields and food security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Gates Foundation, primarily through AGRA, had invested at least\u00a0$16.7 million\u00a0directly into agricultural transformation in Burkina Faso as of 2019, with broader agricultural commitments totalling nearly\u00a0$70 million\u00a0from 2010 to 2018.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As of 2025, the most recent publicly documented figure for Gates Foundation investment in Burkina Faso via AGRA is approximately $37 million up to 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Gates Foundation\u2019s grants database confirms ongoing support to AGRA, with grants as recent as October 2024.\u00a0However, these grants are typically for AGRA\u2019s multi-country programmes, and the precise allocation for Burkina Faso is not specified in public sources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
AGRA\u2019s largest investments have historically gone to countries with bigger populations and agricultural economies (e.g., Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Ghana). While important, Burkina Faso has a smaller population of about 22 million (2024), and its agricultural sector is less diversified and less commercialised compared to AGRA\u2019s primary focus countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Although the amounts invested in Burkina Faso by Agramay seem modest, given the timescales involved, AGRA and the Gates Foundation often use their funds to catalyse or leverage much larger sums from governments, private investors and other donors. For example, AGRA reports that its $37 million investment in Burkina Faso helped unlock over $500 million in additional public and private sector investments. Much of AGRA\/Gates funding is used for pilot projects, technical assistance, policy reform (political influence) and \u2018capacity building\u2019, rather than direct large-scale subsidies or infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It must also be noted that AGRA and the Gates Foundation publish only selected financial details. The $37 million figure is what\u2019s publicly documented for Burkina Faso.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet, the model of agriculture promoted by AGRA\/Gates has come under sustained criticism from African civil society and food sovereignty advocates. Reports by US Right to Know (USRTK) and other watchdog groups have found little evidence that AGRA\u2019s interventions have delivered on their promises in Burkina Faso. USRTK\u2019s analysis, based on internal AGRA documents and independent evaluations, reveals that while AGRA\u2019s programmes have led to some increases in maize sales, there has been no significant improvement in farmer incomes or food security based on AGRA\u2019s activities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Moreover, across Africa, AGRA\u2019s emphasis on commercial seeds and fertilisers has deepened dependency on external inputs, undermining the very autonomy that Traor\u00e9\u2019s government wants to champion. USRTK\u2019s findings are echoed by African civil society groups, faith leaders and food sovereignty advocates, who have called for an end to AGRA funding and a shift toward agroecological, locally controlled food systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Gates Foundation has long partnered with major agribusiness corporations \u2014 including Cargill, Bayer, Syngenta and DuPont \u2014 to roll out industrial agriculture based on genetically modified (GM) crops, patented seeds and heavy agrochemical use. AGRA\u2019s interventions have opened African markets to these corporations, often by influencing national seed laws and agricultural policies to favour commercial, chemical-dependent seed systems over farmer-saved seeds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This shift undermines the traditional practice, still responsible for more than 80% of Africa\u2019s seed supply, of farmers recycling and exchanging seeds and risks consolidating control of seed research, production and distribution in the hands of a few multinationals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Gates Foundation\u2019s approach is part of a broader neoliberal project: the appropriation of the commons-land, seeds, water and knowledge \u2014 transforming them into marketable commodities and driving rural populations off the land.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
AGRA and the Gates Foundation frame their interventions in philanthropic terms or position them as \u2018development\u2019, when in reality they are enabling the consolidation of Western agro capital, the erosion of biodiversity and the disenfranchisement of smallholder farmers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Gates Foundation is not as a benevolent actor; it is driver of a toxic, unjust and dependency-creating food regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Seed sovereignty<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Both AGRA and the Gates Foundation have actively sought to influence seed laws and policies in Burkina Faso. AGRA\u2019s own strategic documents and external evaluations confirm that it has supported the government of Burkina Faso in developing and reforming seed laws. AGRA\u2019s 2023\u20132027 Strategic Plan for Burkina Faso explicitly states its aim to \u201csupport the completion of the seed law reforms\u201d, working with government agencies and seed companies to improve the certified seed system and strengthen distribution and production channels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
