\n<\/p>\n
The recent spikes in global food-prices in 2007-08 served as a\u00a0wake-up call to the global community on the inadequacies of\u00a0our global food system. Commodity prices doubled, the estimated number of hungry people topped one billion and food\u00a0riots spread through the developing world. A second price\u00a0spike in 2010-11, which is expected to drive the global food\u00a0import bill for 2011 to an astonishing $1.3 trillion, only deepened the sense that the policies and principles guiding agricultural development and food security were deeply flawed.\u00a0<\/p>\n
There is now widespread agreement that international\u00a0agricultural prices will remain significantly higher than precrisis levels for at least the next decade, with many warning\u00a0that demand will outstrip supply by 2050 unless concerted\u00a0action is taken to address the underlying problems with our\u00a0food system.<\/p>\n
The crisis certainly awakened the global community. Since\u00a02007, governments and international agencies have made\u00a0food security a priority issue, and with a decidedly different\u00a0tone. They stress the importance of agricultural development and food production in developing countries, the key\u00a0role of small-scale farmers and women, the challenge of\u00a0limited resources in a climate-constrained world, the important role of the state in \u201ccountry-led\u201d agricultural development programs, the critical role of public investment. For\u00a0many, these priorities represent a sea change from policies\u00a0that sought to free markets from government policies seen\u00a0as hampering efficient resource allocation. Now that those\u00a0policies and markets have failed to deliver food security, the\u00a0debates over how countries and international institutions\u00a0should manage our food system are more open than they have\u00a0been in decades.<\/p>\n
The purpose of this report is to look beyond the proclamations\u00a0and communiqu\u00e9s to assess what has really changed since\u00a0the crisis erupted. While not exhaustive, the report looks\u00a0at: Overseas Development Assistance, both in terms of how\u00a0much and what is funded; Multilateral Development Banks\u2019\u00a0policies and programs; selected U.N. agencies and initiatives,\u00a0notably the Committee on Food Security (CFS); the G-20\u00a0group of economically powerful governments; and the U.N.\u00a0Special Rapporteur on the right to food, who has injected a\u00a0resonant \u201cright to food\u201d approach to the issue.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
a bias toward cash crops for export over food production\u00a0for domestic markets;\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
increasing land use for non-food agricultural crops such\u00a0as biofuels for industrial uses;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
support for high-input agricultural methods over more\u00a0environmentally sustainable low-input systems;\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
inadequate attention to the linkages between climate\u00a0change and food security; and\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
deregulation of commodity markets and increasing\u00a0financial speculation in agricultural commodities, \u00a0including staple food crops as well as land.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
Our review suggests that on the positive side, the food crisis\u00a0was an important catalyst for change. As high prices persisted\u00a0and public protest mounted, many governments were confronted with \u201cmoments of truth,\u201d the cumulative result of which was to question some of the assumptions that had\u00a0driven food and agriculture policy over the past few decades.\u00a0This prompted renwed attention to agricultural development, reversing the long-standing neglect of agriculture as\u00a0a vital economic sector. It also brought some important new\u00a0funding, though at levels still far short of what is needed.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
The stated priorities for much of that funding suggest distinct\u00a0improvement over the policies of the past few decades. The\u00a0needs and political voices of small-scale farmers and women;\u00a0environmental issues, including climate change; and, the weaknesses of international markets now receive more attention. The additional funding for these important areas is also driven by greater openness to country-led programs\u00a0with strong state involvement, a marked change from past\u00a0priorities.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Our review suggests areas of great concern, though. We see\u00a0neither the necessary urgency nor the willingness to change\u00a0policies that contributed to the recent crisis. New international funding is welcome, but only $6.1 billion of the G-8\u2019s\u00a0pledged $22 billion, three-year commitment represents new\u00a0money, and those pledges have been slow to materialize and\u00a0are now threatened with cutbacks as developed countries\u00a0adopt austerity measures. The overwhelming priority is\u00a0to increase production. There are reasons to focus on this,\u00a0specifically within low-income net-food importing countries.\u00a0The setting of production targets at the global level, however,\u00a0encourages an expansion in industrial agriculture and the\u00a0consolidation of land holdings, including land grabs, and\u00a0ignores environmental constraints and equity issues.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Beyond funding, we find that the policies that contributed\u00a0to the recent food-price crisis have gone largely unchanged,\u00a0leaving global food security as fragile as ever. The world\u00a0needs policies that discourage biofuels expansion, regulate\u00a0financial speculation, limit irresponsible land investments,\u00a0encourage the use of buffer stocks, move away from fossil fuel\u00a0dependence and toward agro-ecological practices, and reform\u00a0global agricultural trade rules to support rather than undermine food security objectives.