03 January 2025 Happy New Year!<\/p>\n I trust you enjoyed the festive break and are now ready to battle the market for another twelve months!<\/p>\n This post provides a \u2018year in review\u2019 of my current holdings. I recap how each business performed during 2024 as well as provide a few remarks about their attractions, drawbacks and valuations.<\/p>\n These reviews are very useful to write, not least because they help ensure I am still invested for the right reasons. I also hope the reviews help me avoid disappointing returns during the year ahead! I undertook the same review process at the start of 2015<\/a>, 2016<\/a>, 2017<\/a>, 2018<\/a>, 2019<\/a>, 2020<\/a>, 2021<\/a>, 2022<\/a>, 2023<\/a> and 2024<\/a>.<\/p>\n My portfolio gained 22.4% during 2024 and this other post<\/a> explains that performance in more detail.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n I have covered each of my holdings below in order of size within my portfolio. I have accompanied each write-up with a ShareScope<\/a> chart to show how each company has progressed over the longer term.<\/p>\n Of course my calculations, logic, assumptions and charts may have little bearing on the future\u2026 so please do your own research and derive your own conclusions!<\/p>\n Disclosure:<\/strong> Maynard owns shares in Andrews Sykes, Bioventix, City of London Investment, Mincon, Mountview Estates, S & U, System1, FW Thorpe, Tristel and M Winkworth. This blog post contains ShareScope affiliate links.<\/em><\/p>\n SYS1\u2019s transition from bespoke consultancy towards automated \u2018platform\u2019 services accelerated during 2024.<\/p>\n The ad-testing specialist started the year announcing a better-than-expected Q3 that was followed by a better-than-expected Q4. July\u2019s FY results<\/a> confirmed annual revenue gained 28% to \u00a330m and pre-tax profit to be \u00a33.1m \u2014 well ahead of the \u00a32.8m anticipated after the Q4 upgrade. The first dividend for more than four years was even declared.<\/p>\n Then came July\u2019s Q1 update that reported revenue up 53% driven by platform revenue surging an astonishing 74%. The shares had started the year at 295p but touched almost 800p during the summer. \u00a0<\/p>\n The share-price enthusiasm was supported by a growing belief that SYS1 was finally exploiting its \u201cunique<\/em>\u201d way of translating human emotions into accurate predictions of marketing success.<\/p>\n In fact, industry guru Mark Ritson now claims SYS1 has \u201ccome to dominate the field of pre-testing in a remarkable short period of time<\/em>\u201d. Stuart McGurk at the FT<\/a> has meanwhile reported: \u201cEvery retail brand I spoke to for this story tests its advertising with System1.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n Less than two years after facing a shareholder revolt<\/a>, SYS1 is now confident enough to include tantalising \u2018illustrative scenarios\u2019 within its presentations.<\/p>\n SYS1 at first illustrated revenue doubling and Ebitda margins scaling to 30%<\/a> over the \u201cmedium term<\/em>\u201c, which I believed could support a \u00a316 share price. An updated scenario now suggests revenue could quadruple over the \u201clong term<\/em>\u201d to reach the same margin, which might support \u00a330-plus.<\/p>\n Future growth is based upon winning large customers in the United States (which appears increasingly plausible with US H1 revenue up 79%), and revitalising the group\u2019s innovation-testing service (which appears less plausible). Holding back the innovation service is a lack of relevant \u201cthought leadership<\/em>\u201d and confidentiality limitations to publicising client-innovation info.<\/p>\n The accounts do not yet exhibit true \u2018quality\u2019, but record revenue per employee underpins the workforce\u2019s new \u201cperformance culture<\/em>\u201d while \u00a39m net cash allowed December\u2019s H1 statement<\/a> to unveil a \u00a32m \u201cdiscretionary<\/em>\u201d investment. Margins and the share price will suffer if \u2018discretionary\u2019 actually means \u2018mandatory\u2019 and the extra \u2018illustrative\u2019 revenue proves elusive.<\/p>\n SYS1\u2019s founder retains his 22% holding and, fortunately, now acts as a background \u201cmad inventor<\/em>\u201c. I meanwhile trust the other executives will demonstrate strong ambition through a challenging new LTIP.<\/p>\n I bought SYS1 at 325p (2016), 238p (2018), 183p (2020) and 242p (2021), and despite my hefty weighting<\/a> have never top-sliced.