Elizabeth O\u2019Brien Ingleson<\/strong>\u2018s Made in China <\/strong>examines the development of the trade partnership between the US and China after the Cold War, <\/em>ushered in by President Richard Nixon in the late 1960s and early \u201970s. The book unpacks the economic and geopolitical shifts that integrated China into global trade<\/em> at the cost of US manufacturing. It makes for <\/em>a compelling and timely lens for understanding current US-China tensions<\/em>, writes Joanna Rozpedowski<\/strong><\/em>.<\/p>\n Made in China: When US-China Interests Converged to Transform Global Trade<\/em>. Elizabeth O\u2019Brien Ingleson. Harvard University Press. 2024.<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n Since the inauguration of the second Trump administration, the US-China trade relationship is once again at the centre of global economic discussions. Ongoing tensions over tariffs, supply chain disruptions, the US trade deficit, reshoring, and concerns about technological and military competition compel policymakers and business leaders on both sides of the Pacific to confront the consequences of more than five decades of accelerating economic interdependence initiated by the Nixon administration\u2019s opening to China and his \u201cnew prosperity without war\u201d (31) agenda. Meanwhile, Kissinger\u2019s ghosts of \u201cstrategic ambiguity\u201d regarding Taiwan continue to obfuscate America\u2019s defence priorities and commitments to the island.<\/p>\n The shifting dynamics of this highly complex relationship make Elizabeth O\u2019Brien Ingleson\u2019s Made in China: When US-China Interests Converged to Transform Global Trade<\/em> (2024) particularly timely. Her substantial study of the early beginnings of the historically consequential bilateral trade relationship provides a perspective on how a floating dollar<\/a>, structural changes within the US domestic economy, and geopolitical interests played pivotal roles in integrating China into the global economy \u2013 a process that has led to a remarkable transformation of world markets and the nature of political power itself, though not without significant costs to American manufacturing.<\/p>\n Nixon\u2019s decision to end dollar-gold convertibility unleashed ambitious flows of American capital for overseas investment facilitating technology transfers and innovative compartment shipping. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n The 1968 election of Richard Nixon came at a watershed moment in nation\u2019s diplomatic history. The erosion of American nuclear superiority, deepening social divisions from the Vietnam War, and the recalcitrant appeal of communist ideology \u2013 from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia to Latin America \u2013 forced the new president to rethink US foreign policy\u2019s providential rhetoric. This strategic reassessment paved the way for d\u00e9tente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with China, and a more pragmatic approach to Cold War conflicts.\u00a0<\/p>\n The Nixon administration\u2019s bold overtures to China constitute the primary focus of Ingleson\u2019s analysis. Her central thesis, reflected in the book\u2019s suggestive title, contends that the foundation for a new era of economic interdependence emerged from a persistent, if at times halting, pursuit and cultivation of trade relationships between key sectors of the American industrial base, the US diplomatic corps, and opportunistic corporate players and their Chinese counterparts. This interdependence was driven by corporate ambitions, shifting labour markets, and the long-term goal of integrating China into the global economy. Nixon\u2019s decision to end dollar-gold convertibility unleashed ambitious flows of American capital for overseas investment facilitating technology transfers and innovative compartment shipping. These developments transformed China from \u201ca market of 400 million customers to the market of 800 million workers\u201d and accelerated widespread US deindustrialisation, contributing to economic and social dislocation of the American worker.<\/p>\n In 1977, a surge in Chinese imports raised concerns over the US being \u2018lulled into a false sense of security\u2019 as it weighted impacts of the burgeoning trade relationship on the American economy with a \u2018threat of more profound disruption in the future\u2019<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n \u201cChina was the biggest fashion news since miniskirts,\u201d observed<\/a> Bernadine Morris in the New York Times<\/em> in November 1971, as Chinese Mao jackets and workers\u2019 uniforms became bestsellers at Paris\u2019s Galeries Lafayette and New York\u2019s Fifth Avenue establishments, inaugurating a \u201cChicon chic\u201d sensation among the middle- and upper-echelons of society. This phenomenon, which Ingleson terms \u201cfashion diplomacy,\u201d became emblematic of a broader effort to recast China in the American imagination, shifting perceptions from ideological enemy to lucrative trading partner. By the early 1970s, American corporate executives had grown accustomed to chopsticks at the Canton Trade Fairs, where they encountered advertisements for Chinese silks, carpets, porcelain, jewellery, antiques, radios, watches, and Great Wall vodka. Their avid participation helped transform the 1950s and \u201860s image of Red China into an \u201camicable trade partner\u201d (80).\u00a0<\/p>\n China\u2019s economic rise was not merely an inevitable byproduct of globalisation, but an orchestrated effort propelled by specific policy choices made in Washington\u2019s diplomatic circles and America\u2019s corporate boardrooms <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n In 1977, a surge in Chinese imports raised concerns over the US being \u201clulled into a false sense of security\u201d as it weighted impacts of the burgeoning trade relationship on the American economy with a \u201cthreat of more profound disruption in the future\u201d (219). As points of contact and convergence increased, trade for both countries became, in the minds of US political establishment, a \u201ctool for peace and friendship\u201d (62) enabling China to delink its twenty years of Maoist-era industrialisation from militarization. Its broadened and shifting commercial relationships with the West, led by pragmatists such as Zhou Enlai and his circle of advisors, allowed China to focus on acquiring foreign currency essential for importing industrial technology. This ultimately helped restructure and refine its increasingly sophisticated and coveted industrial output, enabling its export-oriented development.