Deposing Corporate Representatives? You Might Get More Time Than You Think<\/h2>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.louisianalawblog.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/98\/2025\/03\/AdobeStock_1320807628-657x438.jpeg\")
<\/figure>\nIn complex litigation, the strategic use of discovery tools is not just beneficial \u2013 it\u2019s imperative. Every litigator knows that a well-executed deposition can be a game-changer by uncovering key admissions, streamlining discovery, and exposing weaknesses in an organization defendant\u2019s case.<\/p>\n
Among the various deposition tools available to litigators in federal court, Rule 30(b)(6) serves a distinct role in shaping the testimony of organizations. A \u201c30(b)(6) deposition\u201d allows a party to depose an organization and requires it to designate one or more representatives to \u201cspeak for the entity<\/em>.\u201d[1]<\/a><\/p>\nIt\u2019s not a secret that an organization may designate multiple representatives, but the broader litigation implications, particularly, the time restraints associated with taking the deposition, are often overlooked.<\/p>\n
More Witnesses, More Time? Yes \u2013 But with Limits.<\/u><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\nUnder Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, each side is entitled to ten depositions before requiring court approval for additional depositions.[2]<\/a> However, when an organization designates multiple 30(b)(6) witnesses, those individual depositions still count as one for the purposes of the ten-deposition limit.<\/p>\nSo, does this mean each designee gets a full seven-hour deposition under Rule 30(d)(1)?<\/p>\n
The answer, for the most part, is yes \u2013 but courts have discretion to impose reasonable time limits. A 2000 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 30(d)(1) clarifies:<\/p>\n
\u201cFor purposes of this durational limit, the deposition of each person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) should be considered a separate deposition.\u201d<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\nThis interpretation has been consistently cited by district courts across multiple circuits, reinforcing that each designee is generally entitled to a full seven-hour deposition. Courts in the First,[3]<\/a> Second,[4]<\/a> Third,[5]<\/a> Fourth,[6]<\/a> Fifth,[7]<\/a> Sixth,[8]<\/a> Seventh,[9]<\/a> Ninth,[10]<\/a> Tenth,[11]<\/a> and Eleventh Circuits[12]<\/a> have acknowledged and applied this guidance, often permitting deposition time for multiple designees in excess of the 7-hour presumption.<\/p>\nThis means that in many cases, if an organization designates three representatives, you could be looking at 21 hours of deposition time. But before you start planning an all-nighter with the court reporter, take note:<\/p>\n
Courts Can \u2013 and Do \u2013 Cap Time Limits.<\/u><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\nWhile courts don\u2019t issue carte blanche<\/em> orders for seemingly endless depositions, 30(b)(6) depositions involving multiple\u00a0designees often exceed the presumptive 7-hour limit.<\/p>\nFor example, in Smith v. Smith<\/em>,[13]<\/a> an organization designated four different representatives. Instead of allowing the full 28 hours pursuant to a strict reading of Rule 30(d)(1), the court limited the four depositions to 14 hours total, citing the scope of the topics and potential for redundancy.<\/p>\nSimilarly, in Buie v. D.C.<\/em>,[14]<\/a> the Court permitted a cumulative 18 hours for 30(b)(6) depositions \u2013 not necessarily based on the number of representatives, but in light of the topics sought by the noticing party and the understanding that multiple persons would be acting as the corporate representative.[15]<\/a><\/p>\nDespite consistent guidance from courts, noticed parties frequently argue that the seven-hour presumptive limit should apply collectively to all.[16]<\/a> These arguments, however, have been largely unsuccessful. As the Buie <\/em>Court noted:<\/p>\n\u201cAlthough the Advisory Committee notes are not binding on the Court, they explain the intent behind the rules and \u2018are nearly universally accorded great weight in interpreting federal rules.