<\/p>\n My SYS1 buy report<\/a>\u00a0|\u00a0All my SYS1 posts<\/a><\/p>\n MTVW was my top top-up idea of 2024. I elevated the regulated-tenancy landlord into second place within my portfolio after almost doubling my holding (Q2<\/a>, Q4<\/a>) at a \u00a396 average. I first bought during 2011 at \u00a342 and acquired more at \u00a398 (2018 and 2019).<\/p>\n The valuation theory is relatively simple: MTVW\u2019s trading properties are carried at cost and I estimate the \u00a3103 per share NAV<\/a> \u2014 up 42x since 1985 \u2014 could eventually realise approximately \u00a3180 per share versus a bid-price of \u00a386. The dividend \u2014 up 117x since 1985 \u2014 meanwhile supports a 6% income. The discount to book is the widest for eleven years and the yield the highest for 15.<\/p>\n I believe today\u2019s lowly rating is due mostly to doubts over whether MTVW still generates adequate property gains<\/a>. My calculations indicate properties bought and then sold since 2014 have realised proceeds of only \u00a369m versus their \u00a364m purchase cost.<\/p>\n The board has repeatedly said MTVW aims to buy regulated tenancies at 75% of vacant possession value, which should in theory lead to 33% profits on disposal.<\/p>\n Group debt costs advancing beyond 6%, the prospect of (further) unfavourable landlord legislation alongside a consistent \u201cdifficult times<\/em>\u201d narrative are other explanations why the stock market remains wary.<\/p>\n MTVW\u2019s ownership structure creates a very fine line between \u2018value bargain\u2019 and \u2018value trap\u2019.<\/p>\n The chief executive\u2019s 50% family concert party dictates proceedings and overlooks regular AGM protest votes from his sister (15% ownership and speaks for 24%) and (I understand) property tycoon David Pears<\/a> (7% ownership). The 2024 AGM<\/a> was another lively event, with trenchant questions about corporate governance, non-executive independence and the lack of another estate valuation. \u00a0<\/p>\n Still, a new non-executive<\/a> provides hope that outside shareholders might one day influence the board; her 25-year property background includes a \u201ckeen focus on governance, risk, and compliance, ensuring best practices are followed across all levels of operations<\/em>\u201c.<\/p>\n MTVW remains a share only for the extremely patient. But the chief executive is 77 and other concert-party stalwarts are at least 69\u2026 and I would like to think their beneficiaries may not be such die-hard MTVW investors.<\/p>\n Indeed, the chief executive did not rule out a group sale at the AGM: \u201cThere may be another company that\u2026 is very capable of taking the rump of our portfolio, who may come in and buy that rump.\u201d <\/em>Although he did add: \u201cWe\u2019re not very near that date yet.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n My MTVW buy report<\/a>\u00a0|\u00a0All my MTVW posts<\/a><\/p>\n Twelve months ago I was left wondering why TSTL\u2019s chief executive had suddenly decided to retire.<\/p>\n All became clear during 2024 after the new chief executive informed shareholders of \u201cpurchasing bureaucracy<\/em>\u201d within the United States.<\/p>\n TSTL had finally achieved FDA approval for its ultrasound-disinfection foam during 2023, but those tasked with selling the product in the US \u2014 which ought to become the group\u2019s most lucrative market \u2014 were simply not prepared for \u2018sales cycles\u2019 of up to 18 months.<\/p>\n The leadership change ought to end TSTL\u2019s persistent over-promising and under-delivery of the US programme. The CV of the new boss ticks a lot of US\/marketing\/healthcare boxes, and I trust he can in time fully exploit TSTL\u2019s unique disinfection chemistry in what is now deemed a \u201c$100m opportunity<\/em>\u201d for the group and its US partner.<\/p>\n Certainly TSTL\u2019s range of hospital disinfectants continue to sell well around the world. Both February\u2019s H1 results<\/a> and October\u2019s FY results<\/a> set new records for revenue and profit, helped in part by overseas sales gaining 8% to \u00a325m from 61 countries. Demand for proper disinfection plus deft purchases of three distributors have advanced overseas revenue five-fold in ten years.\u00a0<\/p>\n TSTL\u2019s UK progress remains very impressive, too. Domestic sales last year gained a remarkable 32% to \u00a316m, supported by 9% greater volumes alongside higher prices included within a new NHS supply agreement.