<\/p>\n Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, the book raises important questions about the long-term consequences of this interdependence and the nexus of trade, international security, and technology. Ingleson\u2019s study shows that China\u2019s economic rise was not merely an inevitable byproduct of globalisation, but an orchestrated effort propelled by specific policy choices made in Washington\u2019s diplomatic circles and America\u2019s corporate boardrooms. This effort was aimed at accessing cheap and compliant labour rather than create a Chinese market for the absorption of US goods.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n To what extent did America\u2019s ruling political class and corporate interests underestimate the political and strategic ramifications of integrating China into global trade networks? And why did US policymakers lack sober consideration for the long-term economic consequences of expanding Chinese trade institutions and manufacturing prowess on American workers and the nation\u2019s once-thriving industries?\u00a0<\/p>\n The contemporary geopolitical landscape \u2013 with decoupling, reshoring, and a renewed emphasis on economic security \u2013 suggests that these historical decisions warrant deeper scrutiny. Ingleson\u2019s book offers a good starting point.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n After decades of economic convergence and China\u2019s exponential 1,400 per cent growth since joining the WTO, are US-China trade relations destined for a reset and divergence<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n As China continues its assertive foreign policy and economic nationalism under Xi Jinping, the historical moment the book describes offers both a cautionary tale and a critical lens through which to evaluate current US-China tensions. If Nixon\u2019s vision was to avoid a world where China remained in \u201cangry isolation,\u201d the pressing question today is whether hypermobility of capital and economic integration has achieved that goal\u2014or merely postponed a more fundamental reckoning, marking, as the author forebodes, the \u201cend of US empire and the reemergence of China\u2019s\u201d (268).<\/p>\n It remains to be seen if the Trump administration can successfully reengineer the international trade system in America\u2019s favour <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Beyond its examination of the origins of US-China trade, Made in China<\/em> also invites introspective and prospective ruminations on the contours of current geopolitical arrangements. After decades of economic convergence and China\u2019s exponential 1,400 per cent growth since joining the WTO, are US-China trade relations destined for a reset and divergence? If so, what might be the economic, political, and strategic costs of such shifts on international peace and security?\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n The book pairs well with other dynamic debates amongst Washington\u2019s political class regarding China\u2019s waging of \u201ca new economic world war.\u201d Senator Tom Cotton\u2019s Seven Things You Can\u2019t Say About China<\/em><\/a> (2005) and Rush Doshi\u2019s The Long Game: China\u2019s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order<\/em><\/a> (2021) are but two recent examples of an ongoing reckoning with China\u2019s state-supported intellectual property theft and commercial espionage which along a panoply of aggressive strategies to undermine America\u2019s hegemony present a formidable so-called \u201cpacing challenge\u201d to US national interests and ambitions.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n The spectres of Nixon and Kissinger still loom over the US foreign policy establishment\u2019s strategic thought. It remains to be seen if the Trump administration can successfully reengineer the international trade system in America\u2019s favour to maintain its global economic and policy clout in the 21st<\/sup> century.<\/p>\n Note:<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0This review gives the views of the author and not the position of the LSE Review of Books blog, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.<\/em><\/p>\n Image:<\/strong> US President Richard Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai toast, February 25, 1972. Credit: <\/strong>Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum via Wikimedia Commons. License:<\/strong> Public Domain.<\/em><\/p>\n Enjoyed this post?\u00a0<\/em>Subscribe to our newsletter<\/em><\/a>\u00a0for a round-up of the latest reviews sent straight to your inbox every other Tuesday.<\/em><\/p>\n
\nA new post-Cold War beginning for US-China trade<\/h2>\n
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Nixon\u2019s strategic shift in foreign policy<\/h2>\n
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Opportunities and costs of US-China economic interdependence<\/h2>\n
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<\/a>The book offers a revealing glimpse into the corporate boardroom and US State Department thinking behind China\u2019s rebranding \u2013 from a \u201ccommunist threat\u201d to a \u201ccapitalist profit\u201d (5) \u2013 a shift that enticed the sophisticated cosmopolitan fashion industry as equally as it mobilised the pragmatic and consummately transactional world of American \u201cfinancial missionaries\u201d (64), including respectable American brands such as Boeing, Bloomingdale\u2019s, Chase Manhattan Bank, Coca-Cola, Exxon, and Hewlett-Packard.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n
Chinese industrialisation and US deindustrialisation<\/h2>\n
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The future of US-China trade relations<\/h2>\n
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