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, we find that the international institutions\u00a0reviewed have shown too little resolve to address these issues.\u00a0Although at the G-20 the world\u2019s most economically powerful\u00a0nations have asserted leadership on food security, their\u00a0actions have been tepid if not counterproductive. This has had\u00a0a chilling effect on reform efforts elsewhere in the international system, most notably at the United Nations. This raises\u00a0important governance issues. The U.N.\u2019s CFS is formally\u00a0recognized by most institutions as the appropriate body to\u00a0<\/p>\n
coordinate the global response to the food crisis, because of\u00a0both its mandate and its inclusive, multi- takeholder structure. Yet in practice the G-20 has systematically constrained\u00a0the reform agenda. Similarly, the WTO\u2019s recent efforts to give\u00a0the Doha Agenda more relevance by including food security\u00a0issues in the form of restrictions on exporting countries\u2019 use\u00a0of export tariffs have failed, because many of the exporters\u00a0(most of the G-20 members) refuse to surrender that policy\u00a0space. Not surprisingly, importing countries\u2019 wish for the\u00a0same policy space with regard to their imports are now more\u00a0determined than ever to insist on their rights.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
The recent food-price crisis exposed the fragility of the global\u00a0food system. A paradigm shift is underway, caused by the\u00a0deepening integration of agricultural, energy and financial markets in a resource-constrained world made more\u00a0vulnerable by climate change. Powerful multinational firms\u00a0dominate these markets. Many benefit from current policies and practices and their interests are a dominant influence in national and global policies\u2014slowing, diverting, or\u00a0halting needed action. This leaves international institutions\u00a0promoting market-friendly reforms but resistant to imposing\u00a0the concomitant regulations required to ensure well-functioning food and agricultural markets.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Three areas in particular demand decisive action:<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Fortunately, many developing countries are not waiting\u00a0for international action or permission to more aggressively\u00a0address the problems that can be dealt with at a national or\u00a0regional level. Many of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) projects in Africa, for example, emphasize the kinds of changes that are needed.\u00a0CAADP has four pillars: land and water management, market\u00a0access, food supply and hunger, and agricultural research.\u00a0Bangladesh and other countries used food reserves to reduce\u00a0the impact of the food-price spikes in far more ambitious\u00a0efforts than the G-20 is proposing to support in West Africa.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Developing-country governments will be central to bringing\u00a0about such changes. They need the policy space to pursue their\u00a0own solutions and they need the support of the international\u00a0community to demand deeper reform in developed-country\u00a0policies. The evidence discussed in this report suggests the\u00a0paradigm shift has started but is incomplete. Many developing-country governments have chosen to step away from\u00a0the prevailing orthodoxy of the last several decades and are\u00a0again exploring a larger role for the public sector in governing\u00a0agriculture and food. Donors, too, have shown some willingness to re-order priorities and to give greater space to agriculture, and to changing priorities within agricultural spending\u00a0to acknowledge the need for more inclusive and sustainable\u00a0outcomes. But they still resist more fundamental reform\u00a0and continue to promote private investment and liberalized\u00a0markets, relying on humanitarian aid and social safety nets\u00a0to try to help those who are displaced by the policies.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Perhaps not surprisingly, developed-country governments\u00a0have yet to make the needed changes to their domestic policies. Comfortable with re-ordering development priorities,\u00a0governments of rich countries have proved unwilling to look\u00a0at their domestic agricultural economies to see what changes\u00a0are needed there. If the most powerful countries are not\u00a0willing to make the changes at home that would help international markets perform better, they should at a minimum stop\u00a0undermining international efforts, at the U.N. and within\u00a0<\/p>\n
and among developing countries, to address the fundamental\u00a0causes of the food crisis.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Executive summary The recent spikes in global food-prices in 2007-08 served as a\u00a0wake-up call to the global community on the inadequacies of\u00a0our global food system. Commodity prices doubled, the estimated number of hungry people topped one billion and food\u00a0riots spread through the developing world. A second price\u00a0spike in 2010-11, which is expected to drive the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[12026],"tags":[15226,11649,2074,5714,11572,33686,25366],"dealstore":[],"offerexpiration":[],"class_list":["post-135302","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-agriculture","tag-assessing","tag-crisis","tag-food","tag-global","tag-policy","tag-reforms","tag-resolving"],"yoast_head":"\n