\u00a0<\/p>\n TSTL\u2019s accounts reflect an attractive industry position, with the top-selling wipes and foams earning an 83% gross margin that perhaps persuaded the new chief executive to retain the group\u2019s appealing 25% Ebitda-margin target.<\/p>\n The new boss should reveal his medium-term financial goals during 2025, although the board\u2019s \u2018boilerplate\u2019 LTIP \u2014 seeking only 5.5% minimum EPS growth \u2014 is a concerning omen for management ambition.<\/p>\n At least the board has kept its bold commitment to lifting the annual dividend by a 5% minimum, while last year\u2019s 29% payout advance plus lowly c1.1x dividend cover emphasise TSTL\u2019s inherent cash generation and lack of significant capital requirements. Net cash at the last count was a healthy \u00a312m.<\/p>\n These shares currently trade at a level first achieved almost five years ago, although the 25x P\/E understandably still reflects the group\u2019s superior growth history and expansion possibilities. I bought at a 46p average during 2013 and 2014, and sadly top-sliced<\/a> at 79p (2014), 100p (2015), 123p (2016) and 289p (2017) to retain just 25% of my original holding.<\/p>\n My TSTL buy report<\/a>\u00a0|\u00a0All my TSTL posts<\/a><\/p>\n Another year, another CLIG purchase. <\/p>\n I topped-up my holding in the fund manager at 332p during 2024 (Q2<\/a>) after previously adding at 320p (2023) and 350p (2022). I invested initially at a 281p average between 2011 and 2013, but did sell 42% of those shares at 335p (2015).<\/p>\n The close proximity of my buy and sell prices do tell a story\u2026 that capital gains here are hard to come by.<\/p>\n Returns are typically delivered by the dividend, which last year remained at 33p per share to support a scarcely believable 10% yield on my 2024 purchase. The income is so high because FY 2024<\/a> earnings of 33.5p per share barely covered the payout while the business generally struggles to attract new clients and grow.<\/p>\n Sad to say, but October\u2019s Q1 2025 update<\/a> announced the eleventh<\/span><\/em> quarterly outflow of client money from the last 16 quarters. Total funds under management at $10.7b are meanwhile less than the $11.0b witnessed at the end of 2020.\u00a0<\/p>\n Although CLIG\u2019s investment strategy \u2014 buying investment trusts at attractive discounts and occasionally taking an activist stance \u2014 is eminently very sensible, the predominantly US client base just seems reluctant to hand over extra money. CLIG delivering mid-single-digit returns<\/a> for a c0.7% fee when the S&P 500 is rocketing 20% per annum for a c0.1% fee probably explains why.\u00a0<\/p>\n The saving grace here is the group\u2019s largest shareholder, George Karpus<\/a>. At the 2023 AGM, Mr Karpus issued a scathing statement that demanded the board \u201cbe replaced with a seasoned group of directors that understand the enormous potential of CLIG<\/em>\u201c.<\/p>\n Mr Karpus founded Karpus Investment Management during the 1980s and knows how to run a lucrative money manager. His firm attracted client money of $3b that paid him a $15m salary before merging with CLIG during FY 2021.\u00a0<\/p>\n Mr Karpus now heads a 38% concert-party stake and his influence persuaded two non-executives to step down last year. A series of \u201cconstructive meetings<\/em>\u201d with CLIG also appears to have appeased his anger, and board comments at the 2024 AGM (notes coming soon!) revealed Mr Karpus having \u201chigh hopes and high expectations<\/em>\u201d \u2014 especially on the matter of generating new business.<\/p>\n Despite clients chipping away at fees and employees enjoying greater pay, CLIG\u2019s margin \u2014 although not as high as it once was \u2014 remains a useful 38%. Net cash of $34m could also shore up the all-important dividend if\/when markets tumble and\/or new clients remain evasive.<\/p>\n My CLIG buy report<\/a>\u00a0|\u00a0All my CLIG posts<\/a><\/p>\n Has WINK put itself up for sale?\u00a0<\/p>\n The appointment last year of two non-executives with extensive corporate-finance backgrounds<\/a> certainly suggested the estate-agency franchisor was at least contemplating some M&A activity.<\/p>\n During September\u2019s H1 webinar<\/a>, WINK claimed the appointments were \u201cpart of the natural evolution of the board as we bring in new talent to ensure that we can do our best to push the company forward, aligned with the vision and values we hold dear.