\u2019\u201d[17]<\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\nConversely, in In re Rembrandt Technologies<\/em>,[18]<\/a> the court rejected a party\u2019s argument that each 30(b)(6) designee should be treated as a separate deponent with a full seven-hour allowance per person. The court reasoned:<\/p>\nA blanket rule permitting a seven-hour deposition of each designated deponent is unfair because it rewards broader deposition notices and penalizes corporate defendants who regularly maintain business information in silos and who therefore must either designate multiple individuals to respond or spend time, energy, money and other resources preparing a single individual to respond and unduly burdensome (because of the manifest increased cost and disruption of preparing more than one person to respond to a deposition notice).<\/strong><\/p>\nDespite this critique, the court ultimately permitted a total of ten (10) hours to depose five 30(b)(6) designees.[19]<\/a><\/p>\nWhile Rembrandt reflects one court\u2019s rationale, it remains a minority view. Most courts reject a strict numerical cap and instead assess time limits based on the scope of the deposition notice, the number of designees, and the complexity of the issues involved.[20]<\/a><\/p>\nThe variances between circuit courts \u2013 while not stark \u2013 are critical in shaping arguments. Even 25 years later, the Advisory Committee notes remain the prevailing authority, despite repeated attempts to impose a strict seven-hour time limit in the 30(b)(6) context.<\/p>\n
By staying informed on the evolving applications of Rule 30(b)(6), litigators can ensure they extract the most from 30(b)(6) depositions while effectively managing court-imposed constraints. Whether you\u2019re conducting a 30(b)(6) deposition or defending one, understanding the nuances of deposition duration and designee limitations can help you strategically maximize \u2013 or reasonably limit \u2013 important testimony.<\/p>\n
\n[1]<\/a> FRCP 30(b)(6).<\/p>\n[2]<\/a> See <\/em>FRCP 30(a)(2)(A)(i).<\/p>\n[3]<\/a> Proa v. NRT Mid-Atl., Inc.,<\/em> No. CV AMD-05-2157, 2008 WL 11363286 at *11 (D. Md. June 20, 2008).<\/p>\n[4]<\/a> Oakley v. MSG Networks, Inc.,<\/em> No. 17-CV-6903 (RJS), 2024 WL 5056111 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2024) (Denying party\u2019s motion to limit 30(b)(6) deposition to seven hours.).<\/p>\n[5]<\/a> Handy v. Delaware River Surgical Suites, LLC<\/em>, No. 2:19-CV-1028-JHS, 2024 WL 1539604 at *fn.1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2024).<\/p>\n[6]<\/a> Oppenheimer v. Scarafile,<\/em> No. CV 2:19-3590-RMG, 2021 WL 5902738 at *1 (D.S.C. July 30, 2021).<\/p>\n[7]<\/a> Payne v. Raytheon Techs. Corp<\/em>., No. 3:22-CV-2675-BN, 2024 WL 5012054 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2024).<\/p>\n[8]<\/a> ChampionX, LLC v. Resonance Sys., Inc.,<\/em> No. 3:21-CV-288-TAV-JEM, 2024 WL 1743101 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 12, 2024).<\/p>\n[9]<\/a> PeopleFlo Mfg., Inc. v. Sundyne,<\/em> LLC<\/em>, No. 20 CV 3642, 2022 WL 7102662 at *fn.4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2022).<\/p>\n[10]<\/a> Unknown Party v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, <\/em>No. CV-18-01623-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL 2291380 (D. Ariz. June 4, 2021).<\/p>\n[11]<\/a> M.G. through Garcia v. Armijo<\/em>, No. 1:22-CV-0325 MIS\/DLM, 2024 WL 168270 (D.N.M. Jan. 16, 2024).<\/p>\n[12]<\/a> United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortg. Invs. Corp<\/em>., No. 1:12-CV-4020-AT, 2017 WL 8222659 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 12, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:12-CV-4020-AT, 2017 WL 8221392 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2017).<\/p>\n[13]<\/a> Smith v. Smith<\/em>, No. 19-10330, 2020 WL 1933820 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2020).<\/p>\n[14]<\/a> Buie v. D.C.,<\/em> 327 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2018).<\/p>\n[15]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n[16]<\/a> See e.g., Smith v. Smith<\/em>, No. 19-10330, 2020 WL 1933820 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2020).<\/p>\n[17]<\/a> Buie v. D.C.,<\/em> 327 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2018).<\/p>\n[18]<\/a> In Re Rembrandt Techs<\/em>., No. 09-CV-00691-WDM-KLM, 2009 WL 1258761 at *14 (D. Colo. May 4, 2009).<\/p>\n