AGRA played a role in the \u201cre-alignment of our seed law in line with the ECOWAS Seed Regulation,\u201d (Economic Community of West African States ) as acknowledged by Burkina Faso\u2019s Minister of Agriculture. This alignment is part of broader efforts to harmonise national laws with regional and international standards, which often prioritise commercial seed systems and intellectual property protections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Furthermore, AGRA has provided technical and financial support to government ministries and research institutes to advance seed sector reforms and promote the adoption of hybrid seed varieties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
AGRA\u2019s stated goal is to create \u201cseed policy and regulatory reforms that enable investment and growth of private sector seed businesses\u201d, which typically involves legal frameworks that favour commercial seed companies and restrict the exchange or sale of traditional, farm-saved seeds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Independent evaluations and civil society organisations have criticised AGRA\u2019s approach, arguing that these policy reforms can undermine traditional farmer-managed seed systems, reduce seed diversity and make farmers more dependent on purchasing commercial seeds each season.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
AGRA\u2019s influence on seed laws is not unique to Burkina Faso but is part of a broader strategy across Africa to promote private sector-led seed systems, often in line with corporate-driven international agreements that strengthen breeders\u2019 rights and can restrict farmers\u2019 rights to save and exchange seeds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Who, then, is providing the seeds and agrochemicals that underpin Burkina Faso\u2019s current strategy? The supply is coordinated through a combination of government programmes, AGRA-backed seed companies and agro-dealers, international organsations such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the EU and local\/regional input suppliers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
AGRA is a central player in strengthening Burkina Faso\u2019s seed system, supporting both government and private seed companies to improve the availability and quality of certified seeds for crops like maize, rice, sorghum, cowpea and soybean. The government itself is a major distributor of chemical fertilisers, with recent initiatives allocating substantial quantities to farmers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
AGRA\u2019s network of agro dealers also plays a role in distributing fertilisers and agrochemicals alongside seeds. International organisations (FAO, EU etc.) in collaboration with private corporations provide seeds to vulnerable farmers, especially during food crises, and support local seed multiplication and certification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It would be naive to think that corporate interests act out of a sense of benevolence here. For instance, back in 2000, Prof. Michel Chossudovsky, in his article \u2018Sowing the Seeds of Famine in Ethiopia, argued that international aid and trade policies, particularly those promoted by global corporations and institutions like the WTO, have undermined Ethiopia\u2019s traditional agricultural systems and contributed to chronic food insecurity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These policies encouraged the dismantling of state programmess, such as emergency grain stocks, seed banks and extension services, paving the way for multinational agribusinesses to introduce commercial and genetically modified seeds into Ethiopia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This shift pressured Ethiopian farmers to adopt corporate seeds, often at the expense of local varieties and traditional practices, thereby increasing their dependence on external suppliers and making them more vulnerable to market fluctuations and food crises.\u00a0Such interventions sow the seeds of further vulnerability by eroding local food sovereignty and resilience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The real power of AGRA, Gates and the global agribusiness interests they are aligned with lies in their ability to shape the rules of the game through seed laws, input supply chains and the global architecture of food trade. AGRA\u2019s partnerships with these corporations and its role in promoting seed and input systems favourable to their interests mean that Burkina Faso\u2019s food sovereignty strategy may never be too far from the reach of global agro capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Anti-imperialism vs technocratic pragmatism<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Why, then, does Traor\u00e9\u2019s government align with a strategy that risks deepening dependency on external actors? Several factors are at play.