<\/em>\u201d Press rumours<\/a> were also dismissed: \u201cThe Negotiator is wrong to suggest that Winkworth is putting itself up for sale<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n The sector nonetheless continues to consolidate, not least because UK housing transactions have stagnated since 2007 and \u2018growth\u2019 therefore depends entirely on wining market share and higher property prices. Maybe the non-executives were recruited because the merger between quoted peers Property Franchise<\/strong> and Belvoir<\/strong><\/a> <\/strong>prompted a fresh bout of tentative bid enquiries.\u00a0<\/p>\n The decision to sell out or not will be taken by WINK\u2019s chairman, who boasts a 41% shareholding and is now 82 years old. The chairman\u2019s son is WINK\u2019s chief executive and owns a further 6%.<\/p>\n WINK\u2019s trading improved during 2024. Interest rates reaching 5.25% during 2023 led to fewer property transactions, with April\u2019s FY results<\/a> revealing a 25% profit decline after sales commissions dropped 20%.<\/p>\n But September\u2019s H1 statement<\/a> announced sales commissions up 9% and profit up 24% after additional sellers returned to the market. Sales activity apparently accelerated during H2.<\/p>\n Bid or no bid, WINK should navigate today\u2019s property market better than most. In particular, the group\u2019s franchising structure \u2014 100 of the 103 branches are operated by franchisees \u2014 provides greater flexibility to revitalise locations \u201cwhere our standards are not met\u201d. <\/em>WINK\u2019s three in-house offices meanwhile create a \u201ctraining ground<\/em>\u201d for up-and-coming agents with ambitions to run their own WINK franchise.<\/p>\n The aforementioned chairman likes his dividends, as they are paid quarterly, have doubled during the last ten years and included a number of specials. The shares yield 6%, but dividend cover is a tight-ish c1.2x because profit currently runs at the same c\u00a32m as 2014\/2015. The accounts remain in good shape, with margins close to 20% and the balance sheet carrying \u00a34m net cash.<\/p>\n My initial WINK buy occurred at 90p during 2011 and I sold 70% at 173p (2013 and 2014). I then topped up at 116p (2016 and 2017) and 178p (2021).<\/p>\n My WINK buy report<\/a>\u00a0|\u00a0All my WINK posts<\/a><\/p>\n Could the next twelve months prove pivotal for BVXP?<\/p>\n I attended the 2024 AGM (notes coming soon!) and the board suggested by \u201cthis time next year<\/em>\u201c, the diagnostic-antibody developer ought to have discovered whether its Alzheimer\u2019s R&D<\/a> has progressed to the final stages of customer testing.<\/p>\n If BVXP does progress, then shareholders are one step closer to possibly participating in what the board described as a \u201cblockbuster era of human-neurology diagnostics during the 2030s<\/em>\u201c.<\/p>\n October\u2019s FY results<\/a> revealed a \u00a3155k income from the Alzheimer\u2019s R&D, which implies BVXP\u2019s customers have enjoyed some prototyping success to date. Purchase orders are apparently \u201cencouraging<\/em>\u201c, as are very tentative conversations about royalty rates. <\/p>\n I am pretty sure the Alzheimer\u2019s potential depends mostly upon the brain-derived tau test<\/a> that measures neuro-degeneration. I get the impression the research-based revenue from the Alzheimer\u2019s work has far exceeded any other research-based revenue BVXP has earned.<\/p>\n The Alzheimer\u2019s R&D was the highlight of a relatively subdued year. Both FY revenue and profit gained 6% after BVXP admitted income from its top-selling vitamin D antibody advanced only 1%. <\/p>\n Rather embarrassingly, past royalties from the troponin antibody \u2014 once expected to become the next big seller \u2014 had been overstated by a major customer. The final dividend was unfortunately reduced by 3p to 87p per share.<\/p>\n The 4.8% dividend yield has today become the principal source of returns as the shares revisit levels first achieved more than six years ago. But BVXP\u2019s wonderful business model \u2014 customers undertake a lot of the antibody manufacturing and pay BVXP usage royalties \u2014 continues to lead to super economics.\u00a0<\/p>\n A stratospheric 78% of revenue was converted into profit last year, partly because BVXP\u2019s physical antibodies sell for up to \u00a3210k a gram and only 17 people are employed in the company\u2019s small lab. Earnings since FY 2016 have meanwhile more than doubled despite being distributed entirely as dividends during the same time. Net cash is \u00a36m, too.