<\/figure>\nIn complex litigation, the strategic use of discovery tools is not just beneficial \u2013 it\u2019s imperative. Every litigator knows that a well-executed deposition can be a game-changer by uncovering key admissions, streamlining discovery, and exposing weaknesses in an organization defendant\u2019s case.<\/p>\n
Among the various deposition tools available to litigators in federal court, Rule 30(b)(6) serves a distinct role in shaping the testimony of organizations. A \u201c30(b)(6) deposition\u201d allows a party to depose an organization and requires it to designate one or more representatives to \u201cspeak for the entity<\/em>.\u201d[1]<\/a><\/p>\n It\u2019s not a secret that an organization may designate multiple representatives, but the broader litigation implications, particularly, the time restraints associated with taking the deposition, are often overlooked.<\/p>\n More Witnesses, More Time? Yes \u2013 But with Limits.<\/u><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Under Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, each side is entitled to ten depositions before requiring court approval for additional depositions.[2]<\/a> However, when an organization designates multiple 30(b)(6) witnesses, those individual depositions still count as one for the purposes of the ten-deposition limit.<\/p>\n So, does this mean each designee gets a full seven-hour deposition under Rule 30(d)(1)?<\/p>\n The answer, for the most part, is yes \u2013 but courts have discretion to impose reasonable time limits. A 2000 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 30(d)(1) clarifies:<\/p>\n \u201cFor purposes of this durational limit, the deposition of each person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) should be considered a separate deposition.\u201d<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n This interpretation has been consistently cited by district courts across multiple circuits, reinforcing that each designee is generally entitled to a full seven-hour deposition. Courts in the First,[3]<\/a> Second,[4]<\/a> Third,[5]<\/a> Fourth,[6]<\/a> Fifth,[7]<\/a> Sixth,[8]<\/a> Seventh,[9]<\/a> Ninth,[10]<\/a> Tenth,[11]<\/a> and Eleventh Circuits[12]<\/a> have acknowledged and applied this guidance, often permitting deposition time for multiple designees in excess of the 7-hour presumption.<\/p>\n This means that in many cases, if an organization designates three representatives, you could be looking at 21 hours of deposition time. But before you start planning an all-nighter with the court reporter, take note:<\/p>\n Courts Can \u2013 and Do \u2013 Cap Time Limits.<\/u><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n While courts don\u2019t issue carte blanche<\/em> orders for seemingly endless depositions, 30(b)(6) depositions involving multiple\u00a0designees often exceed the presumptive 7-hour limit.<\/p>\n For example, in Smith v. Smith<\/em>,[13]<\/a> an organization designated four different representatives. Instead of allowing the full 28 hours pursuant to a strict reading of Rule 30(d)(1), the court limited the four depositions to 14 hours total, citing the scope of the topics and potential for redundancy.<\/p>\n Similarly, in Buie v. D.C.<\/em>,[14]<\/a> the Court permitted a cumulative 18 hours for 30(b)(6) depositions \u2013 not necessarily based on the number of representatives, but in light of the topics sought by the noticing party and the understanding that multiple persons would be acting as the corporate representative.[15]<\/a><\/p>\n Despite consistent guidance from courts, noticed parties frequently argue that the seven-hour presumptive limit should apply collectively to all.[16]<\/a> These arguments, however, have been largely unsuccessful. As the Buie <\/em>Court noted:<\/p>\n \u201cAlthough the Advisory Committee notes are not binding on the Court, they explain the intent behind the rules and \u2018are nearly universally accorded great weight in interpreting federal rules.