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First, Burkina Faso faces urgent and severe challenges: widespread food insecurity, displacement due to conflict, climate challenges and a legacy of colonisation. The government is under intense pressure to deliver rapid, visible results. Mechanised farming, large-scale deployment of youth and the distribution of inputs are seen as ways to quickly boost yields and create jobs. These approaches are easier to scale in the short term than agroecological transitions, which require more time, training and local adaptation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Second, the dominance of the AGRA\/Gates model in African agricultural development means that funding, technical support and international legitimacy are more readily available for input-intensive, market-oriented projects. Agroecological transformation, by contrast, demands significant investment in farmer training, research and institution-building resources that are often lacking or harder to mobilise at scale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Third, there is a powerful political symbolism in mass mobilisation and mechanisation. Traor\u00e9\u2019s initiatives, such as recruiting thousands of youth into mechanised farming, serve as rallying points for national pride and unity. These visible, high-impact projects are easier to communicate to both domestic and international audiences than the slower, less tangible gains of agroecological reform.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet, the risks of this approach are considerable. By deepening reliance on commercial seeds, synthetic fertilisers and global players, Burkina Faso risks locking itself into a new cycle of dependency. AGRA\u2019s own strategic plan for the country emphasises \u201ccrowding in private investment\u201d and scaling up partnerships with commercial banks and microfinance institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the same time, however, agroecological and community-led approaches are also being piloted in Burkina Faso with promising results. Organisations such as the International Water Management Institute and local NGOs promote integrated farming systems that combine crop diversity, soil health and water management. Government-led land restoration projects rehabilitate degraded soils using anti-erosion measures and agro-silvo-pastoral systems (combining agriculture, forestry and livestock grazing on the same land, creating a mutually beneficial and sustainable land use approach).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Community cooperatives, such as those supported by the NEER-TAMBA initiative, strengthen local value chains and empower over 1,500 peasant organisations. These models have demonstrated significant socioeconomic and environmental benefits, outperforming conventional input-heavy approaches.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is highly promising because let\u2019s not forget that agroecology under Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso was very successful during his brief presidency (1983\u20131987), both in immediate outcomes and in its enduring legacy for food sovereignty and environmental consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Sankara\u2019s agroecological reforms rapidly increased food production and achieved self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs. Through land redistribution, the mobilisation of rural communities and the encouragement of local production over imports, Burkina Faso saw wheat yields rise from 1,700 kg per hectare to 3,800 kg per hectare in just a few years, a remarkable achievement given the country\u2019s frequent droughts and technological limitations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Sankara was influenced by agroecology pioneer Pierre Rabhi and sought to make agricultural ecology a national policy. He supported the establishment of agroecological centres and promoted scientific approaches that integrated agricultural development with environmental regeneration.\u00a0The \u2018one village, one grove\u2019 programme encouraged every community to plant trees, reviving pre-colonial traditions and embedding ecological stewardship in Burkinab\u00e8 culture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To combat desertification and recurring drought, Sankara launched a massive tree-planting campaign, resulting in the planting of over 10 million trees in just 15 months.\u00a0This grassroots, people-led reforestation effort became a model for environmental restoration and remains a lasting part of the country\u2019s social fabric.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Sankara\u2019s agroecological vision was deeply participatory and linked to broader social justice goals, including women\u2019s empowerment and public health. He created the country\u2019s first Ministry of Water and aimed to provide every Burkinab\u00e8 with \u201ctwo meals a day and clean water\u201d, a radical target in the drought-prone Sahel.\u00a0His approach to food justice and environmentalism was ahead of its time, emphasising the need for endogenous development and the dangers of dependency on food aid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While Sankara\u2019s reforms were cut short by his assassination in 1987, their legacy endures. Tree planting and ecological consciousness remain embedded in Burkinab\u00e8 society and organizations such as Terres Vivantes\u2013Thomas Sankara continue to draw inspiration from his pioneering agroecological commitments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Moreover, crop diversity in Burkina Faso improved significantly under Thomas Sankara\u2019s leadership. His agrarian reforms and agroecology agenda reversed the narrowing of crop diversity caused by colonial and postcolonial emphasis on cash crops.