<\/p>\n I bought BVXP during 2016 at \u00a311 and have never top-sliced. I must admit the 21x trailing P\/E is not an obvious bargain, but then again seems not to anticipate much Alzheimer\u2019s R&D hitting the big time.<\/p>\n The chief executive founded BVXP, still owns 6% and seems enthused by Alzheimer\u2019s research generally and what he claimed to be \u201cone of the most remarkable changes that I\u2019ve seen downstream amongst our customers in the last 20 years\u201d.<\/em><\/p>\n My BVXP buy report<\/a>\u00a0|\u00a0All my BVXP posts<\/a><\/p>\n I wrote last year: \u201cI am hopeful 2024 sees resilient trading and an opportunity to invest very close to (or even below) NAV<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n I took the opportunity to invest below NAV during 2024 after buying more at \u00a318.62 versus a \u00a319.27 per share NAV (Q2<\/a>).<\/p>\n Since 1994, SUS has only briefly traded below NAV during 2000, 2008\/9 and 2020 \u2014 and the 2024 \u2018bargain\u2019 rating therefore appeared too good to miss.<\/p>\n After all, the specialist lender\u2019s veteran executives boast a 44%-plus shareholding, enjoy 40-year tenures and have successfully handled previous difficulties by always demanding careful underwriting and prudent borrowing. Proof of management\u2019s success is NAV advancing 38x and the dividend expanding 48x since 1987.<\/p>\n Trading last year was sadly not exactly \u201cresilient<\/em>\u201c. April\u2019s FY results<\/a> admitted H2 profit had dropped 41% following an extra \u00a310m impairment on suspected bad loans within SUS\u2019s car-loan division. An \u201cupsurge<\/em>\u201d in regulatory activity led to SUS agreeing to \u201cspecific limitations on its repayment processes<\/em>\u201d as the wider motor-finance industry acclimatised to the FCA\u2019s new Consumer Duty regime.<\/p>\n October\u2019s H1 results<\/a> then showed profit down 40% and the interim payout cut 14% as SUS\u2019s \u2018voluntary\u2019 adherence to FCA collection restrictions prompted a further \u00a311m write-off. The proportion of up-to-date car loans slid to a pandemic-like 69%.<\/p>\n Shareholders did enjoy some respite last year, when SUS confirmed the FCA had lifted its restrictions<\/a> and the motor-loan division could presumably re-engage with late-paying customers.\u00a0<\/p>\n But that respite lasted just two weeks, as a bombshell legal case<\/a> then ruled car dealers could not receive commissions from motor-finance lenders unless customers had provided their \u201cinformed consent<\/em>\u201c. The ruling effectively deemed the FCA\u2019s commission-disclosure rules as unlawful and leaves SUS \u2014 as well as the entire motor-finance sector \u2014 open to compensation claims.<\/p>\n While the bombshell case heads to a final judgement this year, even consumer champion Martin Lewis<\/a> is unsure whether motor-finance lenders should have to reimburse customers:\u00a0\u201cI find it difficult to believe that retrospective redress is due from car-finance firms with fixed commissions, as they were following regulator\u2019s guidelines.\u201d<\/em> SUS has always paid fixed-fee commissions<\/a>.<\/p>\n For now the \u00a314 shares trade at 0.74x NAV and yield a trailing 8%. The upside could be considerable if the bombshell ruling is overturned and SUS then captures market share as rivals succumb to (the separate) DCA compensation<\/a>. I first bought SUS during 2017 at \u00a321 and bought more at \u00a319 (2019) and \u00a317 (2020). I have never top-sliced.<\/p>\n My SUS buy report<\/a>\u00a0|\u00a0All my SUS posts<\/a><\/p>\n Combining the roles of chief executive and finance director<\/a> was the most notable event at TFW last year. I can\u2019t recall another quoted business the size of TFW \u2014 revenue of \u00a3176m and operating profit of \u00a333m \u2014 undertaking such an unusual board structure.<\/p>\n The lighting manufacturer said the combined role followed the \u201cstrengthening [of] the subsidiary boards at the operating companies and promoting a focused group of managers from within that can support Group activities when called on\u201d.