\u2019\u201d[17]<\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Conversely, in In re Rembrandt Technologies<\/em>,[18]<\/a> the court rejected a party\u2019s argument that each 30(b)(6) designee should be treated as a separate deponent with a full seven-hour allowance per person. The court reasoned:<\/p>\n A blanket rule permitting a seven-hour deposition of each designated deponent is unfair because it rewards broader deposition notices and penalizes corporate defendants who regularly maintain business information in silos and who therefore must either designate multiple individuals to respond or spend time, energy, money and other resources preparing a single individual to respond and unduly burdensome (because of the manifest increased cost and disruption of preparing more than one person to respond to a deposition notice).<\/strong><\/p>\n Despite this critique, the court ultimately permitted a total of ten (10) hours to depose five 30(b)(6) designees.[19]<\/a><\/p>\n While Rembrandt reflects one court\u2019s rationale, it remains a minority view. Most courts reject a strict numerical cap and instead assess time limits based on the scope of the deposition notice, the number of designees, and the complexity of the issues involved.[20]<\/a><\/p>\n The variances between circuit courts \u2013 while not stark \u2013 are critical in shaping arguments. Even 25 years later, the Advisory Committee notes remain the prevailing authority, despite repeated attempts to impose a strict seven-hour time limit in the 30(b)(6) context.<\/p>\n By staying informed on the evolving applications of Rule 30(b)(6), litigators can ensure they extract the most from 30(b)(6) depositions while effectively managing court-imposed constraints. Whether you\u2019re conducting a 30(b)(6) deposition or defending one, understanding the nuances of deposition duration and designee limitations can help you strategically maximize \u2013 or reasonably limit \u2013 important testimony.<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> FRCP 30(b)(6).<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> See <\/em>FRCP 30(a)(2)(A)(i).<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Proa v. NRT Mid-Atl., Inc.,<\/em> No. CV AMD-05-2157, 2008 WL 11363286 at *11 (D. Md. June 20, 2008).<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Oakley v. MSG Networks, Inc.,<\/em> No. 17-CV-6903 (RJS), 2024 WL 5056111 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2024) (Denying party\u2019s motion to limit 30(b)(6) deposition to seven hours.).<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Handy v. Delaware River Surgical Suites, LLC<\/em>, No. 2:19-CV-1028-JHS, 2024 WL 1539604 at *fn.1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2024).<\/p>\n [6]<\/a> Oppenheimer v. Scarafile,<\/em> No. CV 2:19-3590-RMG, 2021 WL 5902738 at *1 (D.S.C. July 30, 2021).<\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Payne v. Raytheon Techs. Corp<\/em>., No. 3:22-CV-2675-BN, 2024 WL 5012054 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2024).<\/p>\n [8]<\/a> ChampionX, LLC v. Resonance Sys., Inc.,<\/em> No. 3:21-CV-288-TAV-JEM, 2024 WL 1743101 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 12, 2024).<\/p>\n [9]<\/a> PeopleFlo Mfg., Inc. v. Sundyne,<\/em> LLC<\/em>, No. 20 CV 3642, 2022 WL 7102662 at *fn.4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2022).<\/p>\n [10]<\/a> Unknown Party v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, <\/em>No. CV-18-01623-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL 2291380 (D. Ariz. June 4, 2021).<\/p>\n [11]<\/a> M.G. through Garcia v. Armijo<\/em>, No. 1:22-CV-0325 MIS\/DLM, 2024 WL 168270 (D.N.M. Jan. 16, 2024).<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortg. Invs. Corp<\/em>., No. 1:12-CV-4020-AT, 2017 WL 8222659 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 12, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:12-CV-4020-AT, 2017 WL 8221392 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2017).<\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Smith v. Smith<\/em>, No. 19-10330, 2020 WL 1933820 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2020).<\/p>\n [14]<\/a> Buie v. D.C.,<\/em> 327 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2018).<\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n [16]<\/a> See e.g., Smith v. Smith<\/em>, No. 19-10330, 2020 WL 1933820 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2020).<\/p>\n [17]<\/a> Buie v. D.C.,<\/em> 327 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2018).<\/p>\n [18]<\/a> In Re Rembrandt Techs<\/em>., No. 09-CV-00691-WDM-KLM, 2009 WL 1258761 at *14 (D. Colo. May 4, 2009).<\/p>\n
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