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So, while it is crucial to scrutinise the risks of dependency and the influence of external actors, it\u2019s equally important to recognise the significant progress Burkina Faso is making through its ambitious national initiatives and community empowerment projects. The government\u2019s focus on job creation, mechanisation and local value chains is already yielding positive social and economic impacts. Furthermore, the revival of agroecological principles and investment in land restoration demonstrate a commitment to sustainable, locally adapted solutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, for Burkina Faso to truly honour its anti-imperialist rhetoric, it must move beyond the AGRA\/Gates model by investing further in agroecological transformation, land restoration and cooperative models that put power and resources in the hands of local communities. It must ensure that its quest for food sovereignty is not compromised by the very forces it seeks to resist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Bibliography\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n ABC Burkina. (n.d.).\u00a0Thomas Sankara wanted to make agricultural ecology a national policy<\/em>.\u00a0http:\/\/www.abcburkina.net\/en\/in-depth-publications\/vu-au-sud-vu-du-sud\/876-463-thomas-sankara-wanted-to-make-agricultural-ecology-a-national-policy<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa. (2022).\u00a0AGRA and the corporate capture of African agriculture<\/em>. Nairobi, Kenya: Author.\u00a0https:\/\/afsafrica.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Alliance of Sahel States. (2023).\u00a0Communiqu\u00e9 on regional food security cooperation<\/em>.\u00a0https:\/\/aes-sahel.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa. (2023).\u00a0Country strategy: Burkina Faso 2023\u20132027<\/em>. Nairobi, Kenya: Author.\u00a0https:\/\/agra.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Britannica. (n.d.).\u00a0Thomas Sankara: Ideology, achievements, books, & death<\/em>.\u00a0https:\/\/www.britannica.com\/biography\/Thomas-Sankara<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Burkina Faso Hydromet Project. (2022).\u00a0Enhancing farmer resilience through meteorological tools<\/em>. Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso: Ministry of Agriculture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n CADTM. (2016, October 15). \u201cOur stomachs will make themselves heard\u201d: What Sankara can teach us about food justice today.\u00a0https:\/\/www.cadtm.org\/Our-stomachs-will-make-themselves-heard-What-Sankara-can-teach-us-about-food-justice-today<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Chossudovsky, M. (2001, October 9).\u00a0Sowing the seeds of famine in Ethiopia. Global Research (original published in The Ecologist, 2000).\u00a0https:\/\/archives.globalresearch.ca\/articles\/CHO109B.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2022).\u00a0Burkina Faso country profile: Agriculture and food security<\/em>. Rome, Italy: Author.\u00a0https:\/\/www.fao.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n International Water Management Institute. (2021).\u00a0Agroecological water management in Burkina Faso<\/em>. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Author.\u00a0https:\/\/www.iwmi.cgiar.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Ministry of Agriculture, Burkina Faso. (2023).\u00a02023\u20132025 fishing and agropastoral offensive: Strategic plan<\/em>. Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso: Government of Burkina Faso.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pambazuka. (n.d.).\u00a0Thomas Sankara: An endogenous approach to development<\/em>.\u00a0https:\/\/www.pambazuka.org\/thomas-sankara-endogenous-approach-development<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Palladium Group. (2022, July 6).\u00a0The legacy of Thomas Sankara and how his early environmental work can inspire us today<\/em>.\u00a0https:\/\/thepalladiumgroup.com\/news\/The-Legacy-of-Thomas-Sankara-and-How-His-Early-Environmental-Work-Can-Inspire-Us-Today<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n ThomasSankara.net. (2016, October 15).\u00a0A leader before his time?<\/em>\u00a0https:\/\/www.thomassankara.net\/thomas-sankara-a-leader-before-his-time\/?lang=en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n ThomasSankara.net. (2017, October 15).\u00a0The legacies of Thomas Sankara: A revolutionary experience in retrospect<\/em>.\u00a0https:\/\/www.thomassankara.net\/the-legacies-of-thomas-sankara-a-revolutionary-experience-in-retrospect\/?lang=en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Todhunter, C. (2020, April).\u00a0Toxic agriculture and the Gates Foundation<\/em>. Third World Network Features.\u00a0https:\/\/twn.my\/twnf\/2020\/4916.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n U.S. Right to Know. (2023).\u00a0AGRA\u2019s impact in Africa: An analysis of progress and challenges<\/em>.\u00a0https:\/\/usrtk.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n