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n TFW shed more light on the matter during the 2024 AGM (notes coming soon!). Attendees were told managing the overseas operations at board level had become \u201cquite difficult<\/em>\u201d and that the combined CEO\/FD role was \u201cnot going to be the same forever\u201d. <\/em>Furthermore, a new-ish \u201cgroup innovation team<\/em>\u201d reports directly to the board to offset the current lack of \u2018lighting\u2019 board executives.<\/p>\n Outside shareholders must for now trust the dual CEO\/FD role does not inhibit TFW\u2019s progress \u2014 and its wonderful run of 22 consecutive annual dividend advances.<\/p>\n The board remains reassuringly staffed by two Thorpe-family non-executives, who spent their careers at TFW, have (presumably) accrued plenty of knowledge about management appointments and risk an aggregate 43% shareholding if the board reshuffle is mis-judged.<\/p>\n A standstill H1 effort<\/a> was followed by a stronger H2 that helped FY 2024 profit to gain 9%<\/a> and allowed a small special dividend \u2014 the third in four years \u2014 to be declared.<\/p>\n TFW\u2019s margin last year returned to a welcome 18% \u2014 the highest since FY 2015 \u2014 with the group\u2019s main Thorlux division now boasting 20%. Cash control remained very satisfactory and pushed net cash to a mighty \u00a350m.\u00a0<\/p>\n I speculate a large portion of that \u00a350m will eventually be spent on European acquisitions. The last decade has witnessed TFW spend c\u00a380m in the Netherlands, Spain and Germany in order to, as AGM attendees were told, \u201cde-risk<\/em>\u201d the group from the UK. Although no purchase blunders have so far emerged, the board does not publish return on capital measures to assess its investments.<\/p>\n TFW\u2019s immediate outlook is not incredible, with November\u2019s AGM<\/a> indicating \u201cmarginally ahead<\/em>\u201d progress. But long-term demand for the group\u2019s energy-efficient lighting \u2014 one customer last year enjoyed an energy saving of 94%! \u2014 ought not to diminish.<\/p>\n The share price is back to levels first reached eight years ago while the 14x P\/E is the lowest for ten years. I first bought TFW during 2010 at 69p, added more at 80p (2011) and 89p (2012), and sold 25% at 234p (2016).<\/p>\n My TFW buy report<\/a>\u00a0|\u00a0All my TFW posts<\/a><\/p>\n
By Maynard Paton<\/strong><\/p>\nContents<\/strong><\/h2>\n
1) System1 (SYS1)<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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![\"\"\/](\"https:\/\/maynardpaton.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/SYS1-testyourad-tesco3-800x.png\")
<\/figure>\n2) Mountview Estates (MTVW)<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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![\"\"\/](\"https:\/\/maynardpaton.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/12\/MTVW-houses-banner-1100x389-1.jpg\")
<\/figure>\n3) Tristel (TSTL)<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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![\"\"\/](\"https:\/\/maynardpaton.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/TSTL-product-6x3-grid.png\")
<\/figure>\n4) City of London Investment (CLIG)<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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![\"\"\/](\"https:\/\/maynardpaton.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/CLIG-London-Skyline.jpeg\")
<\/figure>\n5) M Winkworth (WINK<\/strong>)<\/h2>\n
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![\"\"\/](\"https:\/\/maynardpaton.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/07\/WINK-streatham-branch-800x.jpeg\")
<\/figure>\n6) Bioventix (BVXP)<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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![\"\"\/](\"https:\/\/maynardpaton.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/08\/BVXP-gothenburg-henrik-zetterberg.jpeg\")
<\/figure>\n7) S & U (SUS)<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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![\"\"\/](\"https:\/\/maynardpaton.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/04\/SUS-FY-2020-advantage-website-1.png\")
<\/figure>\n8) FW Thorpe (TFW)<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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![\"\"\/](\"https:\/\/maynardpaton.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/TFW-Thorlux-NHS.jpeg\")
<\/figure>\n9) Andrews